By Delphine Strauss
In one of Istanbul’s artier quarters, a second-hand bookshop sells leaves torn from an old school atlas that depict the dominions of the Ottoman empire, all neatly labelled in a flowing script few Turks are now able to read.
The faded pages are a reminder of the heritage long rejected by the modern Turkish state as it sought to forge a new national identity and survive on the frontline of 20th-century geopolitics. Just as the social reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the secular republic, presented European culture as the standard of civilised behaviour, so foreign policy became firmly west-facing as Turkey sought shelter from the Soviet power on its border.
Now, however, the ruling Justice & Development (AK) party is re-engaging with territories once ruled by the sultans, from the Balkans to Baghdad, in a drive to return Turkey to a place among the leadership of the Muslim world and the top ranks of international diplomacy.
Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister and architect of the policy, rejects the expansionist tag of “neo-Ottoman” bandied about by AK critics, preferring his well-used slogan, “zero problems with neighbours”. The US and the European Union praise this unobjectionable aim: to act as a force for stability in an unstable region.
Turkey has long mattered – as Nato ally, friend of Israel, EU applicant and energy route to the west. But its growing economic strength and diplomatic reach give it influence over some of the toughest issues facing Washington and other capitals: from frozen conflicts in the Caucasus to Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the threat of disintegration in Iraq. “We are neither surprised by nor disturbed by an activist Turkish agenda in the Middle East,” Philip Gordon, assistant secretary at the US state department, said in Ankara this month.
Yet the speed and scope of Turkey’s diplomatic endeavours have left both Turkish and western observers wondering whether it can juggle all its new interests. In a month of frenetic activity, Mr Davutoglu has staged a show of friendship with Syria, ending visa restrictions on a border once patrolled by Turkish tanks; paid a high-profile visit to Iraq’s Kurdistan region, long shunned as a threat to Turkish unity; and signed a landmark deal to mend relations with Armenia. “Today we, children of the Ottomans, are here to show interest in the development of Mosul just as our ancestors showed centuries ago,” Zafer Caglayan, trade minister, said as he opened a consulate in the northern Iraqi city last month. Turkish diplomats claim credit, in the last year alone, for mediating between Israel and Syria, hosting talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and liaising with Sunni militants in Iraq.
But Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a prime minister who scorns diplomatic niceties, has shown the potential for new friendships to damage old ones.
“Why is it that...a more prominent Turkey has, it seems, to come at the expense of its relations with Israel?” Robert Wexler, the US congressman, asked recently. US newspaper columnists went further, arguing that Ankara was undermining efforts to put pressure on Iran, or even that illiberal Islamists could no longer be trusted in Nato.
The virulence of the reactions reflects the value attached to Turkish support. Although no longer a bulwark against Soviet power, the threat of radical Islam has given Turkey new weight as a partner to channel western values to the Muslim world – and, by its western alliances, show that a “clash of civilisations” is not an inevitable result of religious difference.
Mr Davutoglu is touring European capitals this month, employing Ottoman-tinged rhetoric to persuade people that Turkey’s European vocation is unchanged. “You cannot understand the history of at least 15 European capitals without exploring the Ottoman archives,” he told an audience in Spain this week.
For Ankara, there is no question of changing orientation. “We have one face to the west and one to the east,” Mr Erdogan said last month as he signed trade deals in Tehran. Yet it is natural for Turkey to keep its options open, given the manifest reluctance in some EU states to admit it to membership. Ankara presents its new friendships as an asset to the EU, giving it a partner to promote western aims in the region. The European Commission’s latest report on Turkey’s accession process endorsed that view, with praise for its foreign policy. But Brussels also makes clear that geostrategic importance cannot replace the domestic judicial, political and human rights reforms required to meet the criteria for membership.
Ankara’s focus, however, is on grander projects than box-ticking compliance with European legislation. A lack of enthusiasm for Herman van Rompuy’s appointment last week as president of the European Council reflects not just worries over his past opposition to Turkey’s candidacy but a preference for a heavyweight leader who would want Europe to play a bigger part on the world stage.
Ibrahim Kalin, Mr Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser, argues that Turkish activism is not a reaction to disappointments in the EU but simply “a fully rational attempt to seize new spaces of opportunity” – including the EU’s virtual absence from geopolitics.
Frictions with the EU may worsen, however, if Turkey engages in rivalry with countries used to seeing it as a junior partner. Western diplomats have noted Mr Davutoglu’s reluctance to support a French attempt at conciliation between Israel and Syria, for example, and say Mr Erdogan’s grandstanding in Iran “is definitely causing irritation”. Turkey thus needs to ascertain how much influence it has, what it is based on, and where new policies may upset old alliances.
Greater regional engagement is in part a response to changing balances of power. The coming American withdrawal from Iraq threatens a vacuum in which Turkey is one of the most plausible counterweights to Iranian influence – its credibility enhanced by its refusal to let the US use its territory to invade in 2003.
Ian Lesser from the Washington-based German Marshall Fund notes that ideas of a “Middle East for Middle Easterners” have been circulating for some time. “The crucial difference is that Turkey is now a much more significant actor in both economic and political terms, and Turkey’s Middle Eastern choices are, rightly or wrongly, seen as linked to the country’s own identity crisis.”
Foreign policy is certainly shaped by a growing affinity with the Islamic world, in a country where religious practice is becoming more visible and public opinion a greater force. Mr Erdogan’s comments on Gaza, or on Iran’s nuclear programme, appear both to recognise and reinforce views on the street: a survey by the GMF found that almost one-third of Turks – compared with only 5 per cent of Americans – would accept a nuclear-armed Iran if diplomacy failed.
Chief AK weapon in its drive eastwards, though, is not religion but trade. Exports to what the country’s official Turkstat agency classifies as the Near and Middle East account for almost 20 per cent of the total so far in 2009, up from 12.5 per cent in 2004. Turkish conglomerates are also stepping up investment in a region where their presence is considered benign.
“We don’t want a cultural bias against us,” says Sureyya Ciliv, chief executive of Turkcell, the mobile operator, which has interests in central Asia, Georgia and Moldova. Anadolu Efes, with almost 10 per cent of Russia’s beer market, wants to start producing non-alcoholic beer in Iran. Limak, a group centred on construction, is seeking projects in the Gulf, north Africa and Europe “east of Vienna”. “It’s a natural development,” says Ferruh Tunc, senior partner in Istanbul for KPMG, the consultancy. “Turkey’s position until the Soviet Union collapsed was unusual – it was like the last stop on a Tube line.”
Yet a previous initiative, reaching out to the Turkic-speaking world after the central Asian states won independence, left Turkey with excellent trade links but limited influence compared with China and Russia. Morton Abramowitz, a former US ambassador to Turkey, warns in this month’s Foreign Affairs journal that in the AKP’s latest diplomatic push as well, “despite the acclaim it showers on itself...symbolic achievements have far exceeded concrete ones”. More-over, Turkey’s opposition this spring to Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s appointment as Nato chief “alienated many Europeans by seeming to favour Muslim sensibilities over liberal democratic values”. Ankara had argued that Denmark’s role in the 2006 controversy over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed had tainted him in the eyes of the Muslim world.
Can Ankara not reach out peacefully on all fronts, as it claims, without repercussions and a risk of overstretch? “You need very judicious fine tuning to be able to deliver this...The danger is of overplaying their hand,” says a western diplomat.
Mending fences with Armenia won praise in the west, for instance, but in Azerbaijan nationalists tore down the Turkish flag, viewing the move as a betrayal of old alliances. Baku may yet take revenge by demanding higher prices to supply gas.
The next test of Turkey’s new foreign policy will be Iran. The AKP claims its opposition to a nuclear-armed Iran is more effective because it delivers the message as a friend and trading partner. Turkey’s interests in trade with Iran are understood but Mr Erdogan may be pressed in Washington and Brussels to explain why he defends Iran’s nuclear programme as “peaceful and humanitarian” and lends the regime credibility rather than backing isolation.
Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform, a London think-tank, says: “As a long-standing Nato member and a country negotiating for EU membership, Turkey is expected to align itself with the US and Europe...As a regional power, Turkey will want to act independently and avoid antagonising its neighbours. It is not clear how long Ankara will be able to avoid tough choices.”
EU membership: ‘There is progress but it’s uneven’
Turkey’s shift in foreign policy reflects its ambition to assume greater responsibility as a regional power, writes Joshua Chaffin. It may also reveal frustration over another ambition that has been delayed, if not thwarted: Istanbul’s bid to join the European Union. Officially, the EU has been committed to full membership since 2005. Yet eight of the 34 negotiating “chapters” remain blocked as a result of Turkey’s long-running conflict with Cyprus. Meanwhile enthusiasm is faint in France and Germany, the bloc’s traditional centres of power. “There is progress but it’s very uneven,” one Commission official says.
The most recent update on negotiations came with the Commission’s mixed review of Turkey in last month’s annual enlargement report. Praise forits overtures to its Kurdish minority, and its agreement to reopen its border with Armenia, was tempered by concern over a fine imposed on one of Turkey’s leading media companies. Ostensibly for tax evasion, the $4bn (€2.7bn, £2.4bn) levy was likened by Olli Rehn, EU enlargement commissioner, to “a political sanction”. Some European diplomats expressed surprise, too, at recent comments suggesting Iran – under pressure over its nuclear programme – was being treated unfairly by the international community. Diplomats also say they do not expect breakthroughs from this week’s EU-Turkey ministerial meeting to discuss foreign affairs.
If it is accepted, Turkey will become the first predominantly Muslim EU member and also the most populous, giving it a sizeable number of seats in the parliament and threatening the power of Paris and Berlin. Nicolas Sarkozy, French president, displayed his opposition at an EU-US summit in Prague in May. After Barack Obama, on the eve of his first visit to Turkey, urged his hosts to “anchor” the country more firmly in Europe, Mr Sarkozy promptly suggested the US president mind his own business. Angela Merkel, German chancellor, has been more diplomatic,suggesting Istanbul be addressed instead as a “privileged partner”.
The creation of a full-time EU presidency and foreign policy chief seems unlikely to accelerate accession. In a 2004 speech, Herman Van Rompuy, the Belgian prime minister chosen as president, said Turkey “is not a part of Europe and will never be”. Those remarks proved awkward in the run-up to his selection last week but – as Istanbul no doubt noticed – they did not cost him the job.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Can Cyprus overcome its bloody history?
Chris Summers
More British soldiers were killed during the "Cyprus emergency" in the 1950s than have died in Iraq or Afghanistan. So why has it been forgotten and what hope is there of reuniting the island?
On Remembrance Sunday, about 500 relatives and veterans watched as a new memorial was unveiled in Kyrenia, in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, to recognise the 371 British servicemen who lost their lives on the island between 1956 and 1959.
The unveiling, and the laying of a wreath by the British High Commissioner, Peter Millett, sparked a diplomatic row, with President Demetris Christofias raising the matter when he met UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown a few days later.
One of the names on the memorial is Corporal Mervyn Whurr, 22, killed by a bomb on Kyrenia's Six Mile Beach in September 1956.
His sister, Barbara Hocking, from Millbrook in Cornwall, said: "My mum had a telegram saying he'd been injured, then she got another one saying he had an arm and a leg amputated. A few days later another telegram came saying he'd died."
Unlike those of troops killed in Afghanistan, his body, like those of most of the Cyprus casualties, was not flown home and lies in a cemetery at Wayne's Keep on the island.
Mrs Hocking was at the unveiling of the memorial, where she was joined by Margaret Moncur, whose brother 19-year-old Matt Neely, from Glasgow, was killed in 1956 by a bomb while doing his National Service.
Mrs Moncur said: "He loved his football, he was full of fun, playing jokes and was very popular with his mates.
"For some reason Cyprus has become a forgotten war."
The Cyprus High Commissioner to London, Alexandros Zenon, said the failure to consult the Cyprus government about the memorial was perceived as an "insult".
He said: "In principle we are not against a country honouring its soldiers who fell in service.
"The problem is that the memorial was built and unveiled in the occupied part of Cyprus. It could have been erected in the British sovereign base area.
"We also feel it's politically premature. I understand they want to honour them, but for Greek Cypriots the anti-colonial struggle is still a very sensitive issue."
In the late 1950s the British Empire was trying to cling on to the island, which remained a strategic location, especially around the time of the Suez crisis.
Greek Cypriot fighters belonging to an organisation called Eoka planted bombs and attacked British servicemen on and off duty.
Several civilians were also killed, including Catherine Cutliffe and her daughter Margaret who were shot while buying a wedding dress in Famagusta, although Eoka denied responsibility for that attack.
Eventually in 1960 Cyprus was granted independence, but tensions between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority grew during the next decade.
In July 1974 a Greek nationalist group, Eoka-B, led by Nikos Sampson, carried out a coup backed by the military junta in power in Athens.
Sampson promised to unite Cyprus with Greece in so-called "enosis".
Turkey sent its army to the northern part of the island, ostensibly to protect Turkish Cypriots.
The idea of enosis evaporated and the moderate Archbishop Makarios returned to power.
But the Turkish Army has remained ever since and the island is still separated, with a UN buffer zone running right through the heart of Nicosia, the world's last remaining divided city.
In 2004 the United Nations came up with the Annan Plan - named after the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan - which suggested a bi-zonal federated state.
But, although it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in a referendum, another poll in the south rejected it.
Cyprus was then admitted into the EU, which many Turkish Cypriots opposed believing it removed an incentive for the Greek Cypriot side to reach a solution.
But fresh momentum was injected with the election of Mr Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, president of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Both are leftists elected on a platform of reconciliation.
Negotiations are ongoing, but one of the major stumbling blocks is the question of how to deal with Greek Cypriots who claim land and property in the north.
Some of this has been sold to some of the 6,000 British expats in northern Cyprus.
In what could prove to be a test case, a court in Cyprus ruled against a couple, David and Linda Orams, who bought land originally belonging to a Greek Cypriot, Meletis Apostolides.
There are fears that if no deal is reached before elections in the TRNC in April what Mr Brown referred to as a "unique opportunity" could be lost.
Mr Zenon said: "The likely opponent of Mr Talat is a hardliner and if he is elected, things will not be made easier. But we will not create artificial deadlines which, as with the Annan Plan, have proved disastrous."
Mr Talat himself, in an interview with the BBC, admitted: "If somebody who is not in favour of a bi-zonal solution is elected then the negotiations will not continue easily."
He said of the negotiations: "The positions of the two sides are not very close, but we are making progress."
Mr Brown recently renewed an offer to hand back just under half of the UK's sovereign base areas on the island - around Akrotiri and Dhekelia - if a deal could be reached between the two sides.
Andrew Dismore, Labour MP for Hendon in north London, feels the timing of the Kyrenia memorial was unfortunate.
He represents more than 3,000 Greek Cypriot constituents and recently led a debate in Parliament about the island.
Mr Dismore said: "Of course, there should be a memorial, but this is neither the time or place, at such a sensitive time in the talks.
"It just serves to remind Greek Cypriots of the UK's less than glorious role as the colonial power, when we are trying to be positive in our support for the talks."
But Mr Talat said the memorial was a "humanitarian" issue and should not have become "politicised".
Mrs Hocking said it was sad the memorial had led to a row and she said of her brother's death: "Was it worth it? The two governments are still not talking. Was it worth all those lives being wasted? It's just like Afghanistan."
More British soldiers were killed during the "Cyprus emergency" in the 1950s than have died in Iraq or Afghanistan. So why has it been forgotten and what hope is there of reuniting the island?
On Remembrance Sunday, about 500 relatives and veterans watched as a new memorial was unveiled in Kyrenia, in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, to recognise the 371 British servicemen who lost their lives on the island between 1956 and 1959.
The unveiling, and the laying of a wreath by the British High Commissioner, Peter Millett, sparked a diplomatic row, with President Demetris Christofias raising the matter when he met UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown a few days later.
One of the names on the memorial is Corporal Mervyn Whurr, 22, killed by a bomb on Kyrenia's Six Mile Beach in September 1956.
His sister, Barbara Hocking, from Millbrook in Cornwall, said: "My mum had a telegram saying he'd been injured, then she got another one saying he had an arm and a leg amputated. A few days later another telegram came saying he'd died."
