By Tony Barber in Brussels
George Papandreou, Greece’s prime minister, acknowledge to his fellow European Union leaders that the Greek public sector was riddled with corruption.
At an EU summit on Thursday night, The bloc’s 26 other national leaders sat in silence as Mr Papandreou delivered a short, blunt speech on Thursday night that said everything the rest of Europe had long known, or suspected, about Greek bureaucracy.
Greece is in the throes of the most serious fiscal emergency to strike the eurozone since the single currency’s launch in 1999. Mr Papandreou’s baring of the national soul capped a tumultuous week in which Greece’s creditworthiness was downgraded, its stock market plunged, the interest rate on its debt soared and even its survival in the eurozone was questioned.
José Manuel Barroso, European Commission president, praised Mr Papandreou’s determination to address the Greek economy’s problems, such as low business competitiveness and a public debt poised to rise far above the nation’s annual economic output.
“He recognised that there was a huge problem of corruption throughout the administration, including in public procurement,” Mr Barroso said.
“He spoke of a reduction in the levels of administration. Whereas there are four or five now, from regional to local level, he promised to suppress two of them, because they are expensive.”
Delegates at the EU summitsaid there had been little discussion of the Greek premier’s presentation, and most leaders – especially those of the 15 countries that share the euro with Greece – wanted to see more action and fewer words from Athens.
Jean-Claude Trichet, the European Central Bank president, told the European parliament’s monetary affairs committee on Monday that Greece’s troubles demanded “very difficult, very courageous but absolutely necessary measures”.
“Our basic problem is systemic corruption,” Mr Papandreou said in Brussels on Friday. “We intend to take harsh measures to root it out.”
However, he made it clear that Greece would not follow Ireland’s example and enforce drastic wage cuts.
“If we were at the edge of the abyss, we would cut wages in half. But we are not and we are fighting hard not to get there. We will protect wage-earners and pensioners.”
His unwillingness to specify cost-cutting measures disappointed market-watchers, aware that Greece is expected to record a budget deficit of more than 12 per cent of gross domestic product this year. Its public debt is projected at 113 per cent of GDP.
Mr Papandreou is expected on Monday to outline how he intends to slash the deficit to 3 per cent of GDP – under EU rules, the upper limit in normal economic times – over the next four years.
The underlying problem is, however, one of Greek credibility. Other eurozone countries were incensed in October when the newly elected socialist government announced that Greece’s public finances were far worse than previously claimed. The socialists blamed the misreporting on faulty statistics and the errors of the previous conservative government.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Turkish court bans pro-Kurd party
Turkey's Constitutional Court has voted to ban the country's largest pro-Kurdish party because of alleged links with Kurdish separatist rebels.
Turkey's chief prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya argued that the Democratic Society Party (DTP) took orders from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
The DTP is the latest in a series of pro-Kurdish parties to have been closed down in Turkey.
The EU, which Turkey hopes to join, expressed concern over Friday's ruling.
"While strongly denouncing violence and terrorism, the presidency recalls that the dissolution of political parties is an exceptional measure that should be used with utmost restraint," the EU's Swedish presidency said in a statement reported by Reuters.
The 11 judges in Turkey's Constitutional Court ruled that the DTP had become a "focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation", court president Hasim Kilic told reporters.
He said DTP leaders Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk had been stripped of parliamentary immunity and banned from politics for five years along with 35 other party members.
All party assets would be seized by the treasury, Mr Kilic added.
The DTP holds 21 seats in Turkey's 550-member parliament.
Some 40,000 people have died since the outlawed PKK launched an armed campaign in the mainly Kurdish south-east in 1984.
The BBC's Jonathan Head, in Istanbul, says the DTP's ban is another blow to the government's hopes of ending the conflict.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has tried to push through a package of reforms aimed at winning over the alienated Kurdish community and persuading militants to lay down their weapons.
Reacting to the ban, DTP chairman Mr Turk said it would not help to end the 25-year conflict.
"Turkey cannot resolve this problem by closing down parties," he said.
The court case has already caused unrest in Kurdish areas.
In the city of Hakkari - near the Iran and Iraq borders - Turkish police used water canon to break up a protest by Kurdish rebel supporters on Friday, Anatolia news agency reported.
Kurds make up about 20% of Turkey's population of more than 70 million.
The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the EU and the US.
Turkey's chief prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya argued that the Democratic Society Party (DTP) took orders from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
The DTP is the latest in a series of pro-Kurdish parties to have been closed down in Turkey.
The EU, which Turkey hopes to join, expressed concern over Friday's ruling.
"While strongly denouncing violence and terrorism, the presidency recalls that the dissolution of political parties is an exceptional measure that should be used with utmost restraint," the EU's Swedish presidency said in a statement reported by Reuters.
The 11 judges in Turkey's Constitutional Court ruled that the DTP had become a "focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation", court president Hasim Kilic told reporters.
He said DTP leaders Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk had been stripped of parliamentary immunity and banned from politics for five years along with 35 other party members.
All party assets would be seized by the treasury, Mr Kilic added.
The DTP holds 21 seats in Turkey's 550-member parliament.
Some 40,000 people have died since the outlawed PKK launched an armed campaign in the mainly Kurdish south-east in 1984.
The BBC's Jonathan Head, in Istanbul, says the DTP's ban is another blow to the government's hopes of ending the conflict.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has tried to push through a package of reforms aimed at winning over the alienated Kurdish community and persuading militants to lay down their weapons.
Reacting to the ban, DTP chairman Mr Turk said it would not help to end the 25-year conflict.
"Turkey cannot resolve this problem by closing down parties," he said.
The court case has already caused unrest in Kurdish areas.
In the city of Hakkari - near the Iran and Iraq borders - Turkish police used water canon to break up a protest by Kurdish rebel supporters on Friday, Anatolia news agency reported.
Kurds make up about 20% of Turkey's population of more than 70 million.
The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the EU and the US.
PKK provokasyonuna yüksek sesle karşı koymak...
CENGİZ ÇANDAR
Tokat Reşadi-ye’de 7 askerin şehit düşmesine yol açan saldırı meğerse ‘provokasyon’ değilmiş, çünkü PKK, Fırat Haber Ajansı aracılığıyla önceki gün olayı üstlendiğini duyurdu.
PKK kaynaklı açıklama, olayın ‘provokasyon’ olduğu gerçeğini ortadan kaldırıyor mu?
Hayır. Tersine, PKK’nın ‘Açılım’a yönelik provokasyon yaptığını gösteriyor.
Bu anlamda, Reşadiye saldırısını, 1993’te Turgut Özal’ın ölümünden bir ay sonra çözüm umutlarını canlandırmış olan ‘ateşkes süreci’ni sona erdiren ‘33 asker’in şehit düşmesini hatırlatan bir ‘provokasyon’ olduğu kanısında olanları yanıltan bir şey yok. Evet, Reşadiye saldırısı, tıpkı ‘33 askerin katli’ olayı gibi bir provokasyondur. PKK imzalı bir provokasyon.
Bakın Stockholm’de yaşayan ve tüm ömrü boyunca şiddete karşı çıkmış olan tanınmış Kürt aydını ve siyasetçisi Kemal Burkay, Cihan Haber Ajansı’na verdiği mülakatta neler diyor:
“Bu 33 askerin katli olayı büyük bir tepki oluşturmuştu. Hem iç hem de dış kamuoyunda dönemin hükümetince demokratik bir çözüm bulunması yönünde olumlu bir beklenti vardı. Özal da çözüm yanlısı bir insandı ama o provokasyon ile çözüm kesintiye uğradı. Savaş yeniden hızlandı ve çok kanlar döküldü yine... Evet, şimdi benzer bir durum var. Ak Parti’nin başlattığı açılım süreci umutlar yarattı; hem yurtiçinde, hem de yurtdışında. Ama ne yazık ki statükocu güçler, savaş lobisi, barış karşıtları ilk günden itibaren sürece çok büyük tepki gösterdiler, bu malûm. En başta da MHP-CHP ve de Baykal-Bahçeli. Bunlar sürekli olarak kamuoyunu kışkırttılar, kamuoyunun korkularına seslendiler. Oysa hükümet iyi niyetlerle bir açılım başlatmıştı ve gerçekten de çözüm yönünde adımlar atmak istiyor. Karşı olanların ise hiçbir projesi yok, sadece engellemeye çalışıyorlar. Bu ortamda Reşadiye olayının gelmesi sürpriz olmadı. Böyle bir şeyin olmasını bekliyordum şahsen ve bundan kaygı duyuyordum. Birçok kimsenin de aynı kaygıları duyduğunu zannediyorum. Her yumuşama döneminde, her demokratik bir adım atılması aşamasında böylesi olaylar oluyor.”
Kendi payıma ben de duyuyordum o kaygıları ve o nedenle geçenlerde de yazdığım gibi ‘Açılım’ı, ‘ince buz üzerinde horon tepme’ye benzetmiş, hassas, kırılgan bir süreç olarak gördüğümü yazmıştım.
Peki, Reşadiye olayı ile ‘Açılım’ın sona erdiğini ilân etmek gerekiyor mu?
Tam tersine, hızlandırmak ve derinleştirmek gerekiyor.
