Georgia 'started unjustified war'

Georgia 'started unjustified war'
The war in Georgia last year was started by a Georgian attack that was not justified by international law, an EU-sponsored report has concluded.

However, the attack followed months of provocation, and both sides violated international law, the report said.

Russia said the report delivered an "unequivocal answer" on the question of who started the conflict.

But Georgia said the investigation proved that Russia had been preparing for war all along.

The report said about 850 people were killed in the August 2008 war, and that more than 100,000 fled their homes, about 35,000 of whom are still displaced.


The conflict erupted on 7 August 2008, as Georgia shelled the breakaway region of South Ossetia, in an attempt to regain control over it. The previous months had seen a series of clashes.

Russian forces quickly repelled the assault, and pushed further into Georgia.

The conflict lasted for five days before a ceasefire was agreed. Russia pulled back, but built up its military presence in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

'Not justifiable'

"The shelling of Tskhinvali (the South Ossetian capital) by the Georgian armed forces during the night of 7 to 8 August 2008 marked the beginning of the large-scale armed conflict in Georgia," the report says.

It adds later: "There is the question of whether [this] use of force... was justifiable under international law. It was not."

It also says Georgia's claim that there had been a large-scale Russian military incursion into South Ossetia before the outbreak of war could not be "sufficiently substantiated", though it said there was evidence of a lower-level military build-up.

The report states that while Russia's initial actions in fighting back against attacks on its personnel in South Ossetia were justified, its subsequent actions, in pushing far into Georgia proper "went far beyond the reasonable limits of defence" and was "in violation of international law".

"Furthermore, continued destruction which came after the ceasefire agreement was not justifiable by any means."

Given the European Union's relations with Russia have improved compared to a year ago, the EU may welcome the report itself, but may want to distance itself from the content, says the BBC Brussels correspondent Dominic Hughes.

EU countries said in a statement the report was not about apportioning blame, but they hoped it could "contribute toward a better understanding of the origins and the course of last year's conflict".

Russia has recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent and has vowed to protect them.

However, Georgia and the vast majority of the international community still views them as part of Georgia, and the report's author said Russia's recognition "must be considered as being not valid in the context of international law, and as violations of Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty."

Aid agencies say a refugee crisis continues in the region, with the Russian-backed authorities in South Ossetia refusing to allow tens of thousands of ethnic Georgians back to their homes in the region.

South Ossetia Becomes Thorn in Russia's Side

South Ossetia has been a de facto Russian protectorate since Moscow's victory in the five-day war in Georgia. But the breakaway republic is becoming an embarrassment for the Kremlin, with a corrupt president, disappearing aid money and brewing social unrest.

Thick clouds hang over the roofs of Tskhinvali, as if fog had enveloped the houses there. But they are clouds of smoke coming from the wood-burning ovens in the homes of the city's 27,000 inhabitants. There is no central gas supply in the South Ossetian capital, where gas pipes are not expected to be installed until next year.

Snow and cold temperatures have descended on this small town in the Caucasus, forcing Valentina Tadtayeva and her family to move once again. "It's already the third time since the war," says Tadtayeva, a thin, gray-haired woman.

In the night before Aug. 8, when Georgian forces launched a surprise attack on South Ossetia, a breakaway province northwest of the capital Tbilisi, three artillery shells tore off the roof and one wall of her house. Valentina, 59, and her husband Pavel, 62, had fled to the basement, together with their two sons Alan, 27, and Oleg, 26, as well as their daughter-in-law Asa, 21. "We feared for our lives," says Valentina.

The war lasted three days for the Tadtayevs. When the Russians liberated Tskhinvali, the family moved to the apartment of the youngest son's mother-in-law, where 14 people lived in two small rooms. Four weeks later, the soldiers set up an army-green tent in the courtyard, and the city administration promised to repair the damaged house within a few weeks. "Nothing has happened yet," Valentina complains. Instead, the family is now forced to move in with relatives once again. "They forgot about us," says Valentina. "Now the peace is becoming a burden."

It has been four months since Russia and Georgia went to war over the tiny state, only slightly larger than Luxembourg and with about 70,000 inhabitants, triggering a geopolitical earthquake. Moscow came to the aid of the South Ossetians. With their concentrated military might, the Russians repelled the Georgian troops from Tskhinvali and made it clear to the world that Georgia is part of their sphere of influence. What had seemed like a struggle between Georgia and Russia had turned into a conflict between Russia and the West.

But what did this victory do for South Ossetia, a mountainous strip of land that declared its independence after the hostilities ended? The state whose fate was allegedly the Kremlin's greatest concern at the time? And for which Moscow continues to collect donations through its embassies abroad -- funds intended for the "victims of the humanitarian disaster in South Ossetia?"