Unlike those of troops killed in Afghanistan, his body, like those of most of the Cyprus casualties, was not flown home and lies in a cemetery at Wayne's Keep on the island.
Mrs Hocking was at the unveiling of the memorial, where she was joined by Margaret Moncur, whose brother 19-year-old Matt Neely, from Glasgow, was killed in 1956 by a bomb while doing his National Service.
Mrs Moncur said: "He loved his football, he was full of fun, playing jokes and was very popular with his mates.
"For some reason Cyprus has become a forgotten war."
The Cyprus High Commissioner to London, Alexandros Zenon, said the failure to consult the Cyprus government about the memorial was perceived as an "insult".
He said: "In principle we are not against a country honouring its soldiers who fell in service.
"The problem is that the memorial was built and unveiled in the occupied part of Cyprus. It could have been erected in the British sovereign base area.
"We also feel it's politically premature. I understand they want to honour them, but for Greek Cypriots the anti-colonial struggle is still a very sensitive issue."
In the late 1950s the British Empire was trying to cling on to the island, which remained a strategic location, especially around the time of the Suez crisis.
Greek Cypriot fighters belonging to an organisation called Eoka planted bombs and attacked British servicemen on and off duty.
Several civilians were also killed, including Catherine Cutliffe and her daughter Margaret who were shot while buying a wedding dress in Famagusta, although Eoka denied responsibility for that attack.
Eventually in 1960 Cyprus was granted independence, but tensions between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority grew during the next decade.
In July 1974 a Greek nationalist group, Eoka-B, led by Nikos Sampson, carried out a coup backed by the military junta in power in Athens.
Sampson promised to unite Cyprus with Greece in so-called "enosis".
Turkey sent its army to the northern part of the island, ostensibly to protect Turkish Cypriots.
The idea of enosis evaporated and the moderate Archbishop Makarios returned to power.
But the Turkish Army has remained ever since and the island is still separated, with a UN buffer zone running right through the heart of Nicosia, the world's last remaining divided city.
In 2004 the United Nations came up with the Annan Plan - named after the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan - which suggested a bi-zonal federated state.
But, although it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in a referendum, another poll in the south rejected it.
Cyprus was then admitted into the EU, which many Turkish Cypriots opposed believing it removed an incentive for the Greek Cypriot side to reach a solution.
But fresh momentum was injected with the election of Mr Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, president of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Both are leftists elected on a platform of reconciliation.
Negotiations are ongoing, but one of the major stumbling blocks is the question of how to deal with Greek Cypriots who claim land and property in the north.
Some of this has been sold to some of the 6,000 British expats in northern Cyprus.
In what could prove to be a test case, a court in Cyprus ruled against a couple, David and Linda Orams, who bought land originally belonging to a Greek Cypriot, Meletis Apostolides.
There are fears that if no deal is reached before elections in the TRNC in April what Mr Brown referred to as a "unique opportunity" could be lost.
Mr Zenon said: "The likely opponent of Mr Talat is a hardliner and if he is elected, things will not be made easier. But we will not create artificial deadlines which, as with the Annan Plan, have proved disastrous."
Mr Talat himself, in an interview with the BBC, admitted: "If somebody who is not in favour of a bi-zonal solution is elected then the negotiations will not continue easily."
He said of the negotiations: "The positions of the two sides are not very close, but we are making progress."
Mr Brown recently renewed an offer to hand back just under half of the UK's sovereign base areas on the island - around Akrotiri and Dhekelia - if a deal could be reached between the two sides.
Andrew Dismore, Labour MP for Hendon in north London, feels the timing of the Kyrenia memorial was unfortunate.
He represents more than 3,000 Greek Cypriot constituents and recently led a debate in Parliament about the island.
Mr Dismore said: "Of course, there should be a memorial, but this is neither the time or place, at such a sensitive time in the talks.
"It just serves to remind Greek Cypriots of the UK's less than glorious role as the colonial power, when we are trying to be positive in our support for the talks."
But Mr Talat said the memorial was a "humanitarian" issue and should not have become "politicised".
Mrs Hocking said it was sad the memorial had led to a row and she said of her brother's death: "Was it worth it? The two governments are still not talking. Was it worth all those lives being wasted? It's just like Afghanistan."
Heritage deal’s end a blow to Genel Enerji
By Delphine Strauss
For Genel Enerji, it has been a brutal reversal of fortune. In June, the Turkish exploration group was celebrating the start of exports from northern Iraq’s Taq Taq field, after a breakthrough in talks between Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities.
The flow of oil, promising a revenue stream to fund development of other fields, was the key to the merger with Heritage Oil, under which Genel would gain a London listing and a 50 per cent share in assets valued at up to $6bn (£3.6bn).
In six months, the twists of Iraqi politics have obliterated those prospects. With Erbil and Baghdad deadlocked on how to pay contractors, Genel has halted exports and lost its main appeal to potential partners – its fortunes reflecting the rise and fall of investors’ interest in the Kurdistan region as a whole.
“It leaves them in a fairly difficult position,” said one analyst, noting that Genel had planned to use Heritage shares to settle a $1.1bn debt to the Kurdish authorities, while most other potential partners in the region were also under financial strain.
Mehmet Sepil, Genel’s chief executive and co-founder, declined to comment on Monday, only confirming that the merger had fallen through because there was no foreseeable prospect of receiving any payment for its Kurdish exports.
But the merger talks were complicated by a Financial Services Authority investigation that Heritage had said could prevent executives from Genel or its unlisted parent Cukurova joining the management of the new company.
Genel’s ties with the Kurdish administration also came under scrutiny this summer when Norwegian authorities began a probe into its dealings in shares of DNO, another Kurdistan-focused exploration group.
It is not clear how the end of talks will affect the partnership at the Miran oilfield in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Heritage has a controlling stake and Genel owns a 25 per cent share.
Analysts say there are concerns Heritage could find the going tougher if its relations with Genel or with the regional authorities have soured.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
For Genel Enerji, it has been a brutal reversal of fortune. In June, the Turkish exploration group was celebrating the start of exports from northern Iraq’s Taq Taq field, after a breakthrough in talks between Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities.
The flow of oil, promising a revenue stream to fund development of other fields, was the key to the merger with Heritage Oil, under which Genel would gain a London listing and a 50 per cent share in assets valued at up to $6bn (£3.6bn).
In six months, the twists of Iraqi politics have obliterated those prospects. With Erbil and Baghdad deadlocked on how to pay contractors, Genel has halted exports and lost its main appeal to potential partners – its fortunes reflecting the rise and fall of investors’ interest in the Kurdistan region as a whole.
“It leaves them in a fairly difficult position,” said one analyst, noting that Genel had planned to use Heritage shares to settle a $1.1bn debt to the Kurdish authorities, while most other potential partners in the region were also under financial strain.
Mehmet Sepil, Genel’s chief executive and co-founder, declined to comment on Monday, only confirming that the merger had fallen through because there was no foreseeable prospect of receiving any payment for its Kurdish exports.
But the merger talks were complicated by a Financial Services Authority investigation that Heritage had said could prevent executives from Genel or its unlisted parent Cukurova joining the management of the new company.
Genel’s ties with the Kurdish administration also came under scrutiny this summer when Norwegian authorities began a probe into its dealings in shares of DNO, another Kurdistan-focused exploration group.
It is not clear how the end of talks will affect the partnership at the Miran oilfield in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Heritage has a controlling stake and Genel owns a 25 per cent share.
Analysts say there are concerns Heritage could find the going tougher if its relations with Genel or with the regional authorities have soured.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Kosovo PM claims poll victory
By Neil MacDonald
Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s prime minister and leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), has claimed victory in the country’s first elections as an independent state, although the election commission has delayed releasing final results.
Mr Thaci said his party had won at least 20 out of 36 contested municipalities. But the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the lesser ruling coalition partner and still a competitor to Mr Thaci, won the mayor’s race and captured the assembly for Pristina, the capital.
The elections took place peacefully, with the ethnic Serb minority visibly opting to participate in some areas despite calls from Belgrade for a boycott.
Final turnout exceeded 45 per cent, compared with only 40 per cent in the last, pre-independence parliamentary elections two years ago, Kosovo’s election commission announced after polls closed. Turnout in Serb districts, although lower, came to nearly 31 per cent in Strpce, a majority-Serb municipality in the south.
Serbs in isolated southern enclaves – feeling weakening support from the Serbian government in the economic downturn – turned up in larger numbers than in past elections, observers said. But those in the north, where Belgrade exerts stronger influence, still disregarded the contest for municipal councils and mayors in the predominantly ethnic Albanian state.
Hashim Thaci, prime minister, said he appreciated involvement by the disaffected minority group, which makes up about 5 per cent of Kosovo’s 2 million people. He also said, however, that free elections would boost the drive for recognition as a sovereign state.
“Full success [of these elections] will reflect well on the country in the continuing process of Kosovo’s international recognition”, Mr Thaci said. “This is a great step forward for the sovereign state.”
In Gracanica, an enclave outside the capital, Pristina, 28 per cent of Serbs wanted to vote, while 32 per cent refused and 40 per cent remained undecided, said Kontakt, a non-governmental organisation. Running for municipal office would not mean recognising independence, Serb candidates insisted.
Organisers decided to postpone voting in two other Serb municipalities at least until next year, partly to avoid hollow victories by ethnic Albanian candidates, international officials said. New municipal boundaries would bolster Serb autonomy as part of a western-backed plan decentralisation plan.
Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and gained prompt recognition from the US and most EU members. New Zealand last week became the 63rd UN member state to extend recognition. But Serbia, backed by Russia, has blocked any endorsement at the UN Security Council.
Fraud allegations marred the final days of campaigning, as rival ethnic Albanian parties accused Mr Thaci’s ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of manipulating the Central Elections Commission.
Pieter Feith, chief international supervisor and European Union envoy, called for careful scrutiny of ballot transport after the voting. The European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations (ENEMO) has sent more than 100 monitors to help to ensure international standards.
The election commission did not give regular updates, and election monitors said they would not disclose further turnout figures until the final count.
Prior to independence, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organised elections in the disputed territory, which the UN governed as a protectorate for nine years following the 1998-1999 war.
● Church bells in Serb enclaves rang to mark the death of Pavle, the 95-year-old patriarch of the Serb Orthodox church in Belgrade, the same morning. His potential successors are deeply divided about whether to work with EU officials to help the remote minority villages survive.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s prime minister and leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), has claimed victory in the country’s first elections as an independent state, although the election commission has delayed releasing final results.
Mr Thaci said his party had won at least 20 out of 36 contested municipalities. But the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the lesser ruling coalition partner and still a competitor to Mr Thaci, won the mayor’s race and captured the assembly for Pristina, the capital.
The elections took place peacefully, with the ethnic Serb minority visibly opting to participate in some areas despite calls from Belgrade for a boycott.
Final turnout exceeded 45 per cent, compared with only 40 per cent in the last, pre-independence parliamentary elections two years ago, Kosovo’s election commission announced after polls closed. Turnout in Serb districts, although lower, came to nearly 31 per cent in Strpce, a majority-Serb municipality in the south.
Serbs in isolated southern enclaves – feeling weakening support from the Serbian government in the economic downturn – turned up in larger numbers than in past elections, observers said. But those in the north, where Belgrade exerts stronger influence, still disregarded the contest for municipal councils and mayors in the predominantly ethnic Albanian state.
Hashim Thaci, prime minister, said he appreciated involvement by the disaffected minority group, which makes up about 5 per cent of Kosovo’s 2 million people. He also said, however, that free elections would boost the drive for recognition as a sovereign state.
“Full success [of these elections] will reflect well on the country in the continuing process of Kosovo’s international recognition”, Mr Thaci said. “This is a great step forward for the sovereign state.”
In Gracanica, an enclave outside the capital, Pristina, 28 per cent of Serbs wanted to vote, while 32 per cent refused and 40 per cent remained undecided, said Kontakt, a non-governmental organisation. Running for municipal office would not mean recognising independence, Serb candidates insisted.
Organisers decided to postpone voting in two other Serb municipalities at least until next year, partly to avoid hollow victories by ethnic Albanian candidates, international officials said. New municipal boundaries would bolster Serb autonomy as part of a western-backed plan decentralisation plan.
Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and gained prompt recognition from the US and most EU members. New Zealand last week became the 63rd UN member state to extend recognition. But Serbia, backed by Russia, has blocked any endorsement at the UN Security Council.
Fraud allegations marred the final days of campaigning, as rival ethnic Albanian parties accused Mr Thaci’s ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of manipulating the Central Elections Commission.
Pieter Feith, chief international supervisor and European Union envoy, called for careful scrutiny of ballot transport after the voting. The European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations (ENEMO) has sent more than 100 monitors to help to ensure international standards.
The election commission did not give regular updates, and election monitors said they would not disclose further turnout figures until the final count.
Prior to independence, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organised elections in the disputed territory, which the UN governed as a protectorate for nine years following the 1998-1999 war.
● Church bells in Serb enclaves rang to mark the death of Pavle, the 95-year-old patriarch of the Serb Orthodox church in Belgrade, the same morning. His potential successors are deeply divided about whether to work with EU officials to help the remote minority villages survive.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Ukraine
Europe is on tenterhooks over whether Russia will shut off gas to Ukraine and leave it shivering in January. If that happens, however, blame will fall on Kiev, not Moscow.
Recession-ravaged Ukraine’s political squabbling and populism has hit fever pitch ahead of presidential elections on January 17. That has led the International Monetary Fund to suspend co-operation and delay a $3.8bn loan payment, due on Sunday. The government had already backed off from commitments to increase long-subsidised domestic gas prices. The final straw was President Viktor Yushchenko signing into law, against IMF objections, a parliamentary bill that will raise minimum wages and pensions by 20 per cent – costing 7 per cent of economic output in 2010.
Since Ukraine is reliant on IMF funding to make ends meet, it could struggle to pay its next two monthly gas bills – leading to another winter shut-off. It only just scraped together October’s payment. Yet, for all its bluster, Russia would rather keep the taps open. The Kremlin has belatedly realised the damage to its reputation from shut-offs, and last January’s interruption to European supplies cost state-run Gazprom dearly. Hence Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s exhortation that Brussels extend a loan to Ukraine.
And why meddle in Ukraine’s electoral process this time? Moscow’s bogeyman, Mr Yushchenko, trails badly in the polls. Either frontrunner, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or Viktor Yanukovich, is more acceptable to Russia.
Ukraine still has $28bn in foreign currency reserves; the central bank will probably allow some to be used to pay for gas. A bigger question is whether it will plug the budgetary gap by printing money. If so, inflation will result; if not, wage arrears beckon. Either option may put pressure on Ukraine’s currency and asset prices. Europe’s gas consumers must hope they do not become collateral damage.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Recession-ravaged Ukraine’s political squabbling and populism has hit fever pitch ahead of presidential elections on January 17. That has led the International Monetary Fund to suspend co-operation and delay a $3.8bn loan payment, due on Sunday. The government had already backed off from commitments to increase long-subsidised domestic gas prices. The final straw was President Viktor Yushchenko signing into law, against IMF objections, a parliamentary bill that will raise minimum wages and pensions by 20 per cent – costing 7 per cent of economic output in 2010.
Since Ukraine is reliant on IMF funding to make ends meet, it could struggle to pay its next two monthly gas bills – leading to another winter shut-off. It only just scraped together October’s payment. Yet, for all its bluster, Russia would rather keep the taps open. The Kremlin has belatedly realised the damage to its reputation from shut-offs, and last January’s interruption to European supplies cost state-run Gazprom dearly. Hence Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s exhortation that Brussels extend a loan to Ukraine.
And why meddle in Ukraine’s electoral process this time? Moscow’s bogeyman, Mr Yushchenko, trails badly in the polls. Either frontrunner, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or Viktor Yanukovich, is more acceptable to Russia.
Ukraine still has $28bn in foreign currency reserves; the central bank will probably allow some to be used to pay for gas. A bigger question is whether it will plug the budgetary gap by printing money. If so, inflation will result; if not, wage arrears beckon. Either option may put pressure on Ukraine’s currency and asset prices. Europe’s gas consumers must hope they do not become collateral damage.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
How Europe can be heard in Washington
By Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney
As Europeans gossip and conspire over the new post-Lisbon appointments to represent the European Union’s external face, they know only too well how global power is slipping away from them. European elites agonise over the spectre of irrelevance.