‘Açılım’ın alternatifi, 1984-1993, 1993-1999 ve 2004-2008 arasına dönmek ise, yani ‘kanlı hesaplaşma’dan başka bir yol bırakmamak ise, ‘Açılım’ı inatla ve belirli dersler alarak devam ettirmekten başka yol yoktur.
***
‘Açılım’, süreç ilân edildiği günden başlayarak, yani son dört aydır önce MHP ve CHP’nin ‘provokasyonları’ ile karşılaştı,
en son olarak da PKK, ‘kanlı saldırısı’ ile ‘provokasyonlar kervanı’ndaki yerini aldı.
Birbirlerine hiç benzemeseler, hatta gayet net biçimde ‘karşıt konum’da yer alsalar bile ‘Açılım’ı değişik türlerden ‘provokasyonlar’ ile sekteye uğratmak ve bitirmek için çaba gösteren siyasi organizmaların benzer yanları var.
En başta, ‘Açılım’ın başarıya ulaşması halinde ‘siyasi’ olarak kendilerini zayıflatacağını düşünmeleri; ki, bu MHP ve CHP için geçerli. Bu iki partinin Türkiye’nin Kürt yoğun bölgelerinde varlığı zaten kalmadı. ‘Açılım’ amacına ulaşır ve Türkiye’de iç çatışma ile kan dökülmesi ihtimali ortadan kalkarsa, bu iki partinin Güneydoğu dışında da siyaset zeminleri büyük ölçüde kaybedilecektir.
Zaten her ikisinin ‘Açılım’a karşı tutumları, örneğin İzmir ve Bayramiç’teki olayların iklimini hazırlamıştır.
PKK, ‘Açılım’ı kendisinin ‘tasfiyesi süreci’ olarak görüyor. ‘Açılım’ kuşkusuz Kürt sorununun ‘şiddetten arındırılması’nı hedef aldığı anlamda, sonuçta PKK’nın tasfiyesine gider. Günümüz dünyasında ve bölgede, şayet Kürt sorununa çözümün ‘şiddet yolu’ ile aranmasının hiçbir ahlâki ve siyasi gerekçesi kalmazsa, PKK’nın silahlı varlığının anlamı kalır mı?
Bu yönü ile bakıldığında, Reşadiye saldırısı PKK için bir ‘güç gösterisi’ olmaktan ziyade bir ‘zaaf belirtisi’dir.
Bu noktada yapılacak en temel yanlış ise, ‘Açılım’ı askıya alarak veya ‘sil baştan’ ile PKK’nın ‘silahlı harekât alanı’nı genişletmek olur. ‘Açılım’, PKK’yı, özellikle ülkemizde nüfuz sağlayabildiği Kürt vatandaşlar nezdinde anlamsızlaştırdığı oranda hedefine yaklaşacaktır.
Öyleyse, ‘demokratik atılımlar’a kararlılıkla devam şarttır.
Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan’ın dün Amerika-Meksika gezisinden dönüşünde söylediği şu sözler doğrudur ve umut vericidir:
“... Biz güvenlik güçlerimizin yaptığının dışında yeni bir süreci başlattık. Nedir bu yeni süreç? Dedik ki bunun psikolojik boyutu vardır. Bu mücadelenin sosyolojik boyutu vardır, diplomatik boyutu vardır, ekonomik boyutu vardır. Tüm bunları içeren bir milli birlik kardeşlik projesi lütfen buna dikkat edin milli birlik kardeşlik projesi ve hedefiyle demokratik açılım süreci olsun dedik ve bu çalışmayı bu şekilde başlattık. Bu beyefendiler (MHP ve CHP) bu çalışmaya başından beri takoz oldular, çözüme yönelik bir projeleri var mı? Yok... Ama dikkat ederseniz sürekli ihanet, hıyanet... Söyledikleri şey bu.
Onlar ne kadar bunu söylerlerse söylesinler, biz şu inandığımız çözüm sürecini aynı kararlılıkla devam ettireceğiz.”
Tamam. Ama artık Kürt sorununa ilişkin kimlik hakları ve demokratik zeminin genişletilmesi konusunda elle tutular, somut adımlar atılması gerekiyor. ‘Retorik’ ne kadar doğru olsa da, siyasetin yerini almıyor.
***
Varılan noktada bir de DTP’nin kapatılması davasında karara yaklaşıldığı olgusu söz konusu. Bazı Ak Partililerin -Cemil Çiçek ve Burhan Kuzu gibi- Herri Batasuna’nın ETA bağlantısına gönderme yaparak, İspanya örneğinden yola çıkarak DTP’nin kapatılmasına çanak tutar beyanları dikkat çekiyor.
Unuttukları -basın köşelerinden kendilerine hatırlatılıyor- temel gerçek, İspanya’da gerek anayasal ve gerekse uygulamada Bask sorununun demokratik biçimde çözülmüş olduğu gerçeği. Bask bölgesinde ‘ayrılıkçılığı’ savunan siyasi partiler bile var. Yasak olan, hak arama yolu olarak ‘şiddet’ ve ETA ‘şiddet’ kullandığı, Herri Batasuna ise bu ‘şiddet kullanan örgütten talimat aldığı’ için AİHM tarafından kapatıldı.
İspanya’daki anayasal yapı ve uygulamanın onda biri Türkiye’de olursa, o vakit DTP’nin kapatılmasının meşruiyetinden söz edebilirsiniz. Aksi halde, DTP’yi şu aşamada kapatmak PKK’ya daha geniş alan açmaktan başka bir anlama gelmez.
Nitekim son beyanlarına bakılırsa, DTP’nin kapatılmasının Abdullah Öcalan’ın umurunda olmadığı hatta bunu arzuladığı bile söylenebilir.
Reşadiye olayı ve bu saldırıyı PKK’nın üstlenmesinden sonra, Türkiye’de hatırı sayılı sayıda ve seslerini geniş çevrede duyurabilen Kürt kanaat önderi konumundaki kişilere özel bir rol düşüyor. Reşadiye olayının -bunu PKK üstlenmiş de olsa- asıl Kürt halkının haklarına ve çıkarlarına yönelik pis bir provokasyon olduğunu yüksek sesle haykırmak ve kınamak.
Bunu yapabildikleri ölçüde, ‘Açılım’ın önünün açık kalmasına ve Kürt sorununun çözümünün şiddetin dışlanarak aranmasına yardımcı olacaklar. Türkiye siyasetinde rol alabilecekler. Bundan en büyük yararı ise herkesten ziyade Türkiye’nin Kürt vatandaşları görecek.
Gün, provokasyonlara karşı koymak ve PKK’nın ‘silahlı saldırıları’na yüksek sesle ‘Hayır’ demek günüdür.
Tokat Reşadi-ye’de 7 askerin şehit düşmesine yol açan saldırı meğerse ‘provokasyon’ değilmiş, çünkü PKK, Fırat Haber Ajansı aracılığıyla önceki gün olayı üstlendiğini duyurdu.
PKK kaynaklı açıklama, olayın ‘provokasyon’ olduğu gerçeğini ortadan kaldırıyor mu?
Hayır. Tersine, PKK’nın ‘Açılım’a yönelik provokasyon yaptığını gösteriyor.
Bu anlamda, Reşadiye saldırısını, 1993’te Turgut Özal’ın ölümünden bir ay sonra çözüm umutlarını canlandırmış olan ‘ateşkes süreci’ni sona erdiren ‘33 asker’in şehit düşmesini hatırlatan bir ‘provokasyon’ olduğu kanısında olanları yanıltan bir şey yok. Evet, Reşadiye saldırısı, tıpkı ‘33 askerin katli’ olayı gibi bir provokasyondur. PKK imzalı bir provokasyon.
Bakın Stockholm’de yaşayan ve tüm ömrü boyunca şiddete karşı çıkmış olan tanınmış Kürt aydını ve siyasetçisi Kemal Burkay, Cihan Haber Ajansı’na verdiği mülakatta neler diyor:
“Bu 33 askerin katli olayı büyük bir tepki oluşturmuştu. Hem iç hem de dış kamuoyunda dönemin hükümetince demokratik bir çözüm bulunması yönünde olumlu bir beklenti vardı. Özal da çözüm yanlısı bir insandı ama o provokasyon ile çözüm kesintiye uğradı. Savaş yeniden hızlandı ve çok kanlar döküldü yine... Evet, şimdi benzer bir durum var. Ak Parti’nin başlattığı açılım süreci umutlar yarattı; hem yurtiçinde, hem de yurtdışında. Ama ne yazık ki statükocu güçler, savaş lobisi, barış karşıtları ilk günden itibaren sürece çok büyük tepki gösterdiler, bu malûm. En başta da MHP-CHP ve de Baykal-Bahçeli. Bunlar sürekli olarak kamuoyunu kışkırttılar, kamuoyunun korkularına seslendiler. Oysa hükümet iyi niyetlerle bir açılım başlatmıştı ve gerçekten de çözüm yönünde adımlar atmak istiyor. Karşı olanların ise hiçbir projesi yok, sadece engellemeye çalışıyorlar. Bu ortamda Reşadiye olayının gelmesi sürpriz olmadı. Böyle bir şeyin olmasını bekliyordum şahsen ve bundan kaygı duyuyordum. Birçok kimsenin de aynı kaygıları duyduğunu zannediyorum. Her yumuşama döneminde, her demokratik bir adım atılması aşamasında böylesi olaylar oluyor.”