Besides Russia, so far only Nicaragua has recognized the separatist republic. Foreign journalists are only permitted to travel in the tiny country when accompanied by officials from the foreign ministry in Moscow. Even the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union, which brokered the cease-fire between Russia and Georgia, are being denied entry by the South Ossetians and their protective power, Russia. For this reason, very little reliable information makes it out of the region.

Russian Criticism Mounting

This makes what recently appeared in Russian newspapers all the more surprising: that the republic is on the brink of social unrest, just as winter is beginning, because the government has allegedly embezzled Russian reconstruction aid funds, as the former South Ossetian defense minister and head of the security council, a Russian lieutenant general, explained; or that South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity fled spinelessly during the war; and that millions of rubles deposited in the safes at the national bank in Tskhinvali had gone missing and that Russian businesspeople are refusing to invest in South Ossetia while its brawny separatist leader remains in power.

Kokoity, a former freestyle wrestler who now sits in the "Office of the President," a six-story concrete building from the Soviet era, calls the criticism in Russian newspapers "arranged." Certain pro-Georgian forces in Russia, he says, are attempting to "discredit South Ossetia and its leadership in the eyes of the Russians." Yes, says Kokoity, it is cold now in Tskhinvali, but "we are occasionally warmed by the joy of victory and independence," he tells his freezing fellow South Ossetians -- while his own office has thermopane windows from Turkey, installed after the war.
In the city, 10 schools, kindergartens and the hospital have been rebuilt. But in many houses there are now plastic tarps and blankets where windows used to be. "We brought enough glass to Tskhinvali to provide it with three times as many windows as it needs," Russian Disaster Protection Minister Sergei Shoigu said angrily.

No one knows exactly what happened to all the glass and other building materials. The same appears to apply to much of the €350 million ($490 million) in Russian reconstruction aid. To be on the safe side, Moscow did send two of its own people to Tskhinvali to serve as prime minister and finance minister. But President Kokoity has declared the budget, filled almost exclusively with Russian funds after the war, a state secret. A former security advisor accuses Kokoity of having surrounded himself with confidants from the Russian regions of Samara and Ulyanovsk and of conducting money-laundering operations with dubious companies.

Yuri Morosov, the former prime minister who resigned after the war -- supposedly of his own free will -- voices similar complaints. According to Morosov, 100 million rubles or about €2.7 million ($3.8 million) in salary payments for public servants were embezzled shortly before the conflict. Most of the money was intended for South Ossetia's armed militias.

It's a difficult situation for Russia. While war refugees in the rest of Georgia will receive new houses, thanks to €3.4 billion ($4.8 billion) in aid money, mainly from the EU and the United States, the reconstruction of South Ossetia could prove to be an embarrassment for Moscow. If so, Russia's efforts to present itself as an protective power to the people of the Caucasus and the world will suffer.

Potential Embarrassment for Moscow

There is at least one location in Tskhinvali that looks how Moscow wants it to look. At Stalin Street 27, across from the seat of Kokoity's government, Russian mobile phone provider Yevrozet has opened a shop. Fashionably dressed saleswomen use computers as cash registers -- as long as there is no power outage. It is warm in the shop, where Nokia mobile phones and Canon cameras glitter in glass cases. The shop is an island of modernity in a city in which the scars of the war are in full view on every street corner.

The shop sees about 1,000 visitors a day, which would even be considered a success for a retail business in downtown Moscow. The trouble is, hardly anyone is buying mobile phones and cameras. "People come here because they want to see normal life," says Irma Alborova, a saleswoman.

Normal life? South Ossetia, which the Russians seem so keen on controlling, has had a bad reputation since the early 1990s. Today it is considered a hub of crime and smuggling. It rebelled against the Georgian central government in a bloody war in the early 1990s, and after the war South Ossetia became impoverished and isolated. Many residents earned a living dealing in vodka on the black market.

Kokoity made a name for himself as the region's "trade representative" in Moscow, and then, with Kremlin support, he managed to catapult himself to the presidency of the rebel republic. But now there are growing doubts, even in Moscow, over whether Kokoity is the right man for the job.

Russian Control of Caucasus at Stake

If South Ossetia plunges in chaos, Russia could lose control over the entire unstable and majority Muslim Caucasus region. In the Russian autonomous republics of Dagestan and Inguchetia, government forces wage battles with underground fighters almost daily. Even in Christian North Ossetia, a pillar of Russian imperialism until now, religious warriors are now trying to stir up resistance within the Muslim minority against the "Russian occupiers."

Kokoity governs his territory like a mafia boss. Critics are threatened with deportation by his security staff, while family members are awarded positions in the administration. Kokoity made his brother Robert, a feared gangster in Tskhinvali, ambassador in sunny Abkhazia on the Black Sea.