No doubt it was this anxiety that impelled EU leaders to press for the EU/US summit meeting in Washington earlier this month. With the guard about to change in Brussels, this was never going to be a productive encounter. The visitors got what they deserved – 90 minutes of the president’s time, and a lunch with Vice- President Joe Biden.
At least the experience may help Europeans take on board two important truths about Barack Obama, the man whose election so delighted them a year ago. First, his foreign policy strategy is to reposition America for the post-American world. Understanding that the US’s brief moment of global dominance has come and gone, he aims to ensure America gets its way by forging tactical alliances. He will work with China on the global economy, with Russia on nuclear disarmament, and with anyone else who can help serve the US’s interest.
Second, his self-declared pragmatism means a rigorous approach to how he allocates his time and energy. He will attend to those who can be useful, not the merely sympathetic. Glad-handing Europeans with nothing to offer will be a low priority.
For Europeans these are difficult truths to absorb. But they will not again carry weight in Washington until they grasp that a post-American world requires a post-American Europe. Such a Europe must discard a set of damaging illusions that, 20 years on from the end of the cold war, still shape its approaches to the US.
The first such illusion is of continuing dependence on US protection. With the Russian military a shadow of its Soviet predecessor, this is no longer the case. But it underlies Europe’s habitual deference to the US.
The second illusion is to mistake shared values for a transatlantic identity of interests. This encourages the widespread European belief that if Americans act in uncongenial ways this is a product of their naiveté – requiring Europeans tactfully to set them back on course.
These two misperceptions lead to a third – that the need to preserve a close and harmonious transatlantic relationship must always trump any more specific European objective. But a vital and healthy transatlantic relationship requires tough negotiations to establish compromises that work for both sides – even if, as the often-combative trade and competition policy dealings across the Atlantic show, that may mean the occasional row.
Such conciliatory attitudes lead European elites to feel – their fourth illusion – that confronting the US from a joint European position would be counter-productive, if not indecent. So the EU member states opt to do their defence and security business under US direction in Nato – and prioritise their bilateral links with Washington over almost everything else. The British may pride themselves on the most celebrated “special relationship”, but most other European nations also quietly believe they have a special “in” with Washington which is the best route for promoting their national interests.
Americans find all this attention-seeking tiresome, but will naturally not pass up the opportunities to divide and rule.
Some Europeans think the answer lies in a proper EU/US strategic dialogue, and they have plenty of proposals for new forums and further summitry to force such a dialogue. But that requires the EU, collectively, to have something to say, which in turn means Europeans must steel themselves to discuss, within the EU, the big strategic issues on which Europe will need to be able to engage the US in the post-American world.
Afghanistan should be an object lesson. European leaders have been happy to ignore this intractable issue in their regular EU meetings, delegating the problem to Nato and American leadership. They now find themselves with over 30,000 troops committed to a troubled campaign, and consigned to the ante-room while they wait to learn the new American strategy, which they must then defend to their publics as their own.
Russia and the Middle East are two more items on an unappetising list of problems that Europeans must address, not in the spirit of second-guessing where the US wants to go, but to assert common European positions. Failing that, even the most charismatic and forceful new EU leaders will find even photo-opportunities in Washington, never mind serious attention, in increasingly short supply.
Jeremy Shapiro is a director of research at the Brookings Institution. Nick Witney is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
As Europeans gossip and conspire over the new post-Lisbon appointments to represent the European Union’s external face, they know only too well how global power is slipping away from them. European elites agonise over the spectre of irrelevance.
No doubt it was this anxiety that impelled EU leaders to press for the EU/US summit meeting in Washington earlier this month. With the guard about to change in Brussels, this was never going to be a productive encounter. The visitors got what they deserved – 90 minutes of the president’s time, and a lunch with Vice- President Joe Biden.
At least the experience may help Europeans take on board two important truths about Barack Obama, the man whose election so delighted them a year ago. First, his foreign policy strategy is to reposition America for the post-American world. Understanding that the US’s brief moment of global dominance has come and gone, he aims to ensure America gets its way by forging tactical alliances. He will work with China on the global economy, with Russia on nuclear disarmament, and with anyone else who can help serve the US’s interest.
Second, his self-declared pragmatism means a rigorous approach to how he allocates his time and energy. He will attend to those who can be useful, not the merely sympathetic. Glad-handing Europeans with nothing to offer will be a low priority.
For Europeans these are difficult truths to absorb. But they will not again carry weight in Washington until they grasp that a post-American world requires a post-American Europe. Such a Europe must discard a set of damaging illusions that, 20 years on from the end of the cold war, still shape its approaches to the US.
The first such illusion is of continuing dependence on US protection. With the Russian military a shadow of its Soviet predecessor, this is no longer the case. But it underlies Europe’s habitual deference to the US.
The second illusion is to mistake shared values for a transatlantic identity of interests. This encourages the widespread European belief that if Americans act in uncongenial ways this is a product of their naiveté – requiring Europeans tactfully to set them back on course.
These two misperceptions lead to a third – that the need to preserve a close and harmonious transatlantic relationship must always trump any more specific European objective. But a vital and healthy transatlantic relationship requires tough negotiations to establish compromises that work for both sides – even if, as the often-combative trade and competition policy dealings across the Atlantic show, that may mean the occasional row.
Such conciliatory attitudes lead European elites to feel – their fourth illusion – that confronting the US from a joint European position would be counter-productive, if not indecent. So the EU member states opt to do their defence and security business under US direction in Nato – and prioritise their bilateral links with Washington over almost everything else. The British may pride themselves on the most celebrated “special relationship”, but most other European nations also quietly believe they have a special “in” with Washington which is the best route for promoting their national interests.
Americans find all this attention-seeking tiresome, but will naturally not pass up the opportunities to divide and rule.
Some Europeans think the answer lies in a proper EU/US strategic dialogue, and they have plenty of proposals for new forums and further summitry to force such a dialogue. But that requires the EU, collectively, to have something to say, which in turn means Europeans must steel themselves to discuss, within the EU, the big strategic issues on which Europe will need to be able to engage the US in the post-American world.
Afghanistan should be an object lesson. European leaders have been happy to ignore this intractable issue in their regular EU meetings, delegating the problem to Nato and American leadership. They now find themselves with over 30,000 troops committed to a troubled campaign, and consigned to the ante-room while they wait to learn the new American strategy, which they must then defend to their publics as their own.
Russia and the Middle East are two more items on an unappetising list of problems that Europeans must address, not in the spirit of second-guessing where the US wants to go, but to assert common European positions. Failing that, even the most charismatic and forceful new EU leaders will find even photo-opportunities in Washington, never mind serious attention, in increasingly short supply.
Jeremy Shapiro is a director of research at the Brookings Institution. Nick Witney is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
Thursday, November 12, 2009
A new era as Turks and Kurds learn to co-operate
By David Phillips
Iraqis have stepped back from the brink by agreeing on a law that will allow elections to go forward in January. While this averts postponement of the ballot, which would have required the US to recalibrate its withdrawal from Iraq, the contentious process is a harbinger of difficulties to come. Once elections are held, Iraqis still have to establish a coalition government and overcome deep divisions on issues such as hydrocarbons, revenue-sharing and the status of Kirkuk, a city claimed by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. Given these flashpoints, Iraqi Kurds are placing as much importance on relations with Ankara as with Baghdad. Turkey is also hedging her bets in case Iraq’s elections trigger sustained violence that polarises Iraqis and destabilises the region.
It was only in February last year that Turkey massed 100,000 troops for a major cross-border operation to root out the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) from its hide-out in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. In a dramatic reversal, Ahmet Davudoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, made a historic visit to Iraqi Kurdistan just two weeks ago to sign landmark deals opening a Turkish consulate in Erbil and border-crossings for travel and trade. Both sides have made the strategic decision that their interests are better served through co-operation than confrontation.
The rapprochement is born from pragmatism and geographic necessity. Kurds know that their future lies to the west, not as a landlocked rump state in the Middle East. Their access to Europe goes through Turkey. Conversely, Iraqi Kurdistan is Turkey’s gate to Iraq and lucrative relations with the Gulf states. Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan are natural economic partners. Their annual trade has jumped to $5bn (€3.3bn, £3bn) since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. It will rise to $10bn this year and $20bn in 2010. There are 1,200 foreign companies in Iraqi Kurdistan, half of which are Turkish; 90 per cent of goods sold in Iraqi Kurdistan are made in Turkey.
In addition, Iraqi Kurdistan has 45bn barrels in estimated oil reserves and huge natural gas fields that Turkey needs to fuel its economy and to fill the Nabucco pipeline with supplies for Europe. A Turkish energy company, Genel Enerjy, has signed production-sharing agreements for the Tak Tak and Tawke oilfields in Iraqi Kurdistan that will produce 1m barrels per day – more than 20 times Turkey’s current domestic production.
There is an old adage that, “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. Yet they increasingly see Turkey as a prudent power and protector. They recall it was a haven to almost a million Iraqi Kurds who fled to the mountains after the Gulf war in 1991. However, they know Turkey will not act out of the goodness of her heart. It will guarantee security in Iraqi Kurdistan because it enables her to influence the balance of power in Iraq.
Turkey’s security establishment is obsessed with Iraq’s territorial integrity. It fears the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would inspire Kurds in Turkey to seek greater self-rule. Recent statements by Masoud Barzani, Iraqi Kurdistan’s president, have helped calm Turkish anxieties; Mr Barzani affirms that Iraqi Kurds accept their fate as part of a democratic, federal republic of Iraq in which political power and control of natural resources are decentralised.
In the 1990s, Ankara denied the very existence of Turkish Kurds, calling them “mountain Turks”. It declared a state of emergency and launched a scorched earth policy that devastated the country’s south-east where Kurds reside. Recently, however, it has taken a more conciliatory approach.
While maintaining security, the government of prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expanded cultural rights and invested heavily in social services and infrastructure in Kurdish areas. Building on Turkey’s repentance law, it is also beginning to explore some kind of PKK amnesty. It has turned to the Kurdish Regional Government to accelerate the PKK’s demobilisation by more vigorously disrupting cash flow, weapons supplies and the organisation’s logistics.
The interests of Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan currently converge, but co-operation could founder unless both sides accommodate the core interests of the other. Without progress on Turkey’s PKK problem, neither side will realise the full scope of benefits from today’s positive trends.
Iraqis have stepped back from the brink by agreeing on a law that will allow elections to go forward in January. While this averts postponement of the ballot, which would have required the US to recalibrate its withdrawal from Iraq, the contentious process is a harbinger of difficulties to come. Once elections are held, Iraqis still have to establish a coalition government and overcome deep divisions on issues such as hydrocarbons, revenue-sharing and the status of Kirkuk, a city claimed by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. Given these flashpoints, Iraqi Kurds are placing as much importance on relations with Ankara as with Baghdad. Turkey is also hedging her bets in case Iraq’s elections trigger sustained violence that polarises Iraqis and destabilises the region.
It was only in February last year that Turkey massed 100,000 troops for a major cross-border operation to root out the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) from its hide-out in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. In a dramatic reversal, Ahmet Davudoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, made a historic visit to Iraqi Kurdistan just two weeks ago to sign landmark deals opening a Turkish consulate in Erbil and border-crossings for travel and trade. Both sides have made the strategic decision that their interests are better served through co-operation than confrontation.
The rapprochement is born from pragmatism and geographic necessity. Kurds know that their future lies to the west, not as a landlocked rump state in the Middle East. Their access to Europe goes through Turkey. Conversely, Iraqi Kurdistan is Turkey’s gate to Iraq and lucrative relations with the Gulf states. Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan are natural economic partners. Their annual trade has jumped to $5bn (€3.3bn, £3bn) since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. It will rise to $10bn this year and $20bn in 2010. There are 1,200 foreign companies in Iraqi Kurdistan, half of which are Turkish; 90 per cent of goods sold in Iraqi Kurdistan are made in Turkey.
In addition, Iraqi Kurdistan has 45bn barrels in estimated oil reserves and huge natural gas fields that Turkey needs to fuel its economy and to fill the Nabucco pipeline with supplies for Europe. A Turkish energy company, Genel Enerjy, has signed production-sharing agreements for the Tak Tak and Tawke oilfields in Iraqi Kurdistan that will produce 1m barrels per day – more than 20 times Turkey’s current domestic production.
There is an old adage that, “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. Yet they increasingly see Turkey as a prudent power and protector. They recall it was a haven to almost a million Iraqi Kurds who fled to the mountains after the Gulf war in 1991. However, they know Turkey will not act out of the goodness of her heart. It will guarantee security in Iraqi Kurdistan because it enables her to influence the balance of power in Iraq.
Turkey’s security establishment is obsessed with Iraq’s territorial integrity. It fears the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would inspire Kurds in Turkey to seek greater self-rule. Recent statements by Masoud Barzani, Iraqi Kurdistan’s president, have helped calm Turkish anxieties; Mr Barzani affirms that Iraqi Kurds accept their fate as part of a democratic, federal republic of Iraq in which political power and control of natural resources are decentralised.
In the 1990s, Ankara denied the very existence of Turkish Kurds, calling them “mountain Turks”. It declared a state of emergency and launched a scorched earth policy that devastated the country’s south-east where Kurds reside. Recently, however, it has taken a more conciliatory approach.
While maintaining security, the government of prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expanded cultural rights and invested heavily in social services and infrastructure in Kurdish areas. Building on Turkey’s repentance law, it is also beginning to explore some kind of PKK amnesty. It has turned to the Kurdish Regional Government to accelerate the PKK’s demobilisation by more vigorously disrupting cash flow, weapons supplies and the organisation’s logistics.
The interests of Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan currently converge, but co-operation could founder unless both sides accommodate the core interests of the other. Without progress on Turkey’s PKK problem, neither side will realise the full scope of benefits from today’s positive trends.
UN envoy focuses on progress in unification talks
By Kerin Hope
Alexander Downer, United Nations special envoy to the latest Cyprus reunification effort, insists that after 14 months of open-ended bicommunal talks he is still “cautiously optimistic” about a settlement.
One hopeful sign, he says, is that Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, the Cypriot leaders, are meeting more often in order to tackle key issues such as power-sharing and property ownership in a future federal state.
After almost 50 sessions the leaders ”have made significant progress – though not equal progress in all (negotiating) chapters,” Mr Downer says. “But they’ve agreed on an enormous number of things.”
These include most issues concerning the economy and European Union responsibilities – seen as the least contentious of the six chapters – as well as a large chunk of the governance and power-sharing chapter that dominated the discussions earlier this year.
But chapters on property, territory and security – issues that brought several previous peace initiatives to a halt - have still to be discussed in depth.
The Australian former foreign minister, now a political consultant, flies in regularly to facilitate the negotiations, with UN-appointed experts providing legal and technical help.
His “good offices” mission – the venue for the talks – occupies a modest one-storey building at the former Nicosia international airport in the UN-controlled buffer zone separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot parts of the island.
Mr Downer’s qualifications for the job include mediating a peace agreement in a civil conflict in Papua New Guinea and helping the UN organise a referendum in East Timor.
Yet the UN is deploying significantly fewer resources than during the ill-fated peace effort of 2002-04 that resulted in the “Annan plan” – a 10,000-page blueprint covering almost every detail of establishing a loose federation on Cyprus that only a handful of islanders claim to have read.
That plan was dropped after 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots who voted rejected it in a referendum - although it was approved by 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots in a separate vote.
This time the UN does not intend to impose deadlines, Mr Downer stresses, in spite of Mr Talat’s concerns about reaching a deal before his presidential term runs out in the spring.
“There’s no timeframe, it’s up to the leaders to work out the timelines and agree on them,” he says. “The Turkish Cypriots want to complete the negotiations by early next year and the Greek Cypriots don’t want to be suffocated by asphyxiating deadlines.”
Mr Christofias and Mr Talat - fellow leftwingers and self-described friends – start their twice-weekly sessions with frank private discussions before sitting down with their advisers and UN experts, according to Cyprus-based officials.
Yet hopes that two veteran Cypriot politicians committed to healing the island’s 35-year division would be able to achieve a breakthrough have so far not been realised.