Kendi payıma ben de duyuyordum o kaygıları ve o nedenle geçenlerde de yazdığım gibi ‘Açılım’ı, ‘ince buz üzerinde horon tepme’ye benzetmiş, hassas, kırılgan bir süreç olarak gördüğümü yazmıştım.
Peki, Reşadiye olayı ile ‘Açılım’ın sona erdiğini ilân etmek gerekiyor mu?
Tam tersine, hızlandırmak ve derinleştirmek gerekiyor.
‘Açılım’ın alternatifi, 1984-1993, 1993-1999 ve 2004-2008 arasına dönmek ise, yani ‘kanlı hesaplaşma’dan başka bir yol bırakmamak ise, ‘Açılım’ı inatla ve belirli dersler alarak devam ettirmekten başka yol yoktur.
***
‘Açılım’, süreç ilân edildiği günden başlayarak, yani son dört aydır önce MHP ve CHP’nin ‘provokasyonları’ ile karşılaştı,
en son olarak da PKK, ‘kanlı saldırısı’ ile ‘provokasyonlar kervanı’ndaki yerini aldı.
Birbirlerine hiç benzemeseler, hatta gayet net biçimde ‘karşıt konum’da yer alsalar bile ‘Açılım’ı değişik türlerden ‘provokasyonlar’ ile sekteye uğratmak ve bitirmek için çaba gösteren siyasi organizmaların benzer yanları var.
En başta, ‘Açılım’ın başarıya ulaşması halinde ‘siyasi’ olarak kendilerini zayıflatacağını düşünmeleri; ki, bu MHP ve CHP için geçerli. Bu iki partinin Türkiye’nin Kürt yoğun bölgelerinde varlığı zaten kalmadı. ‘Açılım’ amacına ulaşır ve Türkiye’de iç çatışma ile kan dökülmesi ihtimali ortadan kalkarsa, bu iki partinin Güneydoğu dışında da siyaset zeminleri büyük ölçüde kaybedilecektir.
Zaten her ikisinin ‘Açılım’a karşı tutumları, örneğin İzmir ve Bayramiç’teki olayların iklimini hazırlamıştır.
PKK, ‘Açılım’ı kendisinin ‘tasfiyesi süreci’ olarak görüyor. ‘Açılım’ kuşkusuz Kürt sorununun ‘şiddetten arındırılması’nı hedef aldığı anlamda, sonuçta PKK’nın tasfiyesine gider. Günümüz dünyasında ve bölgede, şayet Kürt sorununa çözümün ‘şiddet yolu’ ile aranmasının hiçbir ahlâki ve siyasi gerekçesi kalmazsa, PKK’nın silahlı varlığının anlamı kalır mı?
Bu yönü ile bakıldığında, Reşadiye saldırısı PKK için bir ‘güç gösterisi’ olmaktan ziyade bir ‘zaaf belirtisi’dir.
Bu noktada yapılacak en temel yanlış ise, ‘Açılım’ı askıya alarak veya ‘sil baştan’ ile PKK’nın ‘silahlı harekât alanı’nı genişletmek olur. ‘Açılım’, PKK’yı, özellikle ülkemizde nüfuz sağlayabildiği Kürt vatandaşlar nezdinde anlamsızlaştırdığı oranda hedefine yaklaşacaktır.
Öyleyse, ‘demokratik atılımlar’a kararlılıkla devam şarttır.
Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan’ın dün Amerika-Meksika gezisinden dönüşünde söylediği şu sözler doğrudur ve umut vericidir:
“... Biz güvenlik güçlerimizin yaptığının dışında yeni bir süreci başlattık. Nedir bu yeni süreç? Dedik ki bunun psikolojik boyutu vardır. Bu mücadelenin sosyolojik boyutu vardır, diplomatik boyutu vardır, ekonomik boyutu vardır. Tüm bunları içeren bir milli birlik kardeşlik projesi lütfen buna dikkat edin milli birlik kardeşlik projesi ve hedefiyle demokratik açılım süreci olsun dedik ve bu çalışmayı bu şekilde başlattık. Bu beyefendiler (MHP ve CHP) bu çalışmaya başından beri takoz oldular, çözüme yönelik bir projeleri var mı? Yok... Ama dikkat ederseniz sürekli ihanet, hıyanet... Söyledikleri şey bu.
Onlar ne kadar bunu söylerlerse söylesinler, biz şu inandığımız çözüm sürecini aynı kararlılıkla devam ettireceğiz.”
Tamam. Ama artık Kürt sorununa ilişkin kimlik hakları ve demokratik zeminin genişletilmesi konusunda elle tutular, somut adımlar atılması gerekiyor. ‘Retorik’ ne kadar doğru olsa da, siyasetin yerini almıyor.
***
Varılan noktada bir de DTP’nin kapatılması davasında karara yaklaşıldığı olgusu söz konusu. Bazı Ak Partililerin -Cemil Çiçek ve Burhan Kuzu gibi- Herri Batasuna’nın ETA bağlantısına gönderme yaparak, İspanya örneğinden yola çıkarak DTP’nin kapatılmasına çanak tutar beyanları dikkat çekiyor.
Unuttukları -basın köşelerinden kendilerine hatırlatılıyor- temel gerçek, İspanya’da gerek anayasal ve gerekse uygulamada Bask sorununun demokratik biçimde çözülmüş olduğu gerçeği. Bask bölgesinde ‘ayrılıkçılığı’ savunan siyasi partiler bile var. Yasak olan, hak arama yolu olarak ‘şiddet’ ve ETA ‘şiddet’ kullandığı, Herri Batasuna ise bu ‘şiddet kullanan örgütten talimat aldığı’ için AİHM tarafından kapatıldı.
İspanya’daki anayasal yapı ve uygulamanın onda biri Türkiye’de olursa, o vakit DTP’nin kapatılmasının meşruiyetinden söz edebilirsiniz. Aksi halde, DTP’yi şu aşamada kapatmak PKK’ya daha geniş alan açmaktan başka bir anlama gelmez.
Nitekim son beyanlarına bakılırsa, DTP’nin kapatılmasının Abdullah Öcalan’ın umurunda olmadığı hatta bunu arzuladığı bile söylenebilir.
Reşadiye olayı ve bu saldırıyı PKK’nın üstlenmesinden sonra, Türkiye’de hatırı sayılı sayıda ve seslerini geniş çevrede duyurabilen Kürt kanaat önderi konumundaki kişilere özel bir rol düşüyor. Reşadiye olayının -bunu PKK üstlenmiş de olsa- asıl Kürt halkının haklarına ve çıkarlarına yönelik pis bir provokasyon olduğunu yüksek sesle haykırmak ve kınamak.
Bunu yapabildikleri ölçüde, ‘Açılım’ın önünün açık kalmasına ve Kürt sorununun çözümünün şiddetin dışlanarak aranmasına yardımcı olacaklar. Türkiye siyasetinde rol alabilecekler. Bundan en büyük yararı ise herkesten ziyade Türkiye’nin Kürt vatandaşları görecek.
Gün, provokasyonlara karşı koymak ve PKK’nın ‘silahlı saldırıları’na yüksek sesle ‘Hayır’ demek günüdür.
Bu hangi PKK?
ORAL ÇALIŞLAR
Tokat’taki pusuyu ilk duyduğumda, saldırının yapıldığı bölgeyi de dikkate alarak ‘Bunu PKK yapamaz’ diye düşünmüştüm. DTP’nin kapatılma davasının sürdüğü ve açılım tartışmalarının şiddetlendiği bir dönemde PKK tarafından böyle bir eylemin gerçekleştirilmesine az ihtimal vermiştim. Yanılmışım. (DTP hakkındaki karar bu yazıyı yazdığım sırada açıklanmamıştı.
Bu nedenle sonucun ne olduğunu veya olacağını bilmeden yazıyorum.) Tokat’ta 7 askerin
pusuya düşürülerek öldürülmesinin PKK tarafından üstlenilmesi, bu bağlamda tamamen yeni
bir duruma işaret ediyor.
‘Açılım’ sürecinin başlangıcından bu yana Türkiye’nin batısında yükselen milliyetçi tepkiler ortada... PKK’nın Tokat pususunun bu tepkileri güçlendirici ve kışkırtıcı yönde etki yapacağı ortada olan bir şeydi... DTP davasının sürdüğü bu kadar kritik bir dönemde, doğuracağı tepkileri ve Türkiye’nin batısında oluşturacağı isyan potansiyelini herkesin öngörebileceği böylesine vahşi bir katliama girişmekle PKK neyi amaçlıyor?
***
Mantıksal olarak bakıldığında, PKK’nın DTP’nin kapatılmasını istediği gibi bir sonuç ortaya çıkıyor... DTP’nin kapatılması durumunda, ‘açılım’ süresince Kürtler içinde meşru bir muhatap kalmayacak. Tabii bunun sonucunda da, Kürt kimliği konusunda duyarlı olan çevrelerdeki umutsuzluk artacak ve Kürtler içindeki ‘şiddet’ eğilimi güç kazanacak.