The Ossetians certainly have Russia to thank for stopping the invasion of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili in August, thereby preventing reintegration of the province into Georgia. But they are increasingly skeptical about Kokoity's regime.

The Ossetian leader, who publicly drained a tankard containing three liters of wine to celebrate the Russian victory, now intends to give his regime a civilized makeover and curry favor in Moscow. Stalin Street, the only street with this name in a state capital, is to be renamed Medvedev Street.

But even Russian President Dmitry Medvedev knows that "by far not everything is going well" in South Ossetia, as he admitted in public recently.

But to avoid completely isolating itself internationally, Russia has stopped short of formally annexing the captured mountain province. This has its downsides. For example, the Kremlin cannot simply dismiss Kokoity like any other governor. Instead, it must court him as if he were a foreign head of state -- even though Kokoity's militias were apparently involved in gun battles with Russian troops recently. Many in Moscow are realizing that Russia went to war over a region that is not only insignificant, but also has a leadership every bit as unpredictable as Saakashvili.

In Tskhinvali, Valentina Tadtayeva and her sons packed together their few remaining belongings: blankets, a tea kettle, silverware and family photos. They will also take a basket of apples along to their relatives. The apples are from Kechvi, one of the Georgian villages on South Ossetian soil that were "flattened," as Kokoity says, and burned to the ground in the war. "We picked the apples after the war, otherwise we wouldn't have much," Valentina explains.

She remembers the days when Georgians sold their fruit at the market in Tskhinvali. "Somehow it seems long ago now," she says. "Even the market is now bombed out."

Nations aim to hammer out Azeri gas deal

By Guy Dinmore in Rome and Isabel Gorst in Moscow

Published: November 27 2008 22:55 | Last updated: November 27 2008 22:55

The governments of Italy, Greece, Turkey and Azerbaijan will meet in the coming weeks to try to hammer out an agreement on the export of Azeri gas to Europe via a planned pipeline across the Adriatic, official and industry sources said in Rome on Thursday.

Ilham Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan, met Silvio Berlusconi, Italian prime minister, in Rome following talks in Milan with Umberto Quadrino, chief executive of Edison, an Italian-French utility.

Edison is seeking final approval from all four governments on the supply of 8bn cubic metres of gas a year from Azerbaijan. Pipelines already exist to take the gas through Turkey and Greece and Edison intends to construct the missing link, known as ITGI, between Greece and Italy.

Edison quoted Mr Aliyev as saying that he considered the project as the “most realistic” of various proposed ventures, a reference to the Nabucco consortium that would take up to 31bn cubic metres of Caspian gas a year via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to a hub in Austria.

Mr Aliyev is also being courted by Russia’s Gazprom to sell Azerbaijan’s surplus gas to Russia. Washington is pressing him to look towards Europe instead.

Turkey is cited by analysts in all four countries involved as being the main stumbling block to an accord, despite a recent visit by Mr Berlusconi. Turkey wants the option to increase the amount of gas it consumes from Azerbaijan to make up for expiring Russian contracts, and is asking for special transit terms.

The EU, keen to diversify its sources of gas away from Russia, says Turkey has no right to demand special transit terms.

Industry sources said the four governments would meet at a senior level, possibly prime ministers, in Turkey. An Italian government source said the level and venue were to be decided.

Mr Berlusconi, who wants to maintain Italy’s close business relationship with Russia, says the ITGI project is “complementary and not alternative to others”. Eni, the part state-owned Italian energy company, has a joint venture with Russia’s Gazprom to build a deep sea pipeline to take Russian gas across the Black Sea to Europe.

The original ITGI plan assigned 8bn cubic metres of gas a year to Italy and 1.5bn each for Turkey and Greece. The Azeri gas is intended to come from the second phase of the Shah Deniz field.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008

Nagorno-Karabakh agreement signed

Armenia and Azerbaijan have signed a joint agreement aimed at resolving their dispute over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh at talks near Moscow.

Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and his Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sarkisian, agreed to intensify their efforts to find a political settlement.

It is the first time in nearly 15 years that such a deal has been reached.

Sporadic clashes have continued over Nagorno-Karabakh, despite the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 1994.

Before the truce, several years of fighting had left some 30,000 people dead and forced more than one million from their homes.

In 2006, an overwhelming majority of Nagorno-Karabakh residents - mostly ethnic Armenians - voted in favour of declaring a sovereign state. The declaration has not been internationally recognised.

'Political settlement'

At Sunday's talks hosted at Meiendorf Castle, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed "to speed up further moves in the negotiating process" over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said in a statement.





"They will facilitate the improvement of the situation in the South Caucasus and establishment of stability and security in the region through a political settlement of the conflict based on the principles and norms of international law and the decisions and documents adopted in this framework," he said.