Mr Downer points to a recent agreement on setting up a rotating federal presidency as a sign of “real progress” though details of voting procedures have still to be worked out.
Moreover, the two leaders have started to discuss the complex property issue which will also have an impact on opportunities for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to return to homes they abandoned in the 1974 conflict.
After 35 years of division, many Greek Cypriots would prefer to receive compensation or sell their holdings in the Turkish Cypriot north of the island rather than live there after a settlement.
“It’s a complicated issue, legally and economically,” Mr Downer says. “For example, if compensation is going to be a big part of the solution, where does the money come from? You have to work out ways of financing it.”
An agreement on property would also help resolve the issue of how much the territory in north Cyprus would be handed back to the Greek Cypriots in a settlement, he says.
A few issues on security have been agreed, for example that a reunified Cyprus would not have an army, Mr Downer says.
But the continued presence of Turkish and Greek military forces on the island under current treaties of alliance, and the Turkish Cypriot position that a treaty of guarantee is still essential although Cyprus is a member of the European Union, are potential stumbling blocks to a deal.
Both Cypriot leaders have recently sounded considerably less upbeat than Mr Downer about the course of negotiations so far.
Mr Christofias said in Brussels in October that his expectations for the talks “had not been justified” and blamed Turkey’s political and military leadership for the lack of progress.
Mr Talat said in a Financial Times interview in September that overall he was “not satisfied with the pace of the talks” and that the current initiative is the “last chance” of resolving the Cyprus problem.
Yet making pessimistic public statements is also part of the negotiating process, Mr Downer suggests.
“When you go and talk to the two sides, it all depends what mood they’re in,” Mr Downer “They’ll run a different line on different days. We run one line - that this process can succeed. ”
Alexander Downer, United Nations special envoy to the latest Cyprus reunification effort, insists that after 14 months of open-ended bicommunal talks he is still “cautiously optimistic” about a settlement.
One hopeful sign, he says, is that Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, the Cypriot leaders, are meeting more often in order to tackle key issues such as power-sharing and property ownership in a future federal state.
After almost 50 sessions the leaders ”have made significant progress – though not equal progress in all (negotiating) chapters,” Mr Downer says. “But they’ve agreed on an enormous number of things.”
These include most issues concerning the economy and European Union responsibilities – seen as the least contentious of the six chapters – as well as a large chunk of the governance and power-sharing chapter that dominated the discussions earlier this year.
But chapters on property, territory and security – issues that brought several previous peace initiatives to a halt - have still to be discussed in depth.
The Australian former foreign minister, now a political consultant, flies in regularly to facilitate the negotiations, with UN-appointed experts providing legal and technical help.
His “good offices” mission – the venue for the talks – occupies a modest one-storey building at the former Nicosia international airport in the UN-controlled buffer zone separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot parts of the island.
Mr Downer’s qualifications for the job include mediating a peace agreement in a civil conflict in Papua New Guinea and helping the UN organise a referendum in East Timor.
Yet the UN is deploying significantly fewer resources than during the ill-fated peace effort of 2002-04 that resulted in the “Annan plan” – a 10,000-page blueprint covering almost every detail of establishing a loose federation on Cyprus that only a handful of islanders claim to have read.
That plan was dropped after 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots who voted rejected it in a referendum - although it was approved by 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots in a separate vote.
This time the UN does not intend to impose deadlines, Mr Downer stresses, in spite of Mr Talat’s concerns about reaching a deal before his presidential term runs out in the spring.
“There’s no timeframe, it’s up to the leaders to work out the timelines and agree on them,” he says. “The Turkish Cypriots want to complete the negotiations by early next year and the Greek Cypriots don’t want to be suffocated by asphyxiating deadlines.”
Mr Christofias and Mr Talat - fellow leftwingers and self-described friends – start their twice-weekly sessions with frank private discussions before sitting down with their advisers and UN experts, according to Cyprus-based officials.
Yet hopes that two veteran Cypriot politicians committed to healing the island’s 35-year division would be able to achieve a breakthrough have so far not been realised.
Mr Downer points to a recent agreement on setting up a rotating federal presidency as a sign of “real progress” though details of voting procedures have still to be worked out.
Moreover, the two leaders have started to discuss the complex property issue which will also have an impact on opportunities for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to return to homes they abandoned in the 1974 conflict.
After 35 years of division, many Greek Cypriots would prefer to receive compensation or sell their holdings in the Turkish Cypriot north of the island rather than live there after a settlement.
“It’s a complicated issue, legally and economically,” Mr Downer says. “For example, if compensation is going to be a big part of the solution, where does the money come from? You have to work out ways of financing it.”
An agreement on property would also help resolve the issue of how much the territory in north Cyprus would be handed back to the Greek Cypriots in a settlement, he says.
A few issues on security have been agreed, for example that a reunified Cyprus would not have an army, Mr Downer says.
But the continued presence of Turkish and Greek military forces on the island under current treaties of alliance, and the Turkish Cypriot position that a treaty of guarantee is still essential although Cyprus is a member of the European Union, are potential stumbling blocks to a deal.
Both Cypriot leaders have recently sounded considerably less upbeat than Mr Downer about the course of negotiations so far.
Mr Christofias said in Brussels in October that his expectations for the talks “had not been justified” and blamed Turkey’s political and military leadership for the lack of progress.
Mr Talat said in a Financial Times interview in September that overall he was “not satisfied with the pace of the talks” and that the current initiative is the “last chance” of resolving the Cyprus problem.
Yet making pessimistic public statements is also part of the negotiating process, Mr Downer suggests.
“When you go and talk to the two sides, it all depends what mood they’re in,” Mr Downer “They’ll run a different line on different days. We run one line - that this process can succeed. ”
Leaders wrestle to break island’s bitter deadlock
Few outside observers still have doubts about the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders’ commitment to ending the island’s 35-year division.
After 14 months of regular meetings, their blue-upholstered armchairs at the United Nations “good offices” mission outside Nicosia have acquired a comfortable, well-worn look.
Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat are well-qualified negotiators, with a shared trade union background and sufficient language skills to argue the details of a peace settlement in English.
Self-interest also plays a role. If a deal on setting up a bizonal, bicommunal federation is reached, Mr Christofias and Mr Talat would almost certainly be the first to hold the rotating presidency of a reunified Cyprus.
If not, both men are likely to be punished by voters and replaced by hardline nationalists who might opt for a permanent partition of the island.
Yet the UN-sponsored talks are dragging. Last week Mr Christofias admitted that the leaders were not yet ready to discuss in depth the issue of property, which, together with territory and security, lies at the core of a settlement.
“This is a comprehensive and difficult issue and they will go on working,” says Alexander Downer, former foreign minister of Australia and UN special adviser to the negotiations.
Though Nicosia-based diplomats try to avoid talk of deadlines and last chances, Mr Talat is already feeling the heat. His leftwing Republican Turkish Party was defeated last April at a parliamentary election in the north by Dervis Eroglou, whose National Unity Party favours a two-state solution.
Without at least a framework deal in place, Mr Talat’s chances of winning a second presidential term in the April poll look increasingly slim.
Public opinion in the north, once overwhelmingly in favour of reunification – and access to the benefits of European Union membership – is hardening.
“The talks don’t have a positive image and people aren’t very hopeful,” says Emine Erk, a Turkish Cypriot human rights lawyer. “There seems to be a zero-sum attitude, that you’re only happy with the talks if the other side is giving ground.”
Mr Christofias in turn faces pressure from “rejectionists” in the Greek Cypriot south, including influential media barons and members of the centrist Democratic party, which is the junior partner in his communist-led coalition government.
While communist discipline still appears strict, some analysts doubt whether Mr Christofias has the full support of his party on reunification.
However, the election victory of George Papandreou’s Socialist party in Greece has given the island’s pro-settlement politicians a welcome boost.
Mr Papandreou intends to rebuild the close relationship with Turkey he established as foreign minister 10 years ago.
“We have to revive a dynamism that will not only help Turkey on its course towards Europe but contribute to a solution of the Cyprus issue,” he said during a visit to Nicosia.
Next month’s EU summit, at which the bloc’s 27 heads of government are due to assess Turkish progress, will test the resolve of both Mr Papandreou and Mr Christofias. They hope that Turkey will inject fresh momentum into the Cyprus talks, as well as its own bid for accession, by agreeing to open one of its ports to Greek Cypriot traffic.
But if not, Mr Christofias has implicitly ruled out using a veto against Ankara, saying: “Our intention is not to punish Turkey.”
Many Greek Cypriots are uncertain about the benefits of signing up to a federal state that they would have to finance in its early years, as Turkish Cypriot per capita income is about half that of the south.
Greek Cypriots have avoided fostering cross-border relationships because of a widely held view that any form of bicommunal contact – from schoolchildren exchanging visits to football matches against teams from the north – implies “recognition” of the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot republic in the north.
The issue of “recognition” also places constraints on trade across the Green Line, the unofficial border between north and south, which has been developing gradually under an EU umbrella.
Most Turkish Cypriot products are still shipped to Turkey for export, while goods purchased by Greek Cypriots are generally transported in bulk and packaged in the south for sale locally.
“When Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 we were promised direct trade with the Union. That hasn’t happened,” says Oya Barcin, head of trade development at the Turkish Cypriot chamber of commerce.
Both sides of the island are feeling the impact of the global slowdown, following a collapse in the holiday property market and a sharp decline in tourist arrivals this year.
Greek Cypriot unemployment has reached 5.5 per cent, the highest rate since 1974. Turkish Cypriots have also lost jobs in the construction sector in the south.
A weak recovery is forecast for the south, while the isolated economy in the north faces continuing stagnation.
Studies indicate that reunification would bring sustained growth in tourism and business services, the pillars of the Greek Cypriot economy.
Higher education, which underpins the Turkish Cypriot economy and is expanding in the south, would become a growth sector, while the north’s mass tourism market would quickly be upgraded.
“There would obviously be the short-term costs of economic adjustment, but the medium-term prospects, with Greek Cypriot companies gaining access to the large Turkish market, would be very exciting,” says Charilaos Stavrakis, Greek Cypriot finance minister.
Settling issues of property and territory would unlock domestic investment and allow a federal Cyprus to develop a long-term strategy for attracting foreign investment, according to UN advisers. As a result of the island’s frozen conflict, ownership of property worth an estimated €20bn – mainly in the north – remains in dispute.
One arresting example is the derelict resort of Varosha outside Famagusta – a popular Mediterranean playground in the 1960s – with crumbling high-rise hotels surrounded by barbed wire.
“Just the rebuilding of Famagusta as a high-quality resort would make the whole island more prosperous for years to come,” says Symeon Kassianides, a Greek Cypriot businessman.
But so far neither Mr Talat nor Mr Christofias has tried to put forward a vision of a prosperous, reunited Cyprus offering a wealth of opportunity to both communities.
After 14 months of regular meetings, their blue-upholstered armchairs at the United Nations “good offices” mission outside Nicosia have acquired a comfortable, well-worn look.
Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat are well-qualified negotiators, with a shared trade union background and sufficient language skills to argue the details of a peace settlement in English.
Self-interest also plays a role. If a deal on setting up a bizonal, bicommunal federation is reached, Mr Christofias and Mr Talat would almost certainly be the first to hold the rotating presidency of a reunified Cyprus.
If not, both men are likely to be punished by voters and replaced by hardline nationalists who might opt for a permanent partition of the island.
Yet the UN-sponsored talks are dragging. Last week Mr Christofias admitted that the leaders were not yet ready to discuss in depth the issue of property, which, together with territory and security, lies at the core of a settlement.
“This is a comprehensive and difficult issue and they will go on working,” says Alexander Downer, former foreign minister of Australia and UN special adviser to the negotiations.
Though Nicosia-based diplomats try to avoid talk of deadlines and last chances, Mr Talat is already feeling the heat. His leftwing Republican Turkish Party was defeated last April at a parliamentary election in the north by Dervis Eroglou, whose National Unity Party favours a two-state solution.
Without at least a framework deal in place, Mr Talat’s chances of winning a second presidential term in the April poll look increasingly slim.
Public opinion in the north, once overwhelmingly in favour of reunification – and access to the benefits of European Union membership – is hardening.
“The talks don’t have a positive image and people aren’t very hopeful,” says Emine Erk, a Turkish Cypriot human rights lawyer. “There seems to be a zero-sum attitude, that you’re only happy with the talks if the other side is giving ground.”
Mr Christofias in turn faces pressure from “rejectionists” in the Greek Cypriot south, including influential media barons and members of the centrist Democratic party, which is the junior partner in his communist-led coalition government.
While communist discipline still appears strict, some analysts doubt whether Mr Christofias has the full support of his party on reunification.
However, the election victory of George Papandreou’s Socialist party in Greece has given the island’s pro-settlement politicians a welcome boost.
Mr Papandreou intends to rebuild the close relationship with Turkey he established as foreign minister 10 years ago.
“We have to revive a dynamism that will not only help Turkey on its course towards Europe but contribute to a solution of the Cyprus issue,” he said during a visit to Nicosia.
Next month’s EU summit, at which the bloc’s 27 heads of government are due to assess Turkish progress, will test the resolve of both Mr Papandreou and Mr Christofias. They hope that Turkey will inject fresh momentum into the Cyprus talks, as well as its own bid for accession, by agreeing to open one of its ports to Greek Cypriot traffic.
But if not, Mr Christofias has implicitly ruled out using a veto against Ankara, saying: “Our intention is not to punish Turkey.”
Many Greek Cypriots are uncertain about the benefits of signing up to a federal state that they would have to finance in its early years, as Turkish Cypriot per capita income is about half that of the south.
Greek Cypriots have avoided fostering cross-border relationships because of a widely held view that any form of bicommunal contact – from schoolchildren exchanging visits to football matches against teams from the north – implies “recognition” of the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot republic in the north.
The issue of “recognition” also places constraints on trade across the Green Line, the unofficial border between north and south, which has been developing gradually under an EU umbrella.
Most Turkish Cypriot products are still shipped to Turkey for export, while goods purchased by Greek Cypriots are generally transported in bulk and packaged in the south for sale locally.
“When Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 we were promised direct trade with the Union. That hasn’t happened,” says Oya Barcin, head of trade development at the Turkish Cypriot chamber of commerce.
Both sides of the island are feeling the impact of the global slowdown, following a collapse in the holiday property market and a sharp decline in tourist arrivals this year.
Greek Cypriot unemployment has reached 5.5 per cent, the highest rate since 1974. Turkish Cypriots have also lost jobs in the construction sector in the south.
A weak recovery is forecast for the south, while the isolated economy in the north faces continuing stagnation.
Studies indicate that reunification would bring sustained growth in tourism and business services, the pillars of the Greek Cypriot economy.
Higher education, which underpins the Turkish Cypriot economy and is expanding in the south, would become a growth sector, while the north’s mass tourism market would quickly be upgraded.
“There would obviously be the short-term costs of economic adjustment, but the medium-term prospects, with Greek Cypriot companies gaining access to the large Turkish market, would be very exciting,” says Charilaos Stavrakis, Greek Cypriot finance minister.
Settling issues of property and territory would unlock domestic investment and allow a federal Cyprus to develop a long-term strategy for attracting foreign investment, according to UN advisers. As a result of the island’s frozen conflict, ownership of property worth an estimated €20bn – mainly in the north – remains in dispute.
One arresting example is the derelict resort of Varosha outside Famagusta – a popular Mediterranean playground in the 1960s – with crumbling high-rise hotels surrounded by barbed wire.
“Just the rebuilding of Famagusta as a high-quality resort would make the whole island more prosperous for years to come,” says Symeon Kassianides, a Greek Cypriot businessman.
But so far neither Mr Talat nor Mr Christofias has tried to put forward a vision of a prosperous, reunited Cyprus offering a wealth of opportunity to both communities.
Urgency and frustration grow in Ankara
By Delphine Strauss
A clutch of Turkey’s senior diplomats flew to Ankara last month for a weekend of talks behind the closed doors of the foreign ministry. The topic: Cyprus.
In the 35 years since Turkish troops occupied the north of the island, the deadlock has defied successive attempts at UN mediation and become the biggest obstacle to Turkey’s European Union membership bid – even though the Turkish community, and not the Greek one, voted for reunification in a 2004 referendum.