Aslında, son dönemde, hem DTP içinde, hem de Kürtlerin genelinde, silahlı eylemlerin Kürtlerin demokratik taleplerinin gerçekleştirilmesi konusunda bir yarar sağlamadığı, tam tersine bu taleplere zarar verdiği fikri yaygınlaşıyor. Soruna siyasi bir çözüm bulunabileceği umudu da artıyor.
PKK sanki bu psikolojinin daha da güçlenmesinden endişeye kapılmış durumda. DTP’nin (kapatılmaması halinde) açılım süreci ilerledikçe giderek güçlü bir muhatap haline dönüşme ihtimal yüksek. Bu ihtimal, PKK çevrelerinde, kendilerinin devre dışı kalacakları, hatta PKK’nın bir süre sonra ‘misyonunu tamamlamış bir örgüt konumuna gelebileceği’ gibi korkular doğuruyor olabilir.
Açılım sürecinin en hassas ve kritik noktası, ‘muhatap’... DTP’nin bazı yöneticileri, muhtemelen PKK’dan gelen taleplerin ve baskıların da etkisiyle ‘muhatap Öcalan’ deme gereğini duydular. Türkiye’nin Batısı’nda oluşacak tepkileri bilmelerine rağmen bu tutumu sürdürdüler.
Bu konuda, DTP içinde iki farklı dil göze çarpıyor. Bazı yöneticiler, ‘Öcalan bu süreçte olumlu rol oynayabilir, onu da dikkate almak gerekir’ şeklinde daha kontrollü sayılabilecek bir üsluba eğilim gösterirken, bazı yöneticiler, ‘muhatap Öcalan’dır’ demeyi tercih ediyorlar.
Kandil ve Öcalan ise, ‘Muhatap DTP de olabilir’ diyerek muğlak bir ifade kullanmayı tercih etti. Bugünün Türkiye’sinde ve bu psikolojik ortamda, DTP’nin yok sayılması mümkün
olamıyor. DTP, hem kendi içindeki aksaklık ve uyumsuzluklara, hem de dışsal koşullardaki olumsuzluklara rağmen, seçimle gelmiş meşru bir temsilci olarak varlığını ‘konunun tarafları’na kabul ettirebilmiş bir oluşum.
Tabii şu noktayı da göz önünde bulundurmakta yarar var: Tek bir PKK’dan söz etmek, (Türk milliyetçilerinin kafasındaki imajın tam aksine) o kadar da kolay değil. Kongra-Gel’in eski başkanı Zübeyir Aydar’la geçen ay Brüksel’de karşılaştığımıza, o da bu farklılıklara dikkat çekmişti.
Zübeyir Aydar, PKK’nın durumunu değerlendirirken, ‘Kandil’, ‘İmralı’, ‘yurtdışı’, ‘Türkiye’nin içi’ olmak üzere çok değişik merkezlerin ve eğilimlerin PKK’nın kararlarında etkili olduğunu dile getirdi. Öcalan’ın çağrısı üzerine gerçekleşen Kandil’den inişlerin ardından, PKK içindeki değişik eğilimlerin değişik tepkiler verdiğine vurgu yaptı.
***
‘Açılım’ sürecinin en ilginç boyutlarından biri, PKK çevrelerinden gelen, ‘bizi tasfiye etmek istiyorlar’ değerlendirmeleri. Bu değerlendirmeler hem Öcalan’ın açıklamalarına yansıdı, hem de DTP yöneticilerinin kullandıkları üslubu etkiledi.
Tokat’taki acımasız pusu, PKK’dan gelen bir ‘ben hâlâ varım ve gerekirse böyle şeyler yaparım’ mesajı olarak okunabilir. Ancak, belirttiğimiz gibi, hem bölgedeki dengeler, hem de Kürt halkı içinde öne çıkmakta olan eğilim, ‘silahların artık susması’ yönünde.
Eğer Türkiye’ye egemen olan irade süreci doğru yönetebilir, PKK’ya yönelik tepkiyi Kürt halkını hedef alan bir baskıya dönüştürmez ve demokratikleşme iradesinin sürdürülmesi
noktasında ısrar ederse, ‘açılım’ da, Kürt toplumundaki şiddetten uzaklaşma eğilimi de
devam eder. Hatta, şiddeti ihya etme yönündeki çabalar marjinalleşebilirler.
NOT: PKK merkezinin Tokat’taki pusu konusunda yapmış olduğu “Anakarargah Komutanlığımız tarafından herhangi bir talimat verilmemesine rağmen, Dersim eyaletimize bağlı bir birimimiz kendi inisiyatifiyle yaptı” açıklaması, 1993 yılındaki 33 askerin öldürüldüğü Bingöl pususundan sonra gerçeklemiş olan gelişmeleri akla getiriyor.
O zaman da PKK merkezi ve Öcalan tarafından benzer şekilde dolaylı olarak üstlenilmiş olan pusu, daha sonra, ‘Bizim haberimiz yoktu, Şemdin Sakık kendi inisiyatifiyle yaptı’ denilerek reddedilmişti. Sonraki yıllarda, Ergenekon dosyası dahil olmak üzere ortaya çıkan bir çok bilgi ve bulgu, Bingöl pususunun devlet içindeki bazı güçlerle bağlantısı olduğu yönündeki şüpheyi artırdı.
Bu gibi noktaların da bir kenara not edilmelerinde büyük yarar var... Bu gibi şüpheler üzerinden bir araştırmaya ve sorgulamaya girişilirse, olayın arka planındaki olası birtakım karanlık hesapların ve bağlantıların aydınlatılması söz konusu olabilir.
Tokat’taki pusuyu ilk duyduğumda, saldırının yapıldığı bölgeyi de dikkate alarak ‘Bunu PKK yapamaz’ diye düşünmüştüm. DTP’nin kapatılma davasının sürdüğü ve açılım tartışmalarının şiddetlendiği bir dönemde PKK tarafından böyle bir eylemin gerçekleştirilmesine az ihtimal vermiştim. Yanılmışım. (DTP hakkındaki karar bu yazıyı yazdığım sırada açıklanmamıştı.
Bu nedenle sonucun ne olduğunu veya olacağını bilmeden yazıyorum.) Tokat’ta 7 askerin
pusuya düşürülerek öldürülmesinin PKK tarafından üstlenilmesi, bu bağlamda tamamen yeni
bir duruma işaret ediyor.
‘Açılım’ sürecinin başlangıcından bu yana Türkiye’nin batısında yükselen milliyetçi tepkiler ortada... PKK’nın Tokat pususunun bu tepkileri güçlendirici ve kışkırtıcı yönde etki yapacağı ortada olan bir şeydi... DTP davasının sürdüğü bu kadar kritik bir dönemde, doğuracağı tepkileri ve Türkiye’nin batısında oluşturacağı isyan potansiyelini herkesin öngörebileceği böylesine vahşi bir katliama girişmekle PKK neyi amaçlıyor?
***
Mantıksal olarak bakıldığında, PKK’nın DTP’nin kapatılmasını istediği gibi bir sonuç ortaya çıkıyor... DTP’nin kapatılması durumunda, ‘açılım’ süresince Kürtler içinde meşru bir muhatap kalmayacak. Tabii bunun sonucunda da, Kürt kimliği konusunda duyarlı olan çevrelerdeki umutsuzluk artacak ve Kürtler içindeki ‘şiddet’ eğilimi güç kazanacak.
Aslında, son dönemde, hem DTP içinde, hem de Kürtlerin genelinde, silahlı eylemlerin Kürtlerin demokratik taleplerinin gerçekleştirilmesi konusunda bir yarar sağlamadığı, tam tersine bu taleplere zarar verdiği fikri yaygınlaşıyor. Soruna siyasi bir çözüm bulunabileceği umudu da artıyor.
PKK sanki bu psikolojinin daha da güçlenmesinden endişeye kapılmış durumda. DTP’nin (kapatılmaması halinde) açılım süreci ilerledikçe giderek güçlü bir muhatap haline dönüşme ihtimal yüksek. Bu ihtimal, PKK çevrelerinde, kendilerinin devre dışı kalacakları, hatta PKK’nın bir süre sonra ‘misyonunu tamamlamış bir örgüt konumuna gelebileceği’ gibi korkular doğuruyor olabilir.
Açılım sürecinin en hassas ve kritik noktası, ‘muhatap’... DTP’nin bazı yöneticileri, muhtemelen PKK’dan gelen taleplerin ve baskıların da etkisiyle ‘muhatap Öcalan’ deme gereğini duydular. Türkiye’nin Batısı’nda oluşacak tepkileri bilmelerine rağmen bu tutumu sürdürdüler.
Bu konuda, DTP içinde iki farklı dil göze çarpıyor. Bazı yöneticiler, ‘Öcalan bu süreçte olumlu rol oynayabilir, onu da dikkate almak gerekir’ şeklinde daha kontrollü sayılabilecek bir üsluba eğilim gösterirken, bazı yöneticiler, ‘muhatap Öcalan’dır’ demeyi tercih ediyorlar.