The two country's foreign ministers would work with Russia, the US and France, co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which is seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict, he added.

Mr Sarkisian and Mr Aliyev made no comment.

Hopes of a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia were first raised in 2001, after a series of meetings between Armenia's former President, Robert Kocharyan, and Heydar Aliyev, the late Azeri leader. However, the talks and subsequent occasional meetings have come to nothing.

In March, the OSCE said it was sending a mission to Nagorno-Karabakh following serious clashes which reportedly left several soldiers dead on both sides.

Correspondents say Russia's brief war with Georgia in August has given impetus to international efforts to resolve disputes in the Caucasus, a region where Moscow is seeking greater influence.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7705067.stm

Published: 2008/11/02 17:13:58 GMT

TURKEY: CAUCASUS CRISIS LEAVES ANKARA TORN BETWEEN US AND RUSSIA

The simmering crisis brought about by Russia’s recent incursion into Georgia is putting Turkey on the spot, presenting Ankara with an undesirable choice between backing its traditional western allies and preserving its growing trade relations with Russia. "Turkey is torn between the latest developments, not only between Russia and Georgia but mainly between Russia and the United States and NATO as well. Even if we do not go back to the Cold War, at the point that we have arrived to today, Turkey cannot manage this crisis with ’platonic moves,’" said a recent commentary published by the English-language Turkish Daily News. During the Cold War, Turkey -- a member of NATO and a long-time ally of Washington -- found itself on the frontlines of containing the Soviet Union. Even during the Ottoman period, Russia -- which invaded Eastern Anatolia at the start of World War I -- was viewed as a dangerous regional competitor. The Turkish-Russian relationship has changed dramatically in recent years, though. Today, Russia is Turkey’s largest trading partner, with trade between the two countries expected to reach $38 billion this year, up from $27 billion the year before. Russia also supplies close to half of Turkey’s crude oil and 65 percent of its natural gas, used both to heat Turkish home and to run many of the country’s power plants.  But following the invasion of Georgia, Turkey is suddenly facing the prospect of a resurgent Russian presence near its border. "There is a dilemma which Turkey faces," says Ihsan Dagi, a professor of international relations at Ankara’s Middle East Technical University. "Georgia is indispensable to Turkey’s overall Caucasian and Central Asian strategy, and is central to its claim to being an energy corridor." On the other hand, he says, "Russia is mostly indispensable for the Turkish economy. What is at stake is Turkey’s economic stability." Moscow forcefully reminded Turks of this fact when it imposed new trade restrictions in August on goods coming from Turkey, holding up Turkish trucks at Russian border crossings for lengthy inspections. For many Turkish observers, the new restrictions were a clear warning for Ankara not to pick the wrong side in the Georgia crisis. Turkish trade officials say they may lose roughly $3 billion over the short term due to the new Russian restrictions. Turkey’s leaders, meanwhile, have been treading carefully around the Georgia issue. Although Turkey has publicly called for Georgia’s territorial integrity to be respected, it has refrained from embracing the stronger rhetoric coming out of Washington and Brussels. "We would never want such a thing [a new Cold War] to happen," Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said recently. "America is our ally and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy from Russia ... We would be left in the dark." In an effort to defuse the crisis, Ankara had suggested the creation of a "Platform for security and cooperation in the South Caucasus," which would create a regional security framework involving Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. But neither Washington nor Moscow seemed especially keen on the initiative. "The idea sounds attractive, but it will not go far. Such pacts can work only if all members are willing to prioritize stability and good relations over their other interests. Yet if there is one thing we know, it is that there is no consensus for stability in the Caucasus," Michael Reynolds, an expert on Caucasian history at Princeton University, recently wrote in a blog maintained by Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Given the prospect of prolonged uncertainty in the Caucasus, Ankara is exploring options for diversifying its gas supply, in case any tensions with Russia lead to a cut off. And when the United States recently asked for permission for its navy ships to pass through the Turkish controlled Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits in order to bring aid to Georgia, Ankara at first hesitated before giving an ambivalent "yes." This ambivalence could ultimately impact the West’s future plans for dealing with any further developments in Georgia, experts warn. "Against a background of mixed European reaction to Russian behavior, Turkish ambivalence could be a troubling harbinger of [a] transatlantic disputes to come," Ian Lesser, an expert on Turkey at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, wrote in a recent policy paper. "In theory, Turkey’s proximity to the crisis and desire to play a larger diplomatic role in the Black Sea could make Turkey a lynchpin of NATO strategy in Georgia, especially if rapprochement with Armenia is part of the equation. But Turkish willingness to place its territory at the service of Western policy in Georgia is highly uncertain." Added Lesser: "A large-scale economic and humanitarian assistance program for Georgia is virtually inevitable, and Turkey would be a natural partner for United States and European efforts. The United States and at least some NATO allies may go further and opt for significant military assistance to bolster what remains of Georgian independence, increase the country’s capacity for territorial defense, and raise the costs of renewed Russian military operations." "All of this will be much more difficult without Turkish political and logistical support." Ultimately, analysts say, the Georgian crisis may force Turkey to reconsider elements of its foreign policy, which seeks to draw on its Ottoman past as a power in the Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus to help it develop good relations with its neighbors and to act as a regional mediator. "The Georgian crisis put Turkish foreign policy in a predicament of how to reconcile Georgians and Russians and Ossetians and Abkhazians and Armenians and Azeris all at the same time," says METU’s Dagi. "Being a country with good relations with everyone is not possible during a time of conflict. You have to sacrifice something." He adds: "Using soft power in the region is fine, but when a crisis emerges, it’s time for hard choices."