Now, the Greek Cypriot government says Turkey is trying to impose false deadlines on negotiations – but the sense of urgency in Ankara is real.
By April, Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, must have something to show for 18 months of talks to frame a bizonal, bicommunal federation, if he is to win re-election against a hardline opponent with very different views on the island’s future.
Yet although Mr Talat and Demetris Christofias, his Greek Cypriot counterpart and friend, meet more often, they have made little progress.
“We’ll continue making every effort to find a solution. And we’ll never give in to the demands of those who try to impose deadlock,” Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish prime minister, told his ruling party congress last month.
He has every reason to be sincere. The Cyprus stalemate is poisoning relations with the EU, whose leaders meet in December to assess Turkey’s membership bid given its refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot traffic.
Moreover, as the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in a recent report, Mr Erdogan’s Justice & Development (AK) party “wants a solution because it views the hardliners on Cyprus as a bastion of their domestic opponents in the old nationalist establishment”.
Ankara is urging EU governments at December’s meeting not to impose sanctions that could upset talks at a delicate stage, a western diplomat says. The warning is likely to be effective: no country wants to be blamed for talks failing.
Turkey has also been heartened by the election as Greek prime minister of George Papandreou, who helped forge a new era in Greek-Turkish relations on the groundswell of sympathy that followed earthquakes in both countries in 1999.
But some question whether Ankara is doing everything it can to facilitate a deal or doing its utmost to avoid blame if talks again come to nothing.
The ICG noted that Turkish politicians, compared with 2004, were both less engaged and, subtly, taking a harder line on some issues of property, territory and security.
“Compared with 2004, Turkey is following a different strategy. They have confidence in Talat and so have left the negotiations to him,” says Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat who heads the think-tank Edam. “Ankara will not do anything… until things have reached a stage where a deal is a real possibility, and I don’t think we’re there.”
With time running short, one possibility is to press for a framework agreement that would at least give Mr Talat something to offer voters in April’s elections, and leave details to be hammered out afterwards. This is “increasingly looking like the best option”, a western diplomat says.
The alternatives include a new quest to formalise the position of northern Cyprus, at present recognised as a state only by Ankara. Turkish ministers are not yet spelling out contingency plans, but they are dropping hints in a tone of rising frustration.
“No one should expect the Turkish side to be tolerant if we encounter deadlock despite all our efforts for a solution. No one should come to us with new demands,” Mr Erdogan told his party faithful. He also, pointedly, enumerated the countries that accept northern Cypriot passports or host the territory’s offices and representatives.
Such sabre-rattling hides the fact that the Turkish government will have less control of the situation than it would like if Dervis Eroglou, the natural heir of Rauf Denktash who for decades opposed reunification, ousts Mr Talat at the next election.
Ankara holds the purse-strings to the northern Cypriot economy. But Mr Erdogan also has to contend with a strong nationalist lobby at home, already provoked by government plans for Kurdish reform and rapprochement with Armenia. To those audiences, he is clear on one point: “The Turkish Cypriots are an integral part of the Turkish nation.”
A clutch of Turkey’s senior diplomats flew to Ankara last month for a weekend of talks behind the closed doors of the foreign ministry. The topic: Cyprus.
In the 35 years since Turkish troops occupied the north of the island, the deadlock has defied successive attempts at UN mediation and become the biggest obstacle to Turkey’s European Union membership bid – even though the Turkish community, and not the Greek one, voted for reunification in a 2004 referendum.
Now, the Greek Cypriot government says Turkey is trying to impose false deadlines on negotiations – but the sense of urgency in Ankara is real.
By April, Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, must have something to show for 18 months of talks to frame a bizonal, bicommunal federation, if he is to win re-election against a hardline opponent with very different views on the island’s future.
Yet although Mr Talat and Demetris Christofias, his Greek Cypriot counterpart and friend, meet more often, they have made little progress.
“We’ll continue making every effort to find a solution. And we’ll never give in to the demands of those who try to impose deadlock,” Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish prime minister, told his ruling party congress last month.
He has every reason to be sincere. The Cyprus stalemate is poisoning relations with the EU, whose leaders meet in December to assess Turkey’s membership bid given its refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot traffic.
Moreover, as the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in a recent report, Mr Erdogan’s Justice & Development (AK) party “wants a solution because it views the hardliners on Cyprus as a bastion of their domestic opponents in the old nationalist establishment”.
Ankara is urging EU governments at December’s meeting not to impose sanctions that could upset talks at a delicate stage, a western diplomat says. The warning is likely to be effective: no country wants to be blamed for talks failing.
Turkey has also been heartened by the election as Greek prime minister of George Papandreou, who helped forge a new era in Greek-Turkish relations on the groundswell of sympathy that followed earthquakes in both countries in 1999.
But some question whether Ankara is doing everything it can to facilitate a deal or doing its utmost to avoid blame if talks again come to nothing.
The ICG noted that Turkish politicians, compared with 2004, were both less engaged and, subtly, taking a harder line on some issues of property, territory and security.
“Compared with 2004, Turkey is following a different strategy. They have confidence in Talat and so have left the negotiations to him,” says Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat who heads the think-tank Edam. “Ankara will not do anything… until things have reached a stage where a deal is a real possibility, and I don’t think we’re there.”
With time running short, one possibility is to press for a framework agreement that would at least give Mr Talat something to offer voters in April’s elections, and leave details to be hammered out afterwards. This is “increasingly looking like the best option”, a western diplomat says.
The alternatives include a new quest to formalise the position of northern Cyprus, at present recognised as a state only by Ankara. Turkish ministers are not yet spelling out contingency plans, but they are dropping hints in a tone of rising frustration.
“No one should expect the Turkish side to be tolerant if we encounter deadlock despite all our efforts for a solution. No one should come to us with new demands,” Mr Erdogan told his party faithful. He also, pointedly, enumerated the countries that accept northern Cypriot passports or host the territory’s offices and representatives.
Such sabre-rattling hides the fact that the Turkish government will have less control of the situation than it would like if Dervis Eroglou, the natural heir of Rauf Denktash who for decades opposed reunification, ousts Mr Talat at the next election.
Ankara holds the purse-strings to the northern Cypriot economy. But Mr Erdogan also has to contend with a strong nationalist lobby at home, already provoked by government plans for Kurdish reform and rapprochement with Armenia. To those audiences, he is clear on one point: “The Turkish Cypriots are an integral part of the Turkish nation.”
Europe's next chapter starts now. It rests on looking beyond our borders
Timothy Garton Ash
Well, they did it beautifully. Despite the rain, I found the official celebration of the fall of the wall in Berlin night a genuinely, even an unexpectedly moving affair. The organisers, presumably guided by Angela Merkel, got almost every accent right. Freedom, Europe and the wider world were the main themes, not German unity. The east German woman from Leipzig who had been locked up by the Stasi for carrying a banner demanding "an open country with free people"; Lech Walesa and Poland's pioneering Solidarity; the Hungarians; Mikhail Gorbachev; the United States. Everyone was given their share of the credit. Oddly enough, the one person who did not receive adequate acknowledgement was Merkel's predecessor, Helmut Kohl.
The toppling of those giant dominoes was a brilliant coup de theatre, partly because you kept thinking: what if it goes wrong? What if one of the dominoes topples sideways, or just stops? But the Germans got the engineering right, of course – as efficient in toppling dominoes as in making BMWs. And how good to put near the end of the celebration an interview with Muhammad Yunus, the Bangladeshi pioneer of microcredits, who talked about the wall still separating rich north from poor south: die Mauer der Armut, the poverty wall.
So, three cheers for Germany and three cheers for Europe. Looking at the searchlights piercing the night sky above the Brandenburg Gate, we could reflect on the extraordinary distance travelled in a city that was at the heart of two world wars and the cold war. After all, for at least 50 years, from 1939 to 1989, searchlights at the Brandenburg Gate had been a prelude to killing people, one way or another, rather than a signal of their peaceful liberation.
But then it was over. Berliners trudged back through the drizzle; the police started clearing away the crowd-control barriers; and already at dinner, we are told, the leaders of the EU were quietly conspiring in corners about who should be the next so-called president (that is, chair) of the European council, and the new high representative for foreign and security policy. Perhaps that was what Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy and Merkel were really thinking about, on their chilly podium, as the long ceremony ended with young people from all over the world joining in the distinctly Obamaesque refrain of a specially written song, "We can be as one". (As for Silvio Berlusconi, he seemed to have his eyes closed whenever the television camera caught him. Dreaming of …? Better not ask.)
Should the president of the European council be the inspiring, haiku-writing Belgian, Herman van Rompuy? Should the high representitive be Britain's brainy foreign secretary, David Miliband? Has Miliband genuinely ruled himself out, bravely choosing to remain on the bridge of the New Labour Titanic? Will Peter Mandelson nobly step into the breach – then becoming, presumably, the Lord High Representative? (Cue music by Gilbert and Sullivan.) Or will the job go to former Italian prime minister Massimo d'Alema?
I have already proposed my candidates: the Nobel peace prizewinner and elder statesman Martti Ahtisaari for the chair; Joschka Fischer or, failing that, Miliband for high representitive. These personalities matter. Yet even if the usual EU haggling behind closed doors ends up producing two weak, colourless figures – two rabbits out of a grey hat – we will still have the possibility of creating a Europe that acts more "as one", to recall the words of the Berlin song. We will still be able to create the institutions, notably a new European foreign service. And what we do with those institutions anyway depends, with the Lisbon treaty as without it, on the political will of member states and their democratically elected governments. If they want it to happen, it will. If they don't, it won't.
They should want it to happen, because whether we in Europe have anything much to celebrate in another 20 years' time will depend on whether we get our act together in our relations with the rest of the world. Of course, there are still vital things to be done inside the frontiers of today's EU: the creation of new jobs, the integration of Muslim fellow citizens, to name but two. But increasingly the key challenges for the European Union lie not within its own borders but beyond them.
Geographically, the agenda starts with the rest of Europe that is not yet in the EU. Enlargement fatigue is palpable at every turn, but there is still a lot of Europe to be brought in, before "Europe" is really Europe: the rest of the Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, perhaps Georgia and Armenia – and, as a strategically vital special case, Turkey. Provided they meet all the conditions for membership, we should want all these countries to be EU members, in our own, long-term, enlightened self-interest, as well as in theirs.
Then there is Russia. If the EU does not have a Russia policy, it will not have a foreign policy. And to have a common Russia policy, it needs a common energy policy. To the south and southeast, there is the question of how we help the modernisation, liberalisation and eventual democratisation of mainly Muslim countries which are not, in any foreseeable future, going to be members of the EU. Though the Berlin wall has gone, there is still the wall separating Israelis and Palestinians.
Further afield, there are the great emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil. Measured against its own unhappy divided past, Europe has ascended; in relative power, it is descending. The United States no longer looks automatically to Europe as a strategic partner. (Obama's appearance in a video message at the Brandenburg Gate only served to remind everyone of his physical absence. They should have left it to Hillary Clinton.) Miliband's argument that we face the choice between a G2 world, with the crucial shots being called by the US and China, and a G3 world, including the EU as the third partner, usefully simplifies and exaggerates to make the right point.
Beyond that, looming larger still, is the poverty wall of which Yunus spoke. The EU has the largest economy in the world. It and its member states combined give more than half of the world's official development aid. If it acted "as one", and strategically, no one would have a better chance of lowering the wall between the rich north and the poor south. Largest and most important of all is the planetary challenge of climate change, with time now running out before the Copenhagen summit in early December.
The point is this: you don't need to have any sentimental attachment to Europe whatsoever to understand that to tackle these problems we need the scale and clout that only Europe gives. This has nothing at all do with dreams of an "ever closer union". Europe here is a means, not an end in itself. The purpose is to defend and advance the vital interests of all our citizens, Brits included.
Europe has a great story to tell from the last 60 years, and it was told brilliantly in Berlin on Monday night. But that story is mainly about what we have achieved inside Europe. The next chapter will depend on what we do outside it.
Well, they did it beautifully. Despite the rain, I found the official celebration of the fall of the wall in Berlin night a genuinely, even an unexpectedly moving affair. The organisers, presumably guided by Angela Merkel, got almost every accent right. Freedom, Europe and the wider world were the main themes, not German unity. The east German woman from Leipzig who had been locked up by the Stasi for carrying a banner demanding "an open country with free people"; Lech Walesa and Poland's pioneering Solidarity; the Hungarians; Mikhail Gorbachev; the United States. Everyone was given their share of the credit. Oddly enough, the one person who did not receive adequate acknowledgement was Merkel's predecessor, Helmut Kohl.
The toppling of those giant dominoes was a brilliant coup de theatre, partly because you kept thinking: what if it goes wrong? What if one of the dominoes topples sideways, or just stops? But the Germans got the engineering right, of course – as efficient in toppling dominoes as in making BMWs. And how good to put near the end of the celebration an interview with Muhammad Yunus, the Bangladeshi pioneer of microcredits, who talked about the wall still separating rich north from poor south: die Mauer der Armut, the poverty wall.
So, three cheers for Germany and three cheers for Europe. Looking at the searchlights piercing the night sky above the Brandenburg Gate, we could reflect on the extraordinary distance travelled in a city that was at the heart of two world wars and the cold war. After all, for at least 50 years, from 1939 to 1989, searchlights at the Brandenburg Gate had been a prelude to killing people, one way or another, rather than a signal of their peaceful liberation.
But then it was over. Berliners trudged back through the drizzle; the police started clearing away the crowd-control barriers; and already at dinner, we are told, the leaders of the EU were quietly conspiring in corners about who should be the next so-called president (that is, chair) of the European council, and the new high representative for foreign and security policy. Perhaps that was what Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy and Merkel were really thinking about, on their chilly podium, as the long ceremony ended with young people from all over the world joining in the distinctly Obamaesque refrain of a specially written song, "We can be as one". (As for Silvio Berlusconi, he seemed to have his eyes closed whenever the television camera caught him. Dreaming of …? Better not ask.)
Should the president of the European council be the inspiring, haiku-writing Belgian, Herman van Rompuy? Should the high representitive be Britain's brainy foreign secretary, David Miliband? Has Miliband genuinely ruled himself out, bravely choosing to remain on the bridge of the New Labour Titanic? Will Peter Mandelson nobly step into the breach – then becoming, presumably, the Lord High Representative? (Cue music by Gilbert and Sullivan.) Or will the job go to former Italian prime minister Massimo d'Alema?
I have already proposed my candidates: the Nobel peace prizewinner and elder statesman Martti Ahtisaari for the chair; Joschka Fischer or, failing that, Miliband for high representitive. These personalities matter. Yet even if the usual EU haggling behind closed doors ends up producing two weak, colourless figures – two rabbits out of a grey hat – we will still have the possibility of creating a Europe that acts more "as one", to recall the words of the Berlin song. We will still be able to create the institutions, notably a new European foreign service. And what we do with those institutions anyway depends, with the Lisbon treaty as without it, on the political will of member states and their democratically elected governments. If they want it to happen, it will. If they don't, it won't.
They should want it to happen, because whether we in Europe have anything much to celebrate in another 20 years' time will depend on whether we get our act together in our relations with the rest of the world. Of course, there are still vital things to be done inside the frontiers of today's EU: the creation of new jobs, the integration of Muslim fellow citizens, to name but two. But increasingly the key challenges for the European Union lie not within its own borders but beyond them.
Geographically, the agenda starts with the rest of Europe that is not yet in the EU. Enlargement fatigue is palpable at every turn, but there is still a lot of Europe to be brought in, before "Europe" is really Europe: the rest of the Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, perhaps Georgia and Armenia – and, as a strategically vital special case, Turkey. Provided they meet all the conditions for membership, we should want all these countries to be EU members, in our own, long-term, enlightened self-interest, as well as in theirs.
Then there is Russia. If the EU does not have a Russia policy, it will not have a foreign policy. And to have a common Russia policy, it needs a common energy policy. To the south and southeast, there is the question of how we help the modernisation, liberalisation and eventual democratisation of mainly Muslim countries which are not, in any foreseeable future, going to be members of the EU. Though the Berlin wall has gone, there is still the wall separating Israelis and Palestinians.