Kandil ve Öcalan ise, ‘Muhatap DTP de olabilir’ diyerek muğlak bir ifade kullanmayı tercih etti. Bugünün Türkiye’sinde ve bu psikolojik ortamda, DTP’nin yok sayılması mümkün
olamıyor. DTP, hem kendi içindeki aksaklık ve uyumsuzluklara, hem de dışsal koşullardaki olumsuzluklara rağmen, seçimle gelmiş meşru bir temsilci olarak varlığını ‘konunun tarafları’na kabul ettirebilmiş bir oluşum.
Tabii şu noktayı da göz önünde bulundurmakta yarar var: Tek bir PKK’dan söz etmek, (Türk milliyetçilerinin kafasındaki imajın tam aksine) o kadar da kolay değil. Kongra-Gel’in eski başkanı Zübeyir Aydar’la geçen ay Brüksel’de karşılaştığımıza, o da bu farklılıklara dikkat çekmişti.
Zübeyir Aydar, PKK’nın durumunu değerlendirirken, ‘Kandil’, ‘İmralı’, ‘yurtdışı’, ‘Türkiye’nin içi’ olmak üzere çok değişik merkezlerin ve eğilimlerin PKK’nın kararlarında etkili olduğunu dile getirdi. Öcalan’ın çağrısı üzerine gerçekleşen Kandil’den inişlerin ardından, PKK içindeki değişik eğilimlerin değişik tepkiler verdiğine vurgu yaptı.
***
‘Açılım’ sürecinin en ilginç boyutlarından biri, PKK çevrelerinden gelen, ‘bizi tasfiye etmek istiyorlar’ değerlendirmeleri. Bu değerlendirmeler hem Öcalan’ın açıklamalarına yansıdı, hem de DTP yöneticilerinin kullandıkları üslubu etkiledi.
Tokat’taki acımasız pusu, PKK’dan gelen bir ‘ben hâlâ varım ve gerekirse böyle şeyler yaparım’ mesajı olarak okunabilir. Ancak, belirttiğimiz gibi, hem bölgedeki dengeler, hem de Kürt halkı içinde öne çıkmakta olan eğilim, ‘silahların artık susması’ yönünde.
Eğer Türkiye’ye egemen olan irade süreci doğru yönetebilir, PKK’ya yönelik tepkiyi Kürt halkını hedef alan bir baskıya dönüştürmez ve demokratikleşme iradesinin sürdürülmesi
noktasında ısrar ederse, ‘açılım’ da, Kürt toplumundaki şiddetten uzaklaşma eğilimi de
devam eder. Hatta, şiddeti ihya etme yönündeki çabalar marjinalleşebilirler.
NOT: PKK merkezinin Tokat’taki pusu konusunda yapmış olduğu “Anakarargah Komutanlığımız tarafından herhangi bir talimat verilmemesine rağmen, Dersim eyaletimize bağlı bir birimimiz kendi inisiyatifiyle yaptı” açıklaması, 1993 yılındaki 33 askerin öldürüldüğü Bingöl pususundan sonra gerçeklemiş olan gelişmeleri akla getiriyor.
O zaman da PKK merkezi ve Öcalan tarafından benzer şekilde dolaylı olarak üstlenilmiş olan pusu, daha sonra, ‘Bizim haberimiz yoktu, Şemdin Sakık kendi inisiyatifiyle yaptı’ denilerek reddedilmişti. Sonraki yıllarda, Ergenekon dosyası dahil olmak üzere ortaya çıkan bir çok bilgi ve bulgu, Bingöl pususunun devlet içindeki bazı güçlerle bağlantısı olduğu yönündeki şüpheyi artırdı.
Bu gibi noktaların da bir kenara not edilmelerinde büyük yarar var... Bu gibi şüpheler üzerinden bir araştırmaya ve sorgulamaya girişilirse, olayın arka planındaki olası birtakım karanlık hesapların ve bağlantıların aydınlatılması söz konusu olabilir.
Yüksek Mahkeme DTP'yi kapattı
Anayasa Mahkemesi Başkanı Haşim Kılıç Demokratik Toplum Partisi'nin kapatılmasına karar verildiğini açıkladı. 37 DTP'liye 5 yıl boyunca siyaset yasağı geldi
ANKARA - Anayasa Mahkemesi, oybirliği ile Demokratik Toplum Partisi’ni "eylemleri yanında, terör örgütüyle olan bağlantıları da değerlendirildiğinde devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğüne aykırı nitelikteki fiillerin işlendiği bir odak
haline geldiği gerekçesiyle" temelli kapattı. Mahkeme, 37 isim hakkında 5 yıllık siyasi yasak getirirken, bu kapsama giren Parti Genel Başkanı Ahmet Türk ile eski Eşbaşkan Aysel Tuğluk'un milletvekilliklerini düşürdü. DTP dosyasının gündeme alınma zamanlamasıyla demokratik açılım süreci arasında bağlantı kurulmasını eleştiren Haşim Kılıç, "Hukukun yükünü mahkemeler çeker. Siyasetçilerin yükünü de siyasetçilerin çekmesi lazım" dedi. DTP kararını alırken Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nin İspanya'da kapatılan Herri Batasuna partisi ile ilgili kararını da dikkate aldığını söyleyen Kılıç, isim vermeden Başbakan Yardımcısı Cemil Çiçek'in DTP'nin durumunu Batasuna'ya benzeten açıklaması için 'talihsiz açıklama' ifadesini kullandı.
Terör odağı olduğu için
Anayasa Mahkemesi Yargıtay Başsavcılığı'nın 16 Kasım 2007'de 'bölücü eylemlerin odağı olduğu' iddiasıyla DTP aleyhine açtığı davanın esastan görüşmesini 4. gününde tamamladı. 4. günde yapılan 9 saatlik tartışmaların ardından kameraların önüne çıkan Mahkeme Başkanı Haşim Kılıç, yapılan görüşmeler sonunda, DTP’nin, eylemleri yanında, terör örgütüyle olan bağlantıları da değerlendirildiğinde, devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğüne aykırı nitelikteki fiillerin işlendiği bir odak haline geldiği anlaşıldığından, Anayasa’nın 68 ve 69. maddeleriyle 2820 Sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun 101 ve 103. maddeleri gereğince kapatılmasına karar verildiğini açıkladı.
Türk ve Tuğluk'un milletvekilliği düşecek
Partinin tüzel kişiliğinin kapatma kararının çıktığı andan itibaren geçerli olacağını söyleyen Kılıç, beyan ve eylemleriyle partinin kapatılmasına neden olan ve bu nedenle siyasi yasak getirilenler arasında DTP Genel Başkanı ve Mardin Milletvekili Ahmet Türk ile Diyarbakır Milletvekili Aysel Tuğluk’un milletvekilliklerinin karar resmi gazetede yayınlandıktan sonra düşeceğini açıkladı. Tuğluk ve Türk, bağımsız olarak seçime girip TBMM'ye girebilecek, ama herhangi bir parti grubuna üye olamayacak.
Başkanlar bağımsız devam edebilir
Kılıç'ın açıkladığı listede belediye başkanları Necdet Atalay(Batman), Ferhan Türk(Kızıltepe), Selim Sadak (Siirt) ve Aydın Budak (Cizre) yeralıyor. Belediye başkanları İçişleri Bakanlığı kapatma kararını gerekçe göstererem haklarında bir işlem yapmadığı takdirde görevlerine bağımsız olarak devam edebilecek.
Çiçek'in açıklaması talihsiz
Kararı okuduktan sonra davanın zamanlamasına ilişkin yapılan eleştirilere yanıt veren Kılıç, isim vermeden Başbakan Yardımcısı Cemil Çiçek'in Herri Batasuna kararıyla ilgili açıklamalarını "talihsiz açıklamalar" olduğunu ifade ederek şunları söyledi:
ELEŞTİRİLERİ GÖRÜYOR GİBİYİM: Karar yazılana kadar Anayasa Mahkemesi ile ilgili belki de yapılacak eleştirileri şimdiden görüyor gibiyim. Bu nedenle mahkememizle ilgili bu karardan önce bazı düşüncelere eleştirilerini olduğunu basın organlarında bizde adım adım izledik. Bunlar içinde demokrasi ve insan hakları alanında tam bir süreç başlamış iken böyle bir sürecin, bu davanın ele alınmasıyla, bu sürecin sabote edildiği, verilecek kapatma kararının siyasi bir darbe olarak nitelendirildiği ve zamanlamasının da siyasi partinin görüşülmesine ilişkin tarihin çok düşündürücü olduğu ifade edildi. Bu eleştirileri biz çok haksız ve acımasız olarak değerlendiriyoruz. Bu dava 2 yılı aşkın bir süredir devam etmekte ve iki yılı birazda geçmiş durumda. İki yıl bu konuda başsavcı ile 141 belgenin eklerine ilişkin çok ciddi eksikler görüldü. Bu eksiklikler raportörler aracılığıyla kapatılmaya çalışıldı. bizim partiye ilişkin gündemi tespit ederken dışarıda sürmekte olan bir demokratik süreci ile ilgili herhangi öngörümüz değerlendirmemiz herhangi bir düşüncemiz asla olmamıştır.