Turkey's troubles in the Caucasus

From Michael Reynolds

The outbreak of the Russian-Georgian War earlier this month apparently caught Ankara as poorly prepared as it caught Washington. The Turkish Foreign Ministry’s section dealing with the Caucasus reportedly was virtually unstaffed. The head of the section was in Mosul on temporary assignment, the section’s number-two spot is empty and has been for the last six months. The number three was also away on temporary assignment in Nakhichevan and the other assigned section members were on vacation, thus forcing on-duty diplomats from other desks to scramble.

This may surprise. There are abundant reasons for one to expect that Turkey would have been following events in Georgia and the Caucasus with great diligence. The two countries share common borders and intertwined histories. Istanbul ruled large chunks of the Caucasus, including much of Georgia, for centuries, and today there remains inside Turkey a small but vibrant community of Abkhazians and related Caucasian peoples. Russia for most of the past three centuries has loomed over Turkey as its greatest rival and threat, yet at critical times, such as during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-22), it has been a key ally. Today Russia supplies somewhere around 70 percent of Turkey’s natural gas and is Turkey’s second-largest trading partner.

Georgia is a transit point for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas and as such is critical to Turkey’s ambitions to become an energy hub and to diversify its own energy supplies. As a member of NATO, Turkey has been involved in training and supplying the Georgian military. Finally, given Turkey’s own struggle with Kurdish separatists, other instances of ethno-separatism and border revision logically should command Ankara’s keen attention. In short, both Russia and Georgia are of great strategic, economic, and historic importance to Turkey, and the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination over which the Russo-Georgian War was (nominally) fought are directly relevant to the most sensitive of Turkey’s security concerns.

Turkey’s lack of preparedness for the Russo-Georgian war is not coincidental, but instead reflects a long-standing legacy of Kemalism. The fundamental precept of the foreign policy course laid out by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, summed up in his famous phrase, “Peace at home, peace in the world,” was that Turkey should bury its imperial past, avoid foreign entanglements, and focus on internal development. Thus the Turkish Republic deliberately isolated itself from its neighbors, especially those to its south and east. It cut cultural and other ties across the board, and preferred cordial but distant relations over close involvement and interaction. As a result, Turkey today has a strong cadre of diplomats, professors, analysts and others fluent in English and familiar with the United States and Western Europe, but it lacks the sort of expertise about its own neighborhood that one might assume it would naturally possess given its imperial history. Although challenges to this policy of isolation have emerged on occasion (briefly in the 1950s and perhaps during the early 1990s), a preference for cool detachment and inward focus has remained dominant in the Turkish bureaucracy.

There is much to be said for avoiding foreign entanglements, and the reasoning behind “Peace at home, peace abroad” was anything but frivolous. Yet self-imposed isolation carries its own costs. Those costs rose precipitately for Turkey following the end of the Cold War as its neighborhood underwent tremendous political and economic transformation. Ignoring the events taking place around it was no solution. At this time, Turkey’s self-confidence began to grow, and more Turks began to advocate that their country play a more active role in its region. One positive development has been the emergence in Turkey of think tanks, both official and non-governmental, dedicated to foreign and domestic issues.

Old habits and institutional practices die hard, however, and playing an active role in such a complex region is no simple matter. As a way to break out of the old mindset and gain experience in regional affairs without great risk, Turkey has been trying to play the role of mediator in regional conflicts. The architect of this approach is Ahmet Davutoğlu, a former professor and close adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who now holds the rank of ambassador. Thus Turkey has involved itself in negotiations between Syria and Israel. Similarly, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ali Babacan has at times tried to position himself as a broker between the West and Iran.

Erdoğan in the midst of the Russo-Georgian War tried to apply a slightly more advanced variant of this formula by flying to Moscow, Tiblisi, and Baku and proposing a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.” The idea of the platform, which is sometimes also called a pact, is to bring together the three South Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan with Turkey and Russia, and enable them to mediate and solve their conflicts among themselves.