Further afield, there are the great emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil. Measured against its own unhappy divided past, Europe has ascended; in relative power, it is descending. The United States no longer looks automatically to Europe as a strategic partner. (Obama's appearance in a video message at the Brandenburg Gate only served to remind everyone of his physical absence. They should have left it to Hillary Clinton.) Miliband's argument that we face the choice between a G2 world, with the crucial shots being called by the US and China, and a G3 world, including the EU as the third partner, usefully simplifies and exaggerates to make the right point.
Beyond that, looming larger still, is the poverty wall of which Yunus spoke. The EU has the largest economy in the world. It and its member states combined give more than half of the world's official development aid. If it acted "as one", and strategically, no one would have a better chance of lowering the wall between the rich north and the poor south. Largest and most important of all is the planetary challenge of climate change, with time now running out before the Copenhagen summit in early December.
The point is this: you don't need to have any sentimental attachment to Europe whatsoever to understand that to tackle these problems we need the scale and clout that only Europe gives. This has nothing at all do with dreams of an "ever closer union". Europe here is a means, not an end in itself. The purpose is to defend and advance the vital interests of all our citizens, Brits included.
Europe has a great story to tell from the last 60 years, and it was told brilliantly in Berlin on Monday night. But that story is mainly about what we have achieved inside Europe. The next chapter will depend on what we do outside it.
UN denies complicity in Congo war crimes
he UN head of peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo today rejected accusations that the organisation is complicit in war crimes Congolese troops allegedly committed in an offensive against rebel groups.
Alan Doss, the head of the mission in Congo (Monuc), said such charges misrepresented the UN force's role and risked undermining efforts to help the Congolese government end the people's suffering.
Monuc has come in for strong criticism from human rights and aid groups for providing operational and logistical support for an army offensive, Kimia II, against Hutu militias from neighbouring Rwanda. UN forces have provided military firepower, transport, rations and fuel for government troops as they seek to disarm the militias, who call themselves the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
Human Rights Watch last week called on Monuc immediately to suspend its support to the Congolese army or risk being implicated in further atrocities. Human Rights Watch said it had documented the deliberate killing of at least 270 civilians in a remote part of North Kivu province since March, when the offensive began. Most of the victims were women, children and the elderly, it said.
"Some were decapitated. Others were chopped to death by machete, beaten to death with clubs, or shot as they tried to flee." According to Human Rights Watch, army soldiers have killed a total of at least 505 civilians from the start of Kimia II to September.
Other groups, such as Oxfam, have described the human cost of the attempt to defeat the FDLR as "unacceptable and disproportionate to the results it has achieved". Eastern Congo has been ravaged by war and conflict since the 1990s, when perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda fled across the border and local guerrillas and foreign armies battled for control of lucrative mineral deposits.
Doss, who spoke at the Royal United Services Institute thinktank in London, acknowledged the moral and practical dilemmas involved in supporting an army that is frequently accused of human rights violations.
"By extension, any Monuc support for the FARDC [Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo] is criticised as condoning such abuse," Doss said. "And yet I believe that the women and the children of eastern Congo would probably suffer more should we give up and walk away from the FARDC."
Doss pointed out that Monuc's support for the army was not without preconditions, and that it had made clear that, where there was evidence of troops committing human rights violations, Monuc would withdraw its support.
He added that more than 30 army personnel had been prosecuted for crimes against civilians this year, and more such cases were being prepared.
The head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, last week said Monuc would suspend support to army units it believes killed at least 62 civilians during the operations. But he stressed the move would not affect the UN's broader support for the army.
Around 1,300 FDLR fighters have been disarmed and repatriated to Rwanda since the offensive began, according to the UN. During that time, more than 7,000 women and girls have been raped, and more than 900,000 people have been forced to flee their homes.
With a budget this year of $3.1bn (£1.9bn) and some 20,000 peacekeepers, Monuc is the world's largest UN peacekeeping mission.
Alan Doss, the head of the mission in Congo (Monuc), said such charges misrepresented the UN force's role and risked undermining efforts to help the Congolese government end the people's suffering.
Monuc has come in for strong criticism from human rights and aid groups for providing operational and logistical support for an army offensive, Kimia II, against Hutu militias from neighbouring Rwanda. UN forces have provided military firepower, transport, rations and fuel for government troops as they seek to disarm the militias, who call themselves the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
Human Rights Watch last week called on Monuc immediately to suspend its support to the Congolese army or risk being implicated in further atrocities. Human Rights Watch said it had documented the deliberate killing of at least 270 civilians in a remote part of North Kivu province since March, when the offensive began. Most of the victims were women, children and the elderly, it said.
"Some were decapitated. Others were chopped to death by machete, beaten to death with clubs, or shot as they tried to flee." According to Human Rights Watch, army soldiers have killed a total of at least 505 civilians from the start of Kimia II to September.
Other groups, such as Oxfam, have described the human cost of the attempt to defeat the FDLR as "unacceptable and disproportionate to the results it has achieved". Eastern Congo has been ravaged by war and conflict since the 1990s, when perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda fled across the border and local guerrillas and foreign armies battled for control of lucrative mineral deposits.
Doss, who spoke at the Royal United Services Institute thinktank in London, acknowledged the moral and practical dilemmas involved in supporting an army that is frequently accused of human rights violations.
"By extension, any Monuc support for the FARDC [Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo] is criticised as condoning such abuse," Doss said. "And yet I believe that the women and the children of eastern Congo would probably suffer more should we give up and walk away from the FARDC."
Doss pointed out that Monuc's support for the army was not without preconditions, and that it had made clear that, where there was evidence of troops committing human rights violations, Monuc would withdraw its support.
He added that more than 30 army personnel had been prosecuted for crimes against civilians this year, and more such cases were being prepared.
The head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, last week said Monuc would suspend support to army units it believes killed at least 62 civilians during the operations. But he stressed the move would not affect the UN's broader support for the army.
Around 1,300 FDLR fighters have been disarmed and repatriated to Rwanda since the offensive began, according to the UN. During that time, more than 7,000 women and girls have been raped, and more than 900,000 people have been forced to flee their homes.
With a budget this year of $3.1bn (£1.9bn) and some 20,000 peacekeepers, Monuc is the world's largest UN peacekeeping mission.
European Union Struggles to Select New Leaders
By STEPHEN CASTLE
BRUSSELS — Days after securing the landmark treaty that will lead to the naming of the European Union’s first president, the bloc has lapsed into horse-trading-as-usual over the position — the kind of maneuvering that has often yielded the kind of bland leadership that the new presidency was supposed to overcome.
On Tuesday, the latest flurry over the flaws in the European Union’s way of choosing leaders swirled around the British foreign secretary, David Miliband, who reportedly dropped out of the race to become the union’s powerful new foreign policy chief.
Mr. Miliband’s preference for sticking with the Labour Party in Britain rather than moving to the uncertain corridors of Brussels threatened to wreck an emerging compromise package of appointments: a center-leftist as foreign policy chief, with a politician from the center-right, which dominates the European Parliament, getting the presumably bigger plum of the bloc’s presidency.
The Lisbon Treaty was designed to supply the union with the kind of leadership that would give it a more powerful voice on the global stage.
Some member countries — but not all — see the new president as an interlocutor with the presidents of the United States and China, for example.
The latest dealing has underlined the complications of getting 27 heads of state to agree on candidates who need to complement each other and reflect a political, geographical and ideological mix among large and small nations.
Without a direct election involving almost half a billion people in the bloc’s countries, that sort of maneuvering has been the traditional route for finding leaders.
Now, instead of negotiating behind doors for a solution, the union’s three largest nations — France and Germany on one side, Britain on the other — appear increasingly headed for an open clash.
The Lisbon Treaty, in addition to creating a permanent president of the European Council, where national governments meet, the Lisbon Treaty establishes a powerful foreign policy chief supported by a network of diplomats. With a reluctant signing by the Czech president, Vaclav Klaus, the treaty was finally secured last week after eight years of wrangling. Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt of Sweden, which holds the current rotating union presidency, said Tuesday that he was halfway through consulting with the bloc’s leaders. But there is still no date for a summit meeting to decide the who will be selected for the new positions.
Even European ministers sound weary. “It should have been at the end of this week,” Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, told France Inter radio, “but I don’t believe that will happen.”
Mr. Reinfeldt may have to threaten to use a new procedure, under which a weighted majority can agree on the selections without requiring the support of all 27 leaders.
In an implicit attack on the whole process, Poland suggested that candidates face a job interview in front of the union’s leaders where they would “present their vision of how their tasks would be conducted.”
In the unwritten rules for appointment to senior posts in the European Union, most candidates do not declare their interest before decisions are made. An elected official who is not selected for a senior position with the union could find the outcome politically costly at home.
Stephen Wall, a former British ambassador to the bloc, said that this type of negotiation was particularly difficult for diplomats, who are trained to forge compromise and not cling stubbornly to a political position.
“I think it’s always going to be a pretty messy situation, because this is a decision that E.U. leaders care about,” he said, “They will have strong views.”
But he is also dismissive of the Polish proposal for a job interview.
“Given that they have to placate the right, the left, the north, the south, the large and small nations, you could have a brilliant presentation but, if the politics didn’t fit, what would be the point?” he said.
The heavyweight contender for the presidential post had been former Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain. When his campaign failed to gain momentum on the center-left, as well as in Germany and among some smaller nations, a new consensus began to emerge.
That would involve Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy of Belgium, a conservative, becoming president of the union and acting as a broker of compromise, with foreign policy post going to Mr. Miliband, who is regarded as a big hitter among foreign ministers.
Mr. Miliband had declared himself unavailable for the post, but to many people that appeared to mere comply with the unwritten rule under which serving ministers never admit that they are candidates for senior jobs with the bloc. The BBC’s political editor reported Monday night, however, that Mr. Miliband had decided to remain in his current job.
A former Italian prime minister, Massimo D’Alema, is thought to be the new front runner for the foreign policy job, but his past in Italy’s Communist Party is a problem for some nations in eastern Europe. Other potential candidates from Britain include Peter Mandelson, a former European Commissioner, and the current Trade Commissioner, Catherine Ashton.
Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain is still supporting Mr. Blair, who is also not a formally declared candidate. Britain argues that if the presidential post goes to a technocrat like Mr. Van Rompuy, the union would miss an opportunity to expand its profile in the world.
But President Nicolas Sarkozy of France praised Mr. Van Rompuy on Tuesday in the newspaper Le Monde, describing him as “someone very good.”
Besides Mr. Van Rompuy, leading contenders for the presidency include the Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg and a former Latvian president, Vaira Vika-Freiberga.
Mr. Wall said that if past experience is a guide, it will not be possible to find a compromise without a real discussion among the leaders of the bloc’s nations.
“If the Swedes have already got a clear route through this,” he said, “I would be amazed.”
BRUSSELS — Days after securing the landmark treaty that will lead to the naming of the European Union’s first president, the bloc has lapsed into horse-trading-as-usual over the position — the kind of maneuvering that has often yielded the kind of bland leadership that the new presidency was supposed to overcome.
On Tuesday, the latest flurry over the flaws in the European Union’s way of choosing leaders swirled around the British foreign secretary, David Miliband, who reportedly dropped out of the race to become the union’s powerful new foreign policy chief.
Mr. Miliband’s preference for sticking with the Labour Party in Britain rather than moving to the uncertain corridors of Brussels threatened to wreck an emerging compromise package of appointments: a center-leftist as foreign policy chief, with a politician from the center-right, which dominates the European Parliament, getting the presumably bigger plum of the bloc’s presidency.
The Lisbon Treaty was designed to supply the union with the kind of leadership that would give it a more powerful voice on the global stage.
Some member countries — but not all — see the new president as an interlocutor with the presidents of the United States and China, for example.
The latest dealing has underlined the complications of getting 27 heads of state to agree on candidates who need to complement each other and reflect a political, geographical and ideological mix among large and small nations.
Without a direct election involving almost half a billion people in the bloc’s countries, that sort of maneuvering has been the traditional route for finding leaders.
Now, instead of negotiating behind doors for a solution, the union’s three largest nations — France and Germany on one side, Britain on the other — appear increasingly headed for an open clash.
The Lisbon Treaty, in addition to creating a permanent president of the European Council, where national governments meet, the Lisbon Treaty establishes a powerful foreign policy chief supported by a network of diplomats. With a reluctant signing by the Czech president, Vaclav Klaus, the treaty was finally secured last week after eight years of wrangling. Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt of Sweden, which holds the current rotating union presidency, said Tuesday that he was halfway through consulting with the bloc’s leaders. But there is still no date for a summit meeting to decide the who will be selected for the new positions.
Even European ministers sound weary. “It should have been at the end of this week,” Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, told France Inter radio, “but I don’t believe that will happen.”
Mr. Reinfeldt may have to threaten to use a new procedure, under which a weighted majority can agree on the selections without requiring the support of all 27 leaders.
In an implicit attack on the whole process, Poland suggested that candidates face a job interview in front of the union’s leaders where they would “present their vision of how their tasks would be conducted.”
In the unwritten rules for appointment to senior posts in the European Union, most candidates do not declare their interest before decisions are made. An elected official who is not selected for a senior position with the union could find the outcome politically costly at home.
Stephen Wall, a former British ambassador to the bloc, said that this type of negotiation was particularly difficult for diplomats, who are trained to forge compromise and not cling stubbornly to a political position.
“I think it’s always going to be a pretty messy situation, because this is a decision that E.U. leaders care about,” he said, “They will have strong views.”
But he is also dismissive of the Polish proposal for a job interview.
“Given that they have to placate the right, the left, the north, the south, the large and small nations, you could have a brilliant presentation but, if the politics didn’t fit, what would be the point?” he said.
The heavyweight contender for the presidential post had been former Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain. When his campaign failed to gain momentum on the center-left, as well as in Germany and among some smaller nations, a new consensus began to emerge.
That would involve Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy of Belgium, a conservative, becoming president of the union and acting as a broker of compromise, with foreign policy post going to Mr. Miliband, who is regarded as a big hitter among foreign ministers.
Mr. Miliband had declared himself unavailable for the post, but to many people that appeared to mere comply with the unwritten rule under which serving ministers never admit that they are candidates for senior jobs with the bloc. The BBC’s political editor reported Monday night, however, that Mr. Miliband had decided to remain in his current job.
A former Italian prime minister, Massimo D’Alema, is thought to be the new front runner for the foreign policy job, but his past in Italy’s Communist Party is a problem for some nations in eastern Europe. Other potential candidates from Britain include Peter Mandelson, a former European Commissioner, and the current Trade Commissioner, Catherine Ashton.
Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain is still supporting Mr. Blair, who is also not a formally declared candidate. Britain argues that if the presidential post goes to a technocrat like Mr. Van Rompuy, the union would miss an opportunity to expand its profile in the world.
But President Nicolas Sarkozy of France praised Mr. Van Rompuy on Tuesday in the newspaper Le Monde, describing him as “someone very good.”
Besides Mr. Van Rompuy, leading contenders for the presidency include the Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg and a former Latvian president, Vaira Vika-Freiberga.
Mr. Wall said that if past experience is a guide, it will not be possible to find a compromise without a real discussion among the leaders of the bloc’s nations.
“If the Swedes have already got a clear route through this,” he said, “I would be amazed.”
Bulgaria Still Stuck in Trauma of Transition
By MATTHEW BRUNWASSER
SOFIA — The silence on the streets of the Bulgarian capital this week speaks volumes about this nation’s deep ambivalence about democracy.
Although Tuesday was the 20th anniversary of the removal of Bulgaria’s Communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, and the start of democratic changes here, the day went uncelebrated, even as Germany cleaned up from celebrations for the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
To explain the amnesia of Bulgarians about their Communist past, and apathy about their democratic present, Bulgarian commentators are using a biblical metaphor: Like the Israelites, the Bulgarians will have to wander the desert for 40 years to be cleansed of the sins of Communism.
“Twenty years have passed and we are in still the middle of the desert,” said Edvin Sugarev, 56, a poet and former anti-Communist opposition leader. “And we’ll be waiting for another 20 years.”
Bulgaria is the only former Warsaw Pact member state without an institute for national memory to hash out the historical details of a Communist past, during which, historians say, thousands of people were imprisoned and killed. Mr. Sugarev is one of the few public figures in Bulgaria who talks about the need for a moral assessment of Communism.