BİR PARTİ TERÖRÜ KULLANAMAZ :Mahkeme hak ve özgürlükler korusunda birey ile devletin menfaatleri ve çıkarları daha doğrusu anayasada koruma altına alınmış değerler arasında bir denge kuran bir kurumdur. Bu dengeyi kuranken tabi ki Anayasaya, yasalara ulusla arası hukuka ve hukukun üstün kurallarına bağlı kararak bu dengeyi korumaya çalışmıştır. Parti kapatmalarla ilgili çağdaş dünyada geçerli olan uluslararası anlaşmaların ve bizim siyasi partiler kanunumuz ifade ettiği ölçüler içerisinde hem ifade özgürlüğünü hem de örgütlenme özgürlüğünü kullanılmasına ilişkin bir takım ölçülerin olduğunu hepimiz biliyorsunuz. Bir siyasi parti terör, şiddet baskı içeren eylem ve söylemleri kullanma hakkına sahip değildir. terör ve şiddet içeren eylem ve söylemlerle barışçıl söylem ve önerilerin birbirinden ayırmak zorundadır.
KAPATMA GEREKÇELERİ: Nitekim AHİM son yıllarda vermiş olduğu kararlarında bu konunun üzerinde çok açık bir biçimde durmuş bununla ilgili önemli ölçüler ve ölçütler yaratmıştır. İşte bunları ifade edecek olursak bir siyasi partinin terör ve şiddete yakınlığı meşru göstermeye çalışması propagandası, övülmesi yardım ve yataklık yapması açık ve gizli onay ve destek vermesi sözleşmeye asla uygun görülmemiştir. Bu konuda verilmiş kapatma kararları sözleşmeyi ihlal olarak nitelendirilmemiştir. Bir parti demokratik ortam içerisinde amacı ve bu amaca ulaşmak için kullandığı araçlarını demokratik toplum değerleriyle uyum içerisinde kullanmak zorundadır. Bu uygunluk yoksa bu siyasi partinin siyasi alanda bir toplum modeli önerme hakkı da yoktur.
TERÖR VE ŞİDDET YÖNTEM OLAMAZ: Bir partinin savunduğu ya da önerdiği inandığı toplumsal projesi ne kadar kutsal olursa olsun yöntem olarak eğer terör ve şiddetle ilişki kurmuş ise bu amacının bence hiç bir anlamı yoktur. Anayasa mahkemesi son yıllarda verdiği kararlarda AHİM’in yapmış olduğu bu kriterleri ciddi anlamda kullanıyor ve buna örnek olarak HAK-PAR kararında bunu uygulamıştır. Terör ve şiddetle olan eylemlerle, barışçıl yöntemleri ayırarak kararlarını bu ölçüde vermeye çalışmaktadır.
SİYASETÇİLERE UYARI: Hukukun yükünü mahkemeler çeker. Siyasetçilerin yükünü de siyasetçilerin çekmesi lazım. Kimse mahkemelerin siyasi bir görev şeklinde bir yardım beklememeli. Bekleme hakkı da yoktur. Siyasi partiler ilgili ve ihtiyaç duyulan anayasal ya da yasal değişiklikleri yapması için her zaman çağrıda bulunduk. Ancak bu çağrıları siyasilere duyurmayı başaramadık. Hemen belirtelim ki bu çağrının içinde siyasi partilerle ilgili gerek anayasal gerekse yasal düzenlemelerde terör ve şiddete ilişkin izin veren bir düzenleme asla yapılamaz herhangi bir çağrımız yok. Çünkü dünyanın hiç bir yerinde terör ve şiddete bulaşmış partiye ifade özgürlüğünde bir hak verilmektedir. Değişiklikler konusunda yaptığımız çağrı tamamen bunun dışındadır.
YILGINLIK YOK: Terör eylemleri itibariyle terörün amacı korku endişe güvensizlik yaratarak toplumun moralini bozmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bozulan bu ortamdan faydalanarak siyasi hedeflerine ulaşmayı amacı gütmektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti bütün kurumları sistemleri çalışmaktadır. Yılgınlık ve umutsuzluk bu toplumun tarihinde yoktur ve olmayacaktır. Demokrasi sorunlara çözüm bulma sanatıdır. Demokratik ortamda çözüm üretmemek mümkün değildir. Siyasi etnik dinsel tüm farklılıklarımızla birlikte bizlerin yaşama azmini birlikte yaşama azmini ve becerisini göstermek zorunda olduğumuzu altını çizerek ifade etmek istiyorum. Milletimizin terör karşısındaki bu güne kadar gösterdiği asil ve vakur duruşu adeta bir tarih yazmaktadır. 40 yıldır terörü bütün acımasız saldırılarına rağmen birlikte yaşama arzusunu asla kaybetmemiştir.
ÇÖZÜM YERİ MECLİSTİR: Evet zorlu bir süreçte geçiyoruz, sorunlarımız ne kadar ağır olursa olsun çözüm yeri parlamentodur. Parlamento olmalı ve bu inancı asla kaybetmemeliyiz. Siyasi aktörlere bir çağrı yapmak istiyorum öfke ve siyasi gelecek endişelerinde arınarak kaybolan diyaloglar kurulmalıdır. Milletin layık olduğu Demokratik hukuk devletin gerekli kıldığı anayasal ve yasal değişiklikler bir an önce hayata geçirilmelidir. Bu kararın milletimize ve devletimize hayırlı olmasını diliyorum.
BATASUNA ETKİLİ OLDU: Kararımızda ağırlık olarak Batasuna kararı ve ahim kararları etken oldu. Süreç içerisinde çeşitli beyanatlar oldu. Özellikle siyasilerin ve gazetecilerin açıklamaları oldu. Bu açıklamaları talihsizlik olarak görüyorum. Bu tür açıklamalar yapılmaması gerekirken maalesef yapılmıştır. Anayasa Mahkemesi, AHİM’in verdiği kararları göz gönünde tutulmuştur. Batusuna kararı göz önünde tutulmuştur.
ANKARA - Anayasa Mahkemesi, oybirliği ile Demokratik Toplum Partisi’ni "eylemleri yanında, terör örgütüyle olan bağlantıları da değerlendirildiğinde devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğüne aykırı nitelikteki fiillerin işlendiği bir odak
haline geldiği gerekçesiyle" temelli kapattı. Mahkeme, 37 isim hakkında 5 yıllık siyasi yasak getirirken, bu kapsama giren Parti Genel Başkanı Ahmet Türk ile eski Eşbaşkan Aysel Tuğluk'un milletvekilliklerini düşürdü. DTP dosyasının gündeme alınma zamanlamasıyla demokratik açılım süreci arasında bağlantı kurulmasını eleştiren Haşim Kılıç, "Hukukun yükünü mahkemeler çeker. Siyasetçilerin yükünü de siyasetçilerin çekmesi lazım" dedi. DTP kararını alırken Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nin İspanya'da kapatılan Herri Batasuna partisi ile ilgili kararını da dikkate aldığını söyleyen Kılıç, isim vermeden Başbakan Yardımcısı Cemil Çiçek'in DTP'nin durumunu Batasuna'ya benzeten açıklaması için 'talihsiz açıklama' ifadesini kullandı.
Terör odağı olduğu için
Anayasa Mahkemesi Yargıtay Başsavcılığı'nın 16 Kasım 2007'de 'bölücü eylemlerin odağı olduğu' iddiasıyla DTP aleyhine açtığı davanın esastan görüşmesini 4. gününde tamamladı. 4. günde yapılan 9 saatlik tartışmaların ardından kameraların önüne çıkan Mahkeme Başkanı Haşim Kılıç, yapılan görüşmeler sonunda, DTP’nin, eylemleri yanında, terör örgütüyle olan bağlantıları da değerlendirildiğinde, devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğüne aykırı nitelikteki fiillerin işlendiği bir odak haline geldiği anlaşıldığından, Anayasa’nın 68 ve 69. maddeleriyle 2820 Sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun 101 ve 103. maddeleri gereğince kapatılmasına karar verildiğini açıkladı.
Türk ve Tuğluk'un milletvekilliği düşecek
Partinin tüzel kişiliğinin kapatma kararının çıktığı andan itibaren geçerli olacağını söyleyen Kılıç, beyan ve eylemleriyle partinin kapatılmasına neden olan ve bu nedenle siyasi yasak getirilenler arasında DTP Genel Başkanı ve Mardin Milletvekili Ahmet Türk ile Diyarbakır Milletvekili Aysel Tuğluk’un milletvekilliklerinin karar resmi gazetede yayınlandıktan sonra düşeceğini açıkladı. Tuğluk ve Türk, bağımsız olarak seçime girip TBMM'ye girebilecek, ama herhangi bir parti grubuna üye olamayacak.
Başkanlar bağımsız devam edebilir
Kılıç'ın açıkladığı listede belediye başkanları Necdet Atalay(Batman), Ferhan Türk(Kızıltepe), Selim Sadak (Siirt) ve Aydın Budak (Cizre) yeralıyor. Belediye başkanları İçişleri Bakanlığı kapatma kararını gerekçe göstererem haklarında bir işlem yapmadığı takdirde görevlerine bağımsız olarak devam edebilecek.