The idea sounds attractive, but it will not go far. Such pacts can work only if all members are willing to prioritize stability and good relations over their other interests. Yet if there is one thing we know, it is that there is no consensus for stability in the Caucasus. Russia just mounted a calculated and successful effort to overthrow the status quo in the Caucasus at the expense of another putative pact member, Georgia. Russia’s war aims, moreover, extend beyond altering the balance of power in the Caucasus, to restoring its position as the dominant power in Eurasia and restructuring its relations with the United States and Europe. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are pawns in a game bigger than the Caucasus. The notion that what Russia and Georgia need in order to come to a mutually satisfactory agreement is a nearby neutral venue for their diplomats to meet verges on the surreal. Perhaps for this reason, the Russian press chose to give short shrift to Erdoğan’s call for a stability pact, and instead interpret his visit as signifying support for Russia in South Ossetia. It was not the finest moment in Turkish diplomacy.

Azerbaijan is another state in the Caucasus that has for some time been voicing an intense dissatisfaction with the status quo. In recent months, Baku has been dropping subtle threats that it might seek to revise it by going to war. In particular, Azerbaijan is dissatisfied with the outcome of the war it fought with Armenian forces over Nagorno-Karabakh (to use the most widespread English rendering of the region’s name), a predominantly Armenian enclave (technically it held the title of “autonomous oblast” in the Soviet Union) inside the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Karabakh War started in 1988, i.e. when the Soviet Union was still in existence, and ended with a ceasefire some six years later in 1994. During the war not only did Karabakh break free of Baku’s control, but Armenian forces managed to seize roughly fifteen percent of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s territory and expelled the Azeri inhabitants thereof, some 800,000 people.

Since that time, Baku has not been able to achieve any redress through diplomatic measures. But thanks to foreign investment in its oil industry it has accumulated some wealth, and has used that wealth to engage in a military build-up. Whether or not Azerbaijan’s military is capable of defeating and driving out Armenian forces and restoring the occupied territories and Karabakh to Baku is by no means clear, but building frustration among Azeris might tempt them to test their luck.

Turkey and Armenia are the two states in the Caucasus that have the greatest interest in preserving and building upon the status quo. The Armenians, i.e. the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the Republic of Armenia, won the Karabakh War and wish to keep their gains. They would like Azerbaijan and the wider world to acknowledge the de facto independent NKR as sovereign Armenian territory (either as part of the Armenian Republic proper or as a separate republic).

Armenia in addition would like to see Turkey lift the blockade it imposed in 1993 in response to the Armenians’ seizure of Azerbaijani territory. That blockade has stunted land-locked Armenia’s economic development, leaving it dependent upon Georgia and Iran for surface routes to the outside world. The disruption caused by Russia’s invasion to the operations of Georgia’s ports, rail lines, and roads (ironically, Turkish goods are among the biggest commodities imported along those roads into Armenia) has hit Armenia’s economy especially hard. and underscored Armenia’s isolation and fundamental vulnerability. Indeed, even before this most recent war, it was clear that Armenia’s lack of relations with Turkey had left it excessively dependent upon Russia—an unhealthy situation for any state pretending to sovereign status. (Indeed, with Armenia already virtually in its back pocket, one might imagine that Russia may seek to woo Azerbaijan to its side by compelling Armenian concessions on Karabakh.)

For its part, Turkey since the end of the Cold War has benefited in numerous ways from the retreat of Russian power and had reason to be generally satisfied with the state of affairs in the Caucasus prior to this war. The big exception is the state of its relations with Armenia. Although Turkey was one of the very first states to recognize Armenia’s independence in 1991, it never followed up to establish relations. Several difficult issues divide the two states. One bone of contention between them is Turkey’s insistence that Armenia definitively renounce any claims on the territory of the Turkish Republic. Another is Armenia’s insistence that Turkey recognize the massacres and deportations from Anatolia of Ottoman Armenians during and after World War One as a genocide. A third is Turkey’s demand that Armenia withdraw from the territory of Azerbaijan that it occupies.

A fourth issue is, of course, the blockade. Although the imposition of the blockade was greatly appreciated by Azerbaijan, which sees itself as the victim of Armenian aggression, it has harmed Turkey’s image worldwide by reinforcing the stereotype of the “Terrible Turk” as a bully. This is something the Turks, never mind the Azeris, find particularly irksome given that it is the Armenians now who are occupying territory seized in war. Turkish support for Azerbaijan has impaired Turkish efforts to counter the lobbying by Armenian diaspora groups of legislative bodies worldwide to classify the mass deaths of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Opening the border with Armenia, some Turkish officials believe, would enable Turkey to thwart these efforts more effectively.