“Everything in Bulgaria looks fine formally: the free market, human rights, free speech, the multiparty political system, membership in E.U. and NATO,” Mr. Sugarev said. “But that’s only a facade. Behind it there is nothing.”
“People got their freedom, but they don’t know what to do with it,” he added, “because it’s more comfortable when someone tells them what to do, where to go and what is right and wrong.”
Bulgaria earned its reputation as the most obedient of Soviet allies. Mr. Zhivkov said in 1973 that Bulgaria and the Soviet Union would “act as a single body, breathing with the same lungs and nourished by the same bloodstream.”
Despite its political and military achievements, Bulgaria is still the poorest country in the European Union, with monthly wages averaging €300, or $450. The country also suffers from a huge image problem in Europe and years of criticism by the European Commission for failing to fight corruption and organized crime.
The country became to the first in the bloc to see its E.U. funds stopped, in October 2008, because of corruption and poor administration. According to Transparency International, an organization that fights corruption, Bulgaria shares the bottom spot for most corrupt E.U. member state along with Romania.
By most measures, Bulgaria appears the most dissatisfied with democracy and nostalgic for Communism of all the former Warsaw Pact members, with Hungary a close second, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which recently surveyed East Europeans by returning to questions it asked in 1991.
When asked about democracy, 76 percent of Bulgarians said they were dissatisfied. Questioned whether free markets made people better off, only 37 percent of Bulgarians agreed. And when asked about the move away from the state-controlled economy, 54 percent of Bulgarians approved, compared with 46 percent of Hungarians.
Russia’s influence on Bulgaria was viewed as good by 45 percent of Bulgarians, about the same as Ukraine. Only 11 percent of Bulgarians agreed that ordinary people had benefited from the changes in 1989. And asked whether the state was run for the benefit of all people, 16 percent of Bulgarians agreed, down from 55 percent in 1991.
“We have created democratic institutions, but we are missing the democratic-political culture to make them effective,” said Petar-Emil Mitev, a sociologist at the Ivan Hadjiyski Institute for Social Values and Structures in Sofia.
Mr. Mitev added that the collapse of the old political and economic system did not mean the end of the old collectivist values.
“Now we are entering a new system of individual-based values and human rights, etc.” he said. “This new value system can’t be created all at once.”
The boundaries of the new market-based values are still not well defined, Mr. Mitev said, referring to the example of vote selling, which was widely reported in recent elections.
Evgeni Dainov, a political science professor at the New Bulgarian University, said, “It has taken us 20 years to get away from the idea that people are helpless and the state should do everything.”
The hope for Bulgarian democracy is in the generation born since 1989, Mr. Dainov said.
“They are totally different,” he said, even from those born in 1985. For them, he said, 1989 is long ago, “like dinosaurs walking the earth.”
“They are the first achieving generation I have seen,” Mr. Dainov said. “The first who don’t hide behind myths of helplessness. This generation that is now 20 is almost exactly like their peers in the West, which was the whole point in the first place.”
“I don’t know where they got it from,” he added. “Maybe from American movies, certainly not from their parents, who are helpless. From somewhere they got the idea that achieving things is good.”
This young generation is the most critical of Communism and the most positive about the transition, said Mr. Mitev, the sociologist.
But parents of children born in this generation say they have grown up with “slobodia, not svoboda” in Bulgarian, or “licentiousness, not freedom.”
One of the new concepts to emerge from the transition is the Bulgarian word “dalavera,” which means easy money through dishonest means. While older people see dalavera as negative, since money should be earned through work, it is viewed as positive by young people, who are completely comfortable with the free market.
“Enrichment by dishonest means has become a part of the Bulgarian transition and that has been absorbed by the young generation,” Mr. Mitev said. “This is an important part of trauma of the transition.”
At a debate at Sofia University on the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, three students in the crowd who were born in November 1989 were chosen to represent Bulgaria in the European Parliament on Wednesday for a meeting of 89 other Europeans born in the same month.
“I haven’t heard anything good about that time,” said Silvia Vasileva, 20, a law student who was born on Nov. 10. “Even if you had money, there was nothing to buy. Oranges were only for Christmas. If you wore jeans, you were an absolute attraction.”
Vyara Pancheva, also 20 and an English student at Sofia University, said she was not really sure whether Communism was good or bad.
Bulgarians still have extreme and opposing views on Communism, she said, so a mass celebration of Nov. 10 was not possible because the subject was too sensitive.
“As an idea, I think Communism is good,” Ms. Pancheva said.
“But in practice it’s totally unworkable. I personally think democracy is better.”
SOFIA — The silence on the streets of the Bulgarian capital this week speaks volumes about this nation’s deep ambivalence about democracy.
Although Tuesday was the 20th anniversary of the removal of Bulgaria’s Communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, and the start of democratic changes here, the day went uncelebrated, even as Germany cleaned up from celebrations for the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
To explain the amnesia of Bulgarians about their Communist past, and apathy about their democratic present, Bulgarian commentators are using a biblical metaphor: Like the Israelites, the Bulgarians will have to wander the desert for 40 years to be cleansed of the sins of Communism.
“Twenty years have passed and we are in still the middle of the desert,” said Edvin Sugarev, 56, a poet and former anti-Communist opposition leader. “And we’ll be waiting for another 20 years.”
Bulgaria is the only former Warsaw Pact member state without an institute for national memory to hash out the historical details of a Communist past, during which, historians say, thousands of people were imprisoned and killed. Mr. Sugarev is one of the few public figures in Bulgaria who talks about the need for a moral assessment of Communism.
“Everything in Bulgaria looks fine formally: the free market, human rights, free speech, the multiparty political system, membership in E.U. and NATO,” Mr. Sugarev said. “But that’s only a facade. Behind it there is nothing.”
“People got their freedom, but they don’t know what to do with it,” he added, “because it’s more comfortable when someone tells them what to do, where to go and what is right and wrong.”
Bulgaria earned its reputation as the most obedient of Soviet allies. Mr. Zhivkov said in 1973 that Bulgaria and the Soviet Union would “act as a single body, breathing with the same lungs and nourished by the same bloodstream.”
Despite its political and military achievements, Bulgaria is still the poorest country in the European Union, with monthly wages averaging €300, or $450. The country also suffers from a huge image problem in Europe and years of criticism by the European Commission for failing to fight corruption and organized crime.
The country became to the first in the bloc to see its E.U. funds stopped, in October 2008, because of corruption and poor administration. According to Transparency International, an organization that fights corruption, Bulgaria shares the bottom spot for most corrupt E.U. member state along with Romania.
By most measures, Bulgaria appears the most dissatisfied with democracy and nostalgic for Communism of all the former Warsaw Pact members, with Hungary a close second, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which recently surveyed East Europeans by returning to questions it asked in 1991.
When asked about democracy, 76 percent of Bulgarians said they were dissatisfied. Questioned whether free markets made people better off, only 37 percent of Bulgarians agreed. And when asked about the move away from the state-controlled economy, 54 percent of Bulgarians approved, compared with 46 percent of Hungarians.
Russia’s influence on Bulgaria was viewed as good by 45 percent of Bulgarians, about the same as Ukraine. Only 11 percent of Bulgarians agreed that ordinary people had benefited from the changes in 1989. And asked whether the state was run for the benefit of all people, 16 percent of Bulgarians agreed, down from 55 percent in 1991.
“We have created democratic institutions, but we are missing the democratic-political culture to make them effective,” said Petar-Emil Mitev, a sociologist at the Ivan Hadjiyski Institute for Social Values and Structures in Sofia.
Mr. Mitev added that the collapse of the old political and economic system did not mean the end of the old collectivist values.
“Now we are entering a new system of individual-based values and human rights, etc.” he said. “This new value system can’t be created all at once.”
The boundaries of the new market-based values are still not well defined, Mr. Mitev said, referring to the example of vote selling, which was widely reported in recent elections.
Evgeni Dainov, a political science professor at the New Bulgarian University, said, “It has taken us 20 years to get away from the idea that people are helpless and the state should do everything.”
The hope for Bulgarian democracy is in the generation born since 1989, Mr. Dainov said.
“They are totally different,” he said, even from those born in 1985. For them, he said, 1989 is long ago, “like dinosaurs walking the earth.”
“They are the first achieving generation I have seen,” Mr. Dainov said. “The first who don’t hide behind myths of helplessness. This generation that is now 20 is almost exactly like their peers in the West, which was the whole point in the first place.”
“I don’t know where they got it from,” he added. “Maybe from American movies, certainly not from their parents, who are helpless. From somewhere they got the idea that achieving things is good.”
This young generation is the most critical of Communism and the most positive about the transition, said Mr. Mitev, the sociologist.
But parents of children born in this generation say they have grown up with “slobodia, not svoboda” in Bulgarian, or “licentiousness, not freedom.”
One of the new concepts to emerge from the transition is the Bulgarian word “dalavera,” which means easy money through dishonest means. While older people see dalavera as negative, since money should be earned through work, it is viewed as positive by young people, who are completely comfortable with the free market.
“Enrichment by dishonest means has become a part of the Bulgarian transition and that has been absorbed by the young generation,” Mr. Mitev said. “This is an important part of trauma of the transition.”
At a debate at Sofia University on the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, three students in the crowd who were born in November 1989 were chosen to represent Bulgaria in the European Parliament on Wednesday for a meeting of 89 other Europeans born in the same month.
“I haven’t heard anything good about that time,” said Silvia Vasileva, 20, a law student who was born on Nov. 10. “Even if you had money, there was nothing to buy. Oranges were only for Christmas. If you wore jeans, you were an absolute attraction.”
Vyara Pancheva, also 20 and an English student at Sofia University, said she was not really sure whether Communism was good or bad.
Bulgarians still have extreme and opposing views on Communism, she said, so a mass celebration of Nov. 10 was not possible because the subject was too sensitive.
“As an idea, I think Communism is good,” Ms. Pancheva said.
“But in practice it’s totally unworkable. I personally think democracy is better.”
Turkey's PKK peace plan delayed
Opposition parties in Turkey have delayed the government's announcement of its plan to end a conflict in the mainly Kurdish south-east.
Interior Minister Besir Atalay ran out of time to present the measures in parliament as nationalist MPs jeered.
The plans are thought to include some Kurdish language education, restoring Kurdish place names and more freedom to use Kurdish in election campaigns.
The announcement is now expected on Thursday.
Some 40,000 people have been killed in the 25-year Kurdish fight for autonomy.
The government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently been seeking opposition support for a negotiated settlement to end the insurgency by the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).
It first announced the plan three months ago but has yet to publicise details.
Nationalist sentiment
The issue is very sensitive in Turkey, says the BBC's Jonathan Head in Istanbul. The PKK has been vilified as a terrorist organisation, so making peace is a delicate task for the government.
Nationalist sentiment is so strong in Turkey that until recently there was no official recognition of a separate Kurdish identity, our correspondent says, despite the fact that as much as 20% of the population is made up of ethnic Kurds, many of whom speak Kurdish as their first language.
Last month Turkey's government was caught off guard when a group of PKK fighters crossed the border from Iraq and announced they wanted to lay down their arms.
They were not prosecuted as previous returnees have been, but the euphoric welcome they received from thousands of local Kurds provoked a nationalist backlash.
While the government package is expected to allow much greater freedom to use the Kurdish language, the government is almost certain to refuse the request for a general amnesty made by the PKK and its supporters, our correspondent says.
Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, has been in jail since 1999.
In recent years, Turkish warplanes have launched numerous attacks on rebel hideouts in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region, from where Ankara says some 2,000 PKK guerrillas stage hit-and-run attacks on Turkish territory.
Interior Minister Besir Atalay ran out of time to present the measures in parliament as nationalist MPs jeered.
The plans are thought to include some Kurdish language education, restoring Kurdish place names and more freedom to use Kurdish in election campaigns.
The announcement is now expected on Thursday.
Some 40,000 people have been killed in the 25-year Kurdish fight for autonomy.
The government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently been seeking opposition support for a negotiated settlement to end the insurgency by the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).
It first announced the plan three months ago but has yet to publicise details.
Nationalist sentiment
The issue is very sensitive in Turkey, says the BBC's Jonathan Head in Istanbul. The PKK has been vilified as a terrorist organisation, so making peace is a delicate task for the government.
Nationalist sentiment is so strong in Turkey that until recently there was no official recognition of a separate Kurdish identity, our correspondent says, despite the fact that as much as 20% of the population is made up of ethnic Kurds, many of whom speak Kurdish as their first language.
Last month Turkey's government was caught off guard when a group of PKK fighters crossed the border from Iraq and announced they wanted to lay down their arms.
They were not prosecuted as previous returnees have been, but the euphoric welcome they received from thousands of local Kurds provoked a nationalist backlash.
While the government package is expected to allow much greater freedom to use the Kurdish language, the government is almost certain to refuse the request for a general amnesty made by the PKK and its supporters, our correspondent says.
Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, has been in jail since 1999.
In recent years, Turkish warplanes have launched numerous attacks on rebel hideouts in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region, from where Ankara says some 2,000 PKK guerrillas stage hit-and-run attacks on Turkish territory.
EU calls for budget deficit cuts
Thirteen members of the European Union have been told to take action and get their budget deficits back in line.
EU requirements mean that they should not exceed 3% of the country's GDP. However, since the financial crisis most countries have broken that rule.
Deadlines ranging from 2012 to 2014 have been issued.
France, the UK, Spain and the Irish Republic have longer to comply because their economies have worsened since the original deadline was imposed in April.
'Bite the bullet'
France has already warned that it will not meet the new deadline. The government wants to focus on boosting growth rather than cutting spending.
Germany and six other countries have until 2013. Belgium and Italy have the tighter deadline of 2012.
The BBC's business correspondent in Brussels, Nigel Cassidy, said the EU's economy commissioner, Joaquin Almunia, saved his harshest criticism for Greece. Mr Almunia said the country had taken "no effective action".
Our correspondent said: "Ultimately the message from Brussels is straightforward enough. Economic crisis notwithstanding, the named countries must bite the bullet and act now to cut their borrowings".
He says that will mean tax rises or benefit cuts in order to bring budget deficits under control.
EU requirements mean that they should not exceed 3% of the country's GDP. However, since the financial crisis most countries have broken that rule.
Deadlines ranging from 2012 to 2014 have been issued.
France, the UK, Spain and the Irish Republic have longer to comply because their economies have worsened since the original deadline was imposed in April.
'Bite the bullet'
France has already warned that it will not meet the new deadline. The government wants to focus on boosting growth rather than cutting spending.
Germany and six other countries have until 2013. Belgium and Italy have the tighter deadline of 2012.
The BBC's business correspondent in Brussels, Nigel Cassidy, said the EU's economy commissioner, Joaquin Almunia, saved his harshest criticism for Greece. Mr Almunia said the country had taken "no effective action".
Our correspondent said: "Ultimately the message from Brussels is straightforward enough. Economic crisis notwithstanding, the named countries must bite the bullet and act now to cut their borrowings".
He says that will mean tax rises or benefit cuts in order to bring budget deficits under control.
Friday, November 6, 2009
Turkey defends Sudan leader visit
Turkish President Abdullah Gul has accused the EU of interfering after Istanbul was asked to reconsider an invitation to the president of Sudan.
Omar al-Bashir has been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
But Mr Gul said he was invited to a summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), not for bilateral talks with Turkish officials.
Turkey, which has applied for EU membership, does not recognise the ICC.
It says it has no plans to arrest Mr Bashir, who is due to attend an OIC economic summit in Istanbul on Sunday and Monday.
Turkey insists it is not shifting away from its traditionally close ties to the West.
But the BBC's Jonathan Head, in Istanbul, says the country is certainly choosing some controversial new partnerships.
The visit by the Sudanese president comes fresh on the heels of the Turkish prime minister's groundbreaking state visit to Iran in October, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that country's nuclear programme to be entirely peaceful.
Mr Bashir's visit to Turkey will be his third in the past 18 months, but his first since the ICC arrest warrant was issued in March.
A coalition of Turkish human rights groups is protesting against the visit, our correspondent says.
They have accused the government of double standards for condemning Israel over its actions in Gaza, and then hosting a president who is blamed for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Darfur.
Omar al-Bashir has been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
But Mr Gul said he was invited to a summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), not for bilateral talks with Turkish officials.