Çiçek'in açıklaması talihsiz
Kararı okuduktan sonra davanın zamanlamasına ilişkin yapılan eleştirilere yanıt veren Kılıç, isim vermeden Başbakan Yardımcısı Cemil Çiçek'in Herri Batasuna kararıyla ilgili açıklamalarını "talihsiz açıklamalar" olduğunu ifade ederek şunları söyledi:
ELEŞTİRİLERİ GÖRÜYOR GİBİYİM: Karar yazılana kadar Anayasa Mahkemesi ile ilgili belki de yapılacak eleştirileri şimdiden görüyor gibiyim. Bu nedenle mahkememizle ilgili bu karardan önce bazı düşüncelere eleştirilerini olduğunu basın organlarında bizde adım adım izledik. Bunlar içinde demokrasi ve insan hakları alanında tam bir süreç başlamış iken böyle bir sürecin, bu davanın ele alınmasıyla, bu sürecin sabote edildiği, verilecek kapatma kararının siyasi bir darbe olarak nitelendirildiği ve zamanlamasının da siyasi partinin görüşülmesine ilişkin tarihin çok düşündürücü olduğu ifade edildi. Bu eleştirileri biz çok haksız ve acımasız olarak değerlendiriyoruz. Bu dava 2 yılı aşkın bir süredir devam etmekte ve iki yılı birazda geçmiş durumda. İki yıl bu konuda başsavcı ile 141 belgenin eklerine ilişkin çok ciddi eksikler görüldü. Bu eksiklikler raportörler aracılığıyla kapatılmaya çalışıldı. bizim partiye ilişkin gündemi tespit ederken dışarıda sürmekte olan bir demokratik süreci ile ilgili herhangi öngörümüz değerlendirmemiz herhangi bir düşüncemiz asla olmamıştır.
BİR PARTİ TERÖRÜ KULLANAMAZ :Mahkeme hak ve özgürlükler korusunda birey ile devletin menfaatleri ve çıkarları daha doğrusu anayasada koruma altına alınmış değerler arasında bir denge kuran bir kurumdur. Bu dengeyi kuranken tabi ki Anayasaya, yasalara ulusla arası hukuka ve hukukun üstün kurallarına bağlı kararak bu dengeyi korumaya çalışmıştır. Parti kapatmalarla ilgili çağdaş dünyada geçerli olan uluslararası anlaşmaların ve bizim siyasi partiler kanunumuz ifade ettiği ölçüler içerisinde hem ifade özgürlüğünü hem de örgütlenme özgürlüğünü kullanılmasına ilişkin bir takım ölçülerin olduğunu hepimiz biliyorsunuz. Bir siyasi parti terör, şiddet baskı içeren eylem ve söylemleri kullanma hakkına sahip değildir. terör ve şiddet içeren eylem ve söylemlerle barışçıl söylem ve önerilerin birbirinden ayırmak zorundadır.
KAPATMA GEREKÇELERİ: Nitekim AHİM son yıllarda vermiş olduğu kararlarında bu konunun üzerinde çok açık bir biçimde durmuş bununla ilgili önemli ölçüler ve ölçütler yaratmıştır. İşte bunları ifade edecek olursak bir siyasi partinin terör ve şiddete yakınlığı meşru göstermeye çalışması propagandası, övülmesi yardım ve yataklık yapması açık ve gizli onay ve destek vermesi sözleşmeye asla uygun görülmemiştir. Bu konuda verilmiş kapatma kararları sözleşmeyi ihlal olarak nitelendirilmemiştir. Bir parti demokratik ortam içerisinde amacı ve bu amaca ulaşmak için kullandığı araçlarını demokratik toplum değerleriyle uyum içerisinde kullanmak zorundadır. Bu uygunluk yoksa bu siyasi partinin siyasi alanda bir toplum modeli önerme hakkı da yoktur.
TERÖR VE ŞİDDET YÖNTEM OLAMAZ: Bir partinin savunduğu ya da önerdiği inandığı toplumsal projesi ne kadar kutsal olursa olsun yöntem olarak eğer terör ve şiddetle ilişki kurmuş ise bu amacının bence hiç bir anlamı yoktur. Anayasa mahkemesi son yıllarda verdiği kararlarda AHİM’in yapmış olduğu bu kriterleri ciddi anlamda kullanıyor ve buna örnek olarak HAK-PAR kararında bunu uygulamıştır. Terör ve şiddetle olan eylemlerle, barışçıl yöntemleri ayırarak kararlarını bu ölçüde vermeye çalışmaktadır.
SİYASETÇİLERE UYARI: Hukukun yükünü mahkemeler çeker. Siyasetçilerin yükünü de siyasetçilerin çekmesi lazım. Kimse mahkemelerin siyasi bir görev şeklinde bir yardım beklememeli. Bekleme hakkı da yoktur. Siyasi partiler ilgili ve ihtiyaç duyulan anayasal ya da yasal değişiklikleri yapması için her zaman çağrıda bulunduk. Ancak bu çağrıları siyasilere duyurmayı başaramadık. Hemen belirtelim ki bu çağrının içinde siyasi partilerle ilgili gerek anayasal gerekse yasal düzenlemelerde terör ve şiddete ilişkin izin veren bir düzenleme asla yapılamaz herhangi bir çağrımız yok. Çünkü dünyanın hiç bir yerinde terör ve şiddete bulaşmış partiye ifade özgürlüğünde bir hak verilmektedir. Değişiklikler konusunda yaptığımız çağrı tamamen bunun dışındadır.
YILGINLIK YOK: Terör eylemleri itibariyle terörün amacı korku endişe güvensizlik yaratarak toplumun moralini bozmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bozulan bu ortamdan faydalanarak siyasi hedeflerine ulaşmayı amacı gütmektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti bütün kurumları sistemleri çalışmaktadır. Yılgınlık ve umutsuzluk bu toplumun tarihinde yoktur ve olmayacaktır. Demokrasi sorunlara çözüm bulma sanatıdır. Demokratik ortamda çözüm üretmemek mümkün değildir. Siyasi etnik dinsel tüm farklılıklarımızla birlikte bizlerin yaşama azmini birlikte yaşama azmini ve becerisini göstermek zorunda olduğumuzu altını çizerek ifade etmek istiyorum. Milletimizin terör karşısındaki bu güne kadar gösterdiği asil ve vakur duruşu adeta bir tarih yazmaktadır. 40 yıldır terörü bütün acımasız saldırılarına rağmen birlikte yaşama arzusunu asla kaybetmemiştir.
ÇÖZÜM YERİ MECLİSTİR: Evet zorlu bir süreçte geçiyoruz, sorunlarımız ne kadar ağır olursa olsun çözüm yeri parlamentodur. Parlamento olmalı ve bu inancı asla kaybetmemeliyiz. Siyasi aktörlere bir çağrı yapmak istiyorum öfke ve siyasi gelecek endişelerinde arınarak kaybolan diyaloglar kurulmalıdır. Milletin layık olduğu Demokratik hukuk devletin gerekli kıldığı anayasal ve yasal değişiklikler bir an önce hayata geçirilmelidir. Bu kararın milletimize ve devletimize hayırlı olmasını diliyorum.
BATASUNA ETKİLİ OLDU: Kararımızda ağırlık olarak Batasuna kararı ve ahim kararları etken oldu. Süreç içerisinde çeşitli beyanatlar oldu. Özellikle siyasilerin ve gazetecilerin açıklamaları oldu. Bu açıklamaları talihsizlik olarak görüyorum. Bu tür açıklamalar yapılmaması gerekirken maalesef yapılmıştır. Anayasa Mahkemesi, AHİM’in verdiği kararları göz gönünde tutulmuştur. Batusuna kararı göz önünde tutulmuştur.
Friday, December 11, 2009
Turkey forecasts return to growth
By Delphine Strauss in Ankara
Turkey’s economy should return to growth by the end of the year, Durmus Yilmaz, the country’s central bank governor, said on Thursday after data showed the severity of the recession easing in the third quarter of the year.
Gross domestic product fell 3.3 per cent year on year in the three months to September, slightly better than expected, but with downward revisions for earlier quarters taking the contraction over the first 9 months of the year to 8.4 per cent.
The central bank has acted aggressively to counter the downturn, cutting interest rates by more than 10 percentage points in the past year as inflation fell to a historical low close to 5 per cent. But economists think the bank has little scope for further easing and may need to raise rates as the global recovery gains pace.
Mr Yilmaz said inflation could be volatile early in 2010 but would undershoot a 6.5 per cent target for the year. He set a new target of 5.5 per cent inflation for 2012.
The government is forecasting growth of about 3.5 per cent in 2010, a sluggish recovery by Turkish standards. Recent data have been mixed, showing a surprisingly strong industrial rebound in October, but little enthusiasm for new investment, and shaky confidence among both businesses and consumers.
“The tide is turning, but slowly,” said Guldem Atabay, economist at ExpresInvest. Timothy Ash, at the Royal Bank of Scotland, said: “Turkey is a fairly dynamic economy, so I would still assume it should lead the regional recovery.”
The faltering economy contrasts with a financial stability that is unusual, by Turkish historical standards. Mr Ash noted earlier this week that prices suggested Turkish five-year credit default swaps were now considered less risky than those of Greece – and several other eastern European and Baltic countries.