Economics provides another incentive for Turkey to open its borders. Turkey’s east is isolated, distant from markets, and remains underdeveloped. Opening the border with Armenia would provide a boost to the local economy by enabling cross-border trade. It would also make available better routing options for oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian and export corridors to the Caspian and beyond, and thereby provide a boon to Turkey’s national economy as well.

In a gesture intended perhaps to break the stalemate in Turkish-Armenian relations, the Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian invited his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gül to come to Yerevan on September 6 to watch the national soccer teams of the two nations play a World Cup qualifying match. Gül, some Turks hope, will seize the moment to initiate a major shift in the region’s diplomacy. Gül has not yet committed. Were Gül to do so, it would mark a significant change not just in Turkish-Armenian relations, but even more so in Turkish diplomacy, which has a tradition of working slowly and with exceeding caution, and of letting opportunities slip by.

Indeed, with Russian forces now inside Georgia, both Turkey and Armenia (as well as Azerbaijan) probably already have missed an opportunity to overcome their differences and to chart a path toward more secure and prosperous futures for their societies. The Russian state, whether in its Tsarist, Soviet, and contemporary forms has demonstrated substantial skill in manipulating ethnic and other cleavages on its borderlands to weaken its competitors. It is worth remembering that Russia was involved in the emergence of all of the conflicts mentioned above (Turkish-Armenian, Azeri-Armenian, Ossetian-Georgian, and Abkhazian-Georgian) among others. That is not to say that Russia invented these conflicts. Hardly. At times Russia has expended considerable efforts to contain and resolve them. But Russia is not an outsider to them and possesses an intimate familiarity with them—a familiarity that it can, has, and will deploy to its advantage.

Strength is a relative thing. Sapping the cohesion and power of one’s potential rivals is often as effective, and occasionally even more useful, a method for overcoming them than is building up one’s own strength. There are more fissures for Russia to exploit in the Caucasus. The Turkish-Armenian-Azerbaijani fissure is an easy one to exploit. For reasons of history, memory, and culture, all of these societies remain deeply conflicted regarding relations with each other. Pushing the buttons to poison the atmosphere and disrupt any move toward reconciliation is not difficult.

Russia exerts tremendous influence over Armenia, and considerable influence over Azerbaijan. Turkey, too, is vulnerable to Russian pressure. Already Turkish businessmen are fretting over the way increased scrutiny by Russian customs of their goods is harming Turkish exports and are wondering if such scrutiny is intended as a message to Turkey to refrain from close cooperation with the United States against Russia.

Keeping Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan at loggerheads serves Russia by neutralizing the power and options of its Caucasian neighbors, keeping them dependent, and blocking the development of the Caucasus as an alternative corridor for energy and trade. It also serves varied domestic interests in each of those states. But it does nothing for those societies aside from depriving them of options for future development.

It is not clear that Russia’s defeat of Georgia will restore it to the position of hegemon in the Caucasus, but it will increase Moscow’s ability to play the role of regional spoiler. Although many Turks and Armenians retain doubts about the propriety of closer relations between their countries, important constituencies inside the governments and societies of the two nations recognize the multiple benefits better ties would bring. Their difficulty is convincing others that improved relations are, in fact, conceivable. Thus were Gül and Sarkisian to meet this September and announce together that they intend that their states should, together with Azerbaijan, overcome their differences, their words would have a real impact.

As the larger, more senior, more established, and more powerful state, Turkey is the better candidate to take the lead in the drive toward reconciliation. But it is not likely to happen. With Russia inside Georgia, and the Caucasus reverting again to a theater of Great Power confrontation, time is running out. Boldness is required. Yet whereas Moscow drew from its imperial collapse the lesson that fortune favors the bold, Ankara took from the Ottoman experience the lesson that extreme discretion is the better part of valor.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister comments on Ankara's Caucasus Stability and Cooperation platform

 ANS 04.09.2008 17:17

The Minister said Azerbaijan welcomes this initiative.

Azerbaijani Foreign Mnister Elmar Mammadyarov commenter on  Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform initiated by Turkey. The Minister said Azerbaijan welcomes this initiative: "If South Caucasus achieves stability, it will be good for the countries in the region. The point is that the coutnries should continue consultations. Azerbaijan in its turn will perhaps continue discussions with Russia and Georgia."

Mammadyarov said it's early to say in which form the platform will be approved. 

