The Gas Hostages

The drama being played out by Russia and Ukraine has been full of sudden reversals. Germans commentators argue that Europe must take its energy security more seriously in order to avoid an encore performance of this hostage drama.

Despite what looked like the beginning of a solution to the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, gas is still not flowing to Europe through Ukraine.
Many in Europe breathed a (visible) sigh of relief Tuesday morning when the news emerged that Gazprom would start pumping transit gas through Ukraine once again on its way to a Europe gripped by record colds. But they might have breathed easy a little too soon.

According to media reports, Russia's state gas monopoly Gazprom starting pumping gas back into Ukraine at 8:00 a.m. (CET). Late in the morning, however, new reports emerged that the deliveries had been halted once again, with both sides blaming the other for the sudden reversal.

Whether the gas starts flowing again soon or not, given the distance it must travel, officials in Brussels still estimate that it will take between 24 and 36 hours for the gas to pass into European pipelines.

What originally started as a payment and pricing dispute between the countries led to charges from Russia that Ukraine was siphoning off gas destined for Europe. On Jan. 1, Russia cut off the gas used by Ukraine and, on Jan. 7, Gazprom halted all shipments of gas through Ukraine.

The decision to restart shipments came in the wake of a concerted and successful European effort led by the current Czech presidency of the EU to broker a deal, which will now see international observers deployed along the pipeline route to monitor whether Ukraine is siphoning off any transit gas. That is, of course, if and when the gas starts flowing again.

Although Europe welcomed what looked like a positive development, many issues have yet to be addressed. It's anyone's guess when Ukraine will start shipping Russian gas again, but even after the previous agreement, Moscow was still refusing to let Ukraine use the gas itself and the pricing dispute had been left unresolved.

More importantly, however, the crisis has shown just how dependent Europe is on Russian gas. Europe imports nearly a quarter of its gas from Russia, and 80 percent of that is piped through Ukraine. But the hardest-hit countries have been those in Eastern Europe, where a lack of gas reserves, infrastructure and alternative resources has given them much more limited options when their larger and more powerful neighbors scuffle.

In Germany, commentators seem to be less focused on the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian drama and more on how the situation has drawn many thick underlines under Germany's -- and all of Europe's -- need to improve the security and diversity of its energy supply.

The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes:

"In this conflict, which has both political and business relevance, the European Union has been unavoidably -- and successfully -- cast in the position of mediator. Now it should draw conclusions from lessons learned: Europe's dependence on Russian natural gas … is nothing new. But the recent dispute has revealed that Europe also relies on Ukraine's pipelines. ... This twofold dependence is felt most keenly by the new EU member states that were once part of the Soviet Union's sphere of power. In the interests of solidarity and for its own benefit, the EU would be wise to diminish this dependence."

"In terms of European energy politics, the EU must think more about the aspects of supply routes than it has in the past. It must strive for diversification, not only in terms of sources of gas but also in transport routes. A monopoly like Gazprom, with its strong ties to the Kremlin, isn't going to budge unless the EU speaks with a unified voice. And Ukraine's business structures lack transparency. Under these circumstances, the EU would benefit from commercializing (and depoliticizing) the business as much as possible. Progress in this direction -- possibly through the involvement of Western businesses -- is probably easier to achieve in Kiev than in Moscow."

The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes:

"The most recent dispute over deliveries of natural gas has allowed the world to clearly see what it means to be dependent on the political calculus of a major power. …"

"However you assess the (gas) transit conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the fact is that the neighboring countries are freezing and must feel like mere hostages. They see now that (Russia) pays no heed to any collateral damage resulting from efforts to protect its interests. And, in a humiliating fashion, these countries are experiencing what it means to be second-class states that must sudden worry about their sovereignty despite the fact that they are geographically located in the middle of pacified Europe. In dramatic fashion, both they and all the observers in Western Europe are witnessing just how important the issue currently being so hotly debated in the EU on energy security really is."

"The fact that the only thing being put on the table in Slovakia and Bulgaria in terms of (energy) alternatives is putting decommissioned nuclear reactors back into service goes to show just how depressingly hopeless the current situation there really is. And despite the fact that, a few years back, a lot of money was spent on purchasing Western safety technology for these reactors, they still do not meet EU standards. Now is the time for fresh ideas rather than tired fixes. At least then the crisis might have taught us something."

The right-leaning Die Welt writes:

"It's all about the money. … And in times of crisis, every dollar counts for Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly that recently suffered a marked decrease in market value. Since Ukraine is essentially incapable of paying up, the Russians are now casting a covetous eye on Ukrainian businesses. To compensate for unpaid gas deliveries, Gazprom would love to take some of these over -- especially in the country's gas-transit sector, of which Russia already owns up to 25 percent."

"This time around, political aspects have played a more prominent role than they did during similar earlier conflicts. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev have unabashedly involved themselves in Ukrainian affairs like never before and revealed the political intentions behind their conduct as well. As they see it, the Ukrainian leadership has been dragged into criminal intrigues, and the Kremlin was simply hoping to aid the unfortunate Ukrainian population. Top Russian politicians have also made it quite clear that they view the present situation as a result of the Orange Revolution in Kiev, which has been a thorn in Moscow's side from the start."

The left-leaning Berliner Zeitung writes:

"Since the weekend, the pretense that this was really a fight between two commercial enterprises has finally dissipated. And the thing to make this clear was the fact that the heavy hitters among the political leadership of both Russia and the Ukraine made an appearance. …"

"The Putin-Medvedev and the Yulia Timoshenko- Viktor Yushchenko leadership duos could hardly be more different. But they do share one thing in common: No one can say that either the Russian or the Ukrainian leaderships entered into the current gas conflict with a political strategy. For Timoshenko and Yushchenko, the reason for this is simple: They have never had a single strategy but, rather, two. The leaders of the Orange Revolution are at such odds with each other that they are both primarily concerned with distancing themselves from the other on the domestic stage."

"In Russia, things are different. Putin and Medvedev leave the outward impression of closeness. But, in the course of this crisis, it has only become clearer who is more powerful and who is guiding what they are so keen to describe as a 'tandem'."

"So, what is this drama really all about? We don't know, at least not with the necessary degree of exactitude. We -- meaning the EU -- really have no insight into what the elites of Moscow and Kiev are really working out, and that makes the conflict completely absurd. When both Putin and Timoshenko complain in hushed tones about the meddling of obscure middlemen, the EU should address the issue and insist on transparency. The citizens of Russia and Ukraine are themselves in no position to insist on this transparency."

-- Caroline Winter and Josh Ward, 1:00 p.m. CET