Turkey, which has applied for EU membership, does not recognise the ICC.
It says it has no plans to arrest Mr Bashir, who is due to attend an OIC economic summit in Istanbul on Sunday and Monday.
Turkey insists it is not shifting away from its traditionally close ties to the West.
But the BBC's Jonathan Head, in Istanbul, says the country is certainly choosing some controversial new partnerships.
The visit by the Sudanese president comes fresh on the heels of the Turkish prime minister's groundbreaking state visit to Iran in October, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that country's nuclear programme to be entirely peaceful.
Mr Bashir's visit to Turkey will be his third in the past 18 months, but his first since the ICC arrest warrant was issued in March.
A coalition of Turkish human rights groups is protesting against the visit, our correspondent says.
They have accused the government of double standards for condemning Israel over its actions in Gaza, and then hosting a president who is blamed for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Darfur.
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Türk dış politikası İslamileşiyor
Efraim İnbar
Soğuk Savaş’ın bitişiyle birlikte, Kemalist Türkiye İran, Irak ve Suriye’den kaynaklanan ve giderek artan tehditlere karşılık vermesine yardımcı olabilecek Ortadoğulu ortaklar aradı. İsrail kusursuz bir tercihti. Türkiye’nin tehdit algısını paylaşıyordu ve dünyanın yeni hegemonik gücü ABD’de nüfuzu olan güçlü bir Batı yanlısı ülkeydi. Dahası Kudüs, Batı’nın Ankara’nın Kürt isyanına karşı yürüttüğü savaş nedeniyle NATO müttefikine satmaya gönülsüz olduğu askeri teknolojiyi sağlayabilirdi. Sonuçta İsrail’le askeri, ekonomik ve diplomatik ilişkiler gelişip serpildi. İsrail için Ankara’yla yakınlık, ABD’yle ilişkisin-den sonra ikinci sırada geliyordu.
Ancak uluslararası koşullar değişip ulusal çıkarlar yeniden tanımlanırken, ilişkiler soğuyor, hatta uluslararası bir boşanma gerçekleşiyor. İsrail, önemli bir bölgesel güç olan Türkiye’yle kuvvetli ilişkileri sürdürmek konusunda ısrarcı davransa da, Türkiye’nin uluslararası ve ülke içi ortamı değişiyor. İki ülke ara-sındaki mevcut gerilimlerin sebebi bu.
Yepyeni bir perspektif
Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye karşı güç kullanma tehdidinde bulunduğu 1998’den bu yana Şam Kürt isyanına desteği bitirmesi ve Hatay üzerinde hak iddia etmekten vazgeçmesi yönündeki Türk taleplerine riayet ediyor.
Saddam Hüseyin’in Irak’ı 2003’teki ABD işgaliyle tehdit olmaktan çıkarıldı, bu da daha az tehditkâr bir ortam oluşmasına katkıda bulundu. Dahası, ‘proto-İslami’ AKP’nin Türkiye’de iktidara geldiği Ekim 2002’den bu yana, yeni seçkinler bölgeye dair önemli ölçüde farklı bir perspektif ve farklı siyasi öncelikler ihdas etti.
Türkiye kendisini büyük bir güç ve Batı’ya uzanan hayati önemde bir enerji köprüsü olarak görüyor, büyük bir uluslararası ilgiye mazhar olduğunu düşünüyor. Dış ilişkilerdeki giderek büyüyen hevesi, Türkiye’nin uluslararası önemini artırmak umuduyla bölgesel ihtilaflara arabulucuk önermesine yol açmış durumda.
AKP ilk başta İsrail’le iyi ilişkileri sürdürdü. Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan da dahil Türk liderliği İsrail’i ziyaret etti. Söz konusu dönemin büyük bölümünde işler stratejik alanda bile her zamanki gibi yürüdü. Bunun en son tezahürü İsrail’le Türkiye’nin Ağustos 2009’da düzenlediği donanma tatbikatıydı.
Ancak Kudüs’le Ankara arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar adım adım büyüyor, buna Türkiye’nin Batı’dan giderek uzaklaşması eşlik ediyor. Bilhassa AKP’nin Haziran 2007’de Gazze’yi kanlı bir biçimde ele geçirmesinden hemen sonra Hamas’la diyalog kurma kararı almasının ardından, Filistin meselesi daha fazla yankı buluyor. Bu, Batı’nın İsrail’in yok edilmesini savunan bir terör örgütüyle resmi ilişkilerden kaçınmayı öngören dış politika rotasından bir sapmaydı. Türkiye başbakanı 2009 kışında Gazze’ye düzenlenen Dökme Kurşun Operasyonu sırasında İsrail’i kaba ve ateşli bir biçimde kınadı. Oysa Batı yanlısı Arap ülkeleri bile İsrail’in radikal Hamas’a karşı mücadelesini destekliyordu.
Beşir’i ağırladı
Ulusal seçimleri kazanıp tekrar iktidara geldiğinden beri AKP, dış politikasını yürütmek konusunda
daha büyük bir özgüven sergiliyor. Ağustos 2008’de Türkiye İran İslam Cumhuriyeti’nin tepki toplayan cumhurbaşkanı Mahmud Ahmedinecad’ı resmi bir ziyaret çerçevesinde ağırladı. Hiçbir Batı ülkesi İran liderine böyle bir davette bulunmuş değil. Dahası Ankara Batılı müttefiklerinin aksine, geçenlerde İran’ın nükleer programını engellemeyi hedefleyen hiçbir yaptırıma katılmayacağını açıkladı. Türkiye Ağustos 2008’de, Darfur’da savaş suçu işlemek ve ve soykırım yapmakla suçlanmasına rağmen Sudan devlet başkanı Ömer Beşir’i ağırlayarak Batı’nın ortak tutumundan bir kez daha ayrıldı. Velhasıl Türk dış politikası giderek İslami bir renk kazanıyor.
Görünen o ki İsrail, Türkiye’nin arabuluculuk çabası çerçevesinde Suriye’ye yeterince taviz vermeyerek AKP hükümetini düş kırıklığına uğrattı. Dahası Kudüs Türkiye’nin yeni dışişleri bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun İsrail’den Gazze’ye geçme isteğini geri çevirdi; Davutoğlu Yahudi devletine geri dönmeden önce Gazze’de Hamas yetkilileriyle görüşecekti. Bu karar İsrail’in, Hamas yetkilileriyle temas eden yabancı devlet adamlarıyla görüşmeme politikasını yansıtıyordu.
Anti-semitik ifadeler kullanıldı
Fakat Davutoğlu tam da, bugünkü Türkiye için epey önemli görünen ‘’arabuluculuk’ izlenimini yaratmak istiyordu. İsrail’in buna izin vermemesi Türkleri çileden çıkardı ve Türkiye rahatsızlığını İsrail hava kuvvetlerinin de katılması planlanan uluslararası ‘Anadolu Kartalı’ tatbikatını iptal ederek göstermeye karar verdi. Türkiye’nin devlet kontrolündeki televizyon kanalında İsrail karşıtı ateşli bir yeni dizinin yayımlanmaya başlaması gerilimleri daha da artırdı.
Son olarak mevcut durum AKP liderliğinin İsrail ve Yahudilere yönelik gerçek antipatisini de yansıtır nitelikte. Erdoğan’ın New York’ta Amerikan Yahudi toplumu liderleriyle en son görüşmesi fiyaskoyla sonuçlandı. İstanbul Üniversitesi’nde geçenlerde yaptığı bir konuşmada da alenen
anti-Semitik ifadeler kullandı.
Batı için büyük stratejik kayıp
İsrail için AKP’nin tutumunu hazmetmek zor olacaktır. En hassas mesele elbette ki silah satışları ve stratejik işbirliği. Kudüs Ankara’nın niye Tahran, Şam ve Gazze’deki diktatörleri Yahudi devletinin demokrasisine tercih ettiğini merak ediyor. Ne yazık ki Türkiye bir kimlik krizi yaşıyor ve iktidar partisinin İslami kökleri iç ve dış meselelerde giderek egemen hale geliyor.
Umut edilir ki Türk demokrasisi, sadece Batı’ya demirlemenin sağlayabileceği ilerlemeyi ve refahı tercih edecek kadar güçlü olsun. Türkiye’nin İslamcılığa sürüklenmesi İsrail ve Batı için büyük bir stratejik kayıp olacaktır. Fakat bu en başta Türkler için bir trajedi anlamına gelecektir.
(The Daily Star- Lübnan’da İngilizce yayımlanan gazete, Bar-İlan Üniversitesi’nde siyaset bilimi profesörü, Begin-Sedat Stratejik Çalışmalar Merkezi direktörü, 28 Ekim 2009)
Soğuk Savaş’ın bitişiyle birlikte, Kemalist Türkiye İran, Irak ve Suriye’den kaynaklanan ve giderek artan tehditlere karşılık vermesine yardımcı olabilecek Ortadoğulu ortaklar aradı. İsrail kusursuz bir tercihti. Türkiye’nin tehdit algısını paylaşıyordu ve dünyanın yeni hegemonik gücü ABD’de nüfuzu olan güçlü bir Batı yanlısı ülkeydi. Dahası Kudüs, Batı’nın Ankara’nın Kürt isyanına karşı yürüttüğü savaş nedeniyle NATO müttefikine satmaya gönülsüz olduğu askeri teknolojiyi sağlayabilirdi. Sonuçta İsrail’le askeri, ekonomik ve diplomatik ilişkiler gelişip serpildi. İsrail için Ankara’yla yakınlık, ABD’yle ilişkisin-den sonra ikinci sırada geliyordu.
Ancak uluslararası koşullar değişip ulusal çıkarlar yeniden tanımlanırken, ilişkiler soğuyor, hatta uluslararası bir boşanma gerçekleşiyor. İsrail, önemli bir bölgesel güç olan Türkiye’yle kuvvetli ilişkileri sürdürmek konusunda ısrarcı davransa da, Türkiye’nin uluslararası ve ülke içi ortamı değişiyor. İki ülke ara-sındaki mevcut gerilimlerin sebebi bu.
Yepyeni bir perspektif
Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye karşı güç kullanma tehdidinde bulunduğu 1998’den bu yana Şam Kürt isyanına desteği bitirmesi ve Hatay üzerinde hak iddia etmekten vazgeçmesi yönündeki Türk taleplerine riayet ediyor.
Saddam Hüseyin’in Irak’ı 2003’teki ABD işgaliyle tehdit olmaktan çıkarıldı, bu da daha az tehditkâr bir ortam oluşmasına katkıda bulundu. Dahası, ‘proto-İslami’ AKP’nin Türkiye’de iktidara geldiği Ekim 2002’den bu yana, yeni seçkinler bölgeye dair önemli ölçüde farklı bir perspektif ve farklı siyasi öncelikler ihdas etti.
Türkiye kendisini büyük bir güç ve Batı’ya uzanan hayati önemde bir enerji köprüsü olarak görüyor, büyük bir uluslararası ilgiye mazhar olduğunu düşünüyor. Dış ilişkilerdeki giderek büyüyen hevesi, Türkiye’nin uluslararası önemini artırmak umuduyla bölgesel ihtilaflara arabulucuk önermesine yol açmış durumda.
AKP ilk başta İsrail’le iyi ilişkileri sürdürdü. Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan da dahil Türk liderliği İsrail’i ziyaret etti. Söz konusu dönemin büyük bölümünde işler stratejik alanda bile her zamanki gibi yürüdü. Bunun en son tezahürü İsrail’le Türkiye’nin Ağustos 2009’da düzenlediği donanma tatbikatıydı.
Ancak Kudüs’le Ankara arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar adım adım büyüyor, buna Türkiye’nin Batı’dan giderek uzaklaşması eşlik ediyor. Bilhassa AKP’nin Haziran 2007’de Gazze’yi kanlı bir biçimde ele geçirmesinden hemen sonra Hamas’la diyalog kurma kararı almasının ardından, Filistin meselesi daha fazla yankı buluyor. Bu, Batı’nın İsrail’in yok edilmesini savunan bir terör örgütüyle resmi ilişkilerden kaçınmayı öngören dış politika rotasından bir sapmaydı. Türkiye başbakanı 2009 kışında Gazze’ye düzenlenen Dökme Kurşun Operasyonu sırasında İsrail’i kaba ve ateşli bir biçimde kınadı. Oysa Batı yanlısı Arap ülkeleri bile İsrail’in radikal Hamas’a karşı mücadelesini destekliyordu.
Beşir’i ağırladı
Ulusal seçimleri kazanıp tekrar iktidara geldiğinden beri AKP, dış politikasını yürütmek konusunda
daha büyük bir özgüven sergiliyor. Ağustos 2008’de Türkiye İran İslam Cumhuriyeti’nin tepki toplayan cumhurbaşkanı Mahmud Ahmedinecad’ı resmi bir ziyaret çerçevesinde ağırladı. Hiçbir Batı ülkesi İran liderine böyle bir davette bulunmuş değil. Dahası Ankara Batılı müttefiklerinin aksine, geçenlerde İran’ın nükleer programını engellemeyi hedefleyen hiçbir yaptırıma katılmayacağını açıkladı. Türkiye Ağustos 2008’de, Darfur’da savaş suçu işlemek ve ve soykırım yapmakla suçlanmasına rağmen Sudan devlet başkanı Ömer Beşir’i ağırlayarak Batı’nın ortak tutumundan bir kez daha ayrıldı. Velhasıl Türk dış politikası giderek İslami bir renk kazanıyor.
Görünen o ki İsrail, Türkiye’nin arabuluculuk çabası çerçevesinde Suriye’ye yeterince taviz vermeyerek AKP hükümetini düş kırıklığına uğrattı. Dahası Kudüs Türkiye’nin yeni dışişleri bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun İsrail’den Gazze’ye geçme isteğini geri çevirdi; Davutoğlu Yahudi devletine geri dönmeden önce Gazze’de Hamas yetkilileriyle görüşecekti. Bu karar İsrail’in, Hamas yetkilileriyle temas eden yabancı devlet adamlarıyla görüşmeme politikasını yansıtıyordu.
Anti-semitik ifadeler kullanıldı
Fakat Davutoğlu tam da, bugünkü Türkiye için epey önemli görünen ‘’arabuluculuk’ izlenimini yaratmak istiyordu. İsrail’in buna izin vermemesi Türkleri çileden çıkardı ve Türkiye rahatsızlığını İsrail hava kuvvetlerinin de katılması planlanan uluslararası ‘Anadolu Kartalı’ tatbikatını iptal ederek göstermeye karar verdi. Türkiye’nin devlet kontrolündeki televizyon kanalında İsrail karşıtı ateşli bir yeni dizinin yayımlanmaya başlaması gerilimleri daha da artırdı.
Son olarak mevcut durum AKP liderliğinin İsrail ve Yahudilere yönelik gerçek antipatisini de yansıtır nitelikte. Erdoğan’ın New York’ta Amerikan Yahudi toplumu liderleriyle en son görüşmesi fiyaskoyla sonuçlandı. İstanbul Üniversitesi’nde geçenlerde yaptığı bir konuşmada da alenen
anti-Semitik ifadeler kullandı.
Batı için büyük stratejik kayıp
İsrail için AKP’nin tutumunu hazmetmek zor olacaktır. En hassas mesele elbette ki silah satışları ve stratejik işbirliği. Kudüs Ankara’nın niye Tahran, Şam ve Gazze’deki diktatörleri Yahudi devletinin demokrasisine tercih ettiğini merak ediyor. Ne yazık ki Türkiye bir kimlik krizi yaşıyor ve iktidar partisinin İslami kökleri iç ve dış meselelerde giderek egemen hale geliyor.
Umut edilir ki Türk demokrasisi, sadece Batı’ya demirlemenin sağlayabileceği ilerlemeyi ve refahı tercih edecek kadar güçlü olsun. Türkiye’nin İslamcılığa sürüklenmesi İsrail ve Batı için büyük bir stratejik kayıp olacaktır. Fakat bu en başta Türkler için bir trajedi anlamına gelecektir.
(The Daily Star- Lübnan’da İngilizce yayımlanan gazete, Bar-İlan Üniversitesi’nde siyaset bilimi profesörü, Begin-Sedat Stratejik Çalışmalar Merkezi direktörü, 28 Ekim 2009)
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