Turkiye Kafkaslar'da Arabuluculuga soyunuyor

Taken from "Radikal" on September 7, 2008

By Muhammed Nureddin

Enerji konusunda sırtını büyük ölçüde Moskova’ya dayayan, ancak Tiflis’le iyi ilişkilerini de korumak durumunda olan AKP hükümeti, Türkiye’nin yeni çok boyutlu dış politika doktrinini Kafkaslar’da da hayata geçirmek istiyor

Kafkasyalar’da yeni gelişmeler yaşanırken ABD’yle Polonya arasında füze kalkanı anlaşmasının imzalanması, Washington’ın ‘İran tehlikesi’yle mücadeleden ziyade Rusya’nın süper güç ve ABD’ye denk bir kutup olarak uluslararası arenaya yeniden çıkma girişimini engellemeyi amaçladığını teyit etti. Soğuk Savaş’ın bittiğinin ve uluslararası ilişkilere hükmeden yasaların içeriğinin değiştiğinin düşünülmesi sonrası, Kafkasya savaşı oyunun hemen hemen aynı araçlarla sürdüğünü gösterdi. Bu yeni vaka, Soğuk Savaş sırasında komünizmle mücadelede Batı’nın öncü kalelerinden biri olmasının ardından, kendisini bu yeni uluslararası çekişmedeki rolünü araştırmak zorunda bulan Türkiye’de birçok soruyu gündeme getiriyor.

Bugün Ankara’da, ülkenin 1990’ların başından bugüne kadar farklı uluslararası değişimlere uyum sağlamış çıkarlarına uygun yaklaşımın ne olacağına dair soru sürekli tekrarlanıyor. Ankara Batı’ya yakın politikalar izlemiş olsa da, Erdoğan hükümetlerinin izlediği ‘çok boyutlu’ siyaset Türk dış politikasına yeni bir durum dayattı. Türkiye, Araplardan İran ve Rusya’ya kadar kendi bölgesine karşı Batı-İsrail sistemi içinde taraf olması sonrasında, şimdi doğulu komşularıyla iyi ilişkiler kuruyor. Bu ülke, doğalgaz ve petrolü de tarihi rekabet ve ideolojik farklılık içinde bulunduğu Rusya ve İran’dan ithal ediyor. Bu nedenle Rusya’yla Gürcistan arasındaki kriz patlak verdiğinde, Türkiye kendisini çok boyutlu siyasetin ilk gerçekçi sorunu karşısında buldu. Müttefik Gürcistan’ı ve ABD’yi mi seçecekti, yoksa ekonomik çıkarlarına bağlı kalacak ve komşuluk etkeni baskın mı gelecekti?

Aslında Başbakan Erdoğan, tıpkı Cumhurbaşkanı Gül gibi komşu Rusya’yla ekonomik ilişkilerin geliştirilmesinin öneminin farkında. Bu durum karşısında Ankara, Gürcistan’ın bağımsızlığının yanı sıra Tiflis ve Bakü’yle koalisyonunu da koruma gereğiyle, iyi ilişkilere sahip olduğu Rusya’yı buluşturan bir formül bulma yönünde ilerliyor. Türkiye petrolünün yüzde 40’ını ve doğalgazının yüzde 36’sını Rusya’dan ithal ettiği için bu ülkeyle işbirliği yapılmasının önemini anlıyoruz. Özellikle de Türkiye sıra dışı bir büyüme ve ekonomik kalkınma döneminden geçerken... Ayrıca Mavi Akım diye bilinen Samsun-Ceyhan boru hattı, esasında Rus gazının dünyaya taşınmasını amaçlıyor.

Erdoğan, önerisini bizzat kendisinin Kafkasya’daki durumla ilgili taraflara sunduğu bir projeye aktarmakta gecikmedi. 

Kafkasya İstikrar ve İşbirliği Platformu adını taşıyan proje, Rusya, Türkiye, Gürcistan, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan’ı kapsıyor. Öneri Türkiye’yle tarihi anlaşmazlıkları bulunan
Ermenistan’ı bile dışlamadığı için yaratıcı sayılıyor. Böylelikle Türkiye herkesle ilişki kurmaya kararlı görünüyor. Hatta platformun Türkiye-Ermenistan anlaşmazlığı gibi başka sorunların çözümüne de bir giriş kapısı oluşturması, İran ve Ukrayna gibi Kafkaslar’daki gelişmelerle doğrudan bağlantılı başka ülkeleri kapsaması amacıyla genişlemesi de mümkün. Erdoğan Türkiye’yi herkesle ilişki kurmaya kadir bir arabulucu olarak gösterme girişiminde bulundu. Rus, Gürcü ve Azeri liderlerle görüştü. Yakında dışişleri bakanı Ermeni meslektaşıyla bir araya gelecek. Bu hareketlenmenin başarılı olup olmayacağını veya ABD’nin, özellikle de Polonya’yla yaptığı füze kalkanı anlaşmasının zamanlaması sonrası, bölgede istikrarı engellemek amacıyla deliğe çomak sokup sokmayacağını görmek için beklemek gerek. 

(Katar gazetesi Şark, Beyrut Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Direktörü, 24 Agustos 2008)