The treasury on Thursday announced borrowing plans for 2010, welcomed by analysts, saying it would roll over 99.5 per cent of domestic debt in 2010 and might launch longer-term 10 year lira bonds. It left the door open for a programme with the International Monetary Fund, after more than a year of talks, saying plans would be revised if there were any additional funds from international institutions.
Mr Yilmaz said the central bank would buy government bonds worth 8bn TL ($5.3bn, €3.6bn, £3.3bn) in 2010, essentially replacing its current portfolio. Yarkin Cebeci, economist at JPMorgan, welcomed the confirmation that it “had no intention of helping the Treasury in rolling over its debt”, saying it would improve the bank’s credibility.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Turkey’s economy should return to growth by the end of the year, Durmus Yilmaz, the country’s central bank governor, said on Thursday after data showed the severity of the recession easing in the third quarter of the year.
Gross domestic product fell 3.3 per cent year on year in the three months to September, slightly better than expected, but with downward revisions for earlier quarters taking the contraction over the first 9 months of the year to 8.4 per cent.
The central bank has acted aggressively to counter the downturn, cutting interest rates by more than 10 percentage points in the past year as inflation fell to a historical low close to 5 per cent. But economists think the bank has little scope for further easing and may need to raise rates as the global recovery gains pace.
Mr Yilmaz said inflation could be volatile early in 2010 but would undershoot a 6.5 per cent target for the year. He set a new target of 5.5 per cent inflation for 2012.
The government is forecasting growth of about 3.5 per cent in 2010, a sluggish recovery by Turkish standards. Recent data have been mixed, showing a surprisingly strong industrial rebound in October, but little enthusiasm for new investment, and shaky confidence among both businesses and consumers.
“The tide is turning, but slowly,” said Guldem Atabay, economist at ExpresInvest. Timothy Ash, at the Royal Bank of Scotland, said: “Turkey is a fairly dynamic economy, so I would still assume it should lead the regional recovery.”
The faltering economy contrasts with a financial stability that is unusual, by Turkish historical standards. Mr Ash noted earlier this week that prices suggested Turkish five-year credit default swaps were now considered less risky than those of Greece – and several other eastern European and Baltic countries.
The treasury on Thursday announced borrowing plans for 2010, welcomed by analysts, saying it would roll over 99.5 per cent of domestic debt in 2010 and might launch longer-term 10 year lira bonds. It left the door open for a programme with the International Monetary Fund, after more than a year of talks, saying plans would be revised if there were any additional funds from international institutions.
Mr Yilmaz said the central bank would buy government bonds worth 8bn TL ($5.3bn, €3.6bn, £3.3bn) in 2010, essentially replacing its current portfolio. Yarkin Cebeci, economist at JPMorgan, welcomed the confirmation that it “had no intention of helping the Treasury in rolling over its debt”, saying it would improve the bank’s credibility.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Greek Debt Poses a Danger to Common Currency
By Wolfgang Reuter
As economic indicators have improved, concern about the financial crisis has abated. But the next big problem could be approaching. Greece's public deficit is skyrocketing and the country may become insolvent. The effect on Europe's common currency could be dire.
Josef Ackermann, the CEO of Deutsche Bank, has given the all-clear signal many times in the past. He has repeatedly said that the worst was over, only to see the financial crisis strengthen its grip on the world economy.
Last week, however, Ackermann was singing a completely different tune. Although many indicators are once again pointing skyward, he said at a Berlin summit on the economy, Chancellor Angela Merkel, the assembled cabinet ministers, corporate CEOs and union leaders should not to be deluded. He warned emphatically that the financial situation could deteriorate once again. "A few time bombs" are still ticking, Ackermann told his audience, noting that the growing problems of highly leveraged small countries could lead to new tremors. And then, almost casually, Ackermann mentioned the problem child of the European financial world by name: Greece.
Ackermann isn't alone in his opinion. Practically unnoticed by the public, an issue has returned to the forefront in recent weeks -- one that was a cause for great concern at the height of the financial crisis but then, as optimism about the economy began to grow, was eventually forgotten: the fear of a national bankruptcy in the euro zone. And the question as to whether such a bankruptcy, should it come about, could destroy the common European currency.
Greece was always at the very top of the list of countries at risk. But now the danger appears to be more acute than ever.
Insuring Against Default
The seismographs in the trading rooms at investment banks detected the initial tremors weeks ago. Today, when the code "Greece CDS 10Yr" appears on Bloomberg terminals, a curve at the bottom of the screen points sharply upward. It reflects the price that banks are now charging to insure 10-year Greek government bonds against default.
The price of these securities has jumped dramatically since Greek Finance Minister Giorgos Papakonstantinou announced three weeks ago that his country's budget deficit would reach 12.7 percent of gross domestic product this year, instead of the 6 percent originally forecast -- and well about the 3 percent limit foreseen by European Union rules.
A second curve is the mirror image of the first. It depicts the price of government bonds from the euro-zone country. It points sharply downward.
Greece already pays almost 2 percent more in interest on its debt than Germany. In other words, at a total debt of €270 billion ($402 billion), Greece will be paying €5 billion more in annual interest than it would if it were Germany. And, with rating agencies threatening to downgrade the country's already dismal credit rating, the situation is only likely to get worse.
The finance ministers and central bankers of the euro-zone member states are as alarmed as they are helpless. "The Greek problem," says a senior administration official in Berlin, "will be an acid test for the currency union."
No Buyers Can Be Found
Greece has already accumulated a mountain of debt that will be difficult if not impossible to pay off. The government has borrowed more than 110 percent of the country's economic output over the years, and if investors lose confidence in the bonds, a meltdown could happen as early as next year.
That's when the government borrowers in Athens will be required to refinance €25 billion worth of debt -- that is, repay what they owe using funds borrowed from the financial markets. But if no buyers can be found for its securities, Greece will have no choice but to declare insolvency -- just as Mexico, Ecuador, Russia and Argentina have done in past decades.
This puts Brussels in a predicament. European Union rules preclude the 27-member bloc from lending money to member states to plug holes in their budgets or bridge deficits.
And even if there were a way to circumvent this prohibition, the consequences could be disastrous. The lack of concern over budget discipline in countries like Spain, Italy and Ireland would spread like wildfire across the entire continent. The message would be clear: Why save, if others will eventually foot the bill?
A Domino Effect
On the other hand, if Brussels left the Greeks to their own devices, the consequences would also be dire. Confidence in the euro would be shattered, and the union would face a crucial test. What good is a common currency, many would ask, if some of the member states pay their debts while others do not?
Furthermore, there is a threat of a domino effect. If one euro member falls, speculators will test the stability of other potential bankruptcy candidates. This could destroy the currency union. Because of this systemic risk, say the economists at the Swiss bank UBS, "we believe that if a country is facing a problem with debt repayment or issuance, it will be supported.
A default of a euro-group country doesn't worry the monetary policy hawks at the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank. "So what if Greece stops paying its debts?" one of the executive board members asked at a recent banquet in Frankfurt. "The euro is strong enough to take it." The real threat, he says, is if Brussels comes to the Greeks' aid. "Then the currency union will turn into an inflation union."
But it remains to be seen whether politicians can maintain such an unbending approach. The prices for Greek government bonds plunged once in the past, until then German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück, to the horror of the Bundesbank, publicly pledged to help the Greeks if necessary. There is much to be said for the government taking exactly the same position today.
Can Bankruptcy Be Prevented?
A national bankruptcy in Greece would have a serious impact on Germany, where many banks have invested heavily in the high-yield Greek treasury bonds -- after borrowing the money to buy the bonds from the European Central Bank (ECB) or other central banks at rates of 1-2 percent. Making money doesn't get much easier -- as long as the Greeks remain solvent.
But can a Greek bankruptcy even be prevented anymore? The answer, at least initially, depends heavily on the ECB. Will the custodian of the euro continue to accept Greek bonds as collateral for short-term liquidity assistance, or will it turn down the securities in the future? Another possibility is a compromise, under which the banks would pay additional interest when they submit Greek bonds.
The next meeting of the ECB takes place on Dec. 17. "The subject will be on the agenda," say officials in Frankfurt. Time is of the essence.
Central bankers in the euro zone are already speculating, behind closed doors, what would happen if the Greeks started printing euros without ECB approval. There is no answer to the question, and that makes central bankers from Lisbon to Dublin even more nervous than they are already.
Massaging Budget Figures
And more mistrustful. In 2004, it was discovered, completely by accident, that Greece had only managed to qualify for entry into the currency union by massaging its budget figures. The Greeks have only complied with the Maastricht criteria once since the introduction of the euro, in 2006.
Even those figures may have been doctored. At the time, the Greeks managed to increase their official gross national product by a hefty 25 percent, partly because they included the black market and prostitution in economic output. This brought down the deficit rate -- on paper, at any rate -- to 2.9 percent.
The figures representing Greece's budget deficit are constantly being revised upward. The most recent uptick, by close to 7 percent, is a record for Europe -- and it comes in a country that was relatively unaffected by the financial crisis. This year, the Greek economy will have shrunk by only 1.2 percent, say Greek economists. Next year they expect the economy to return to grown, albeit modest.
Particularly vexing to the remaining EU countries is the fact that Greece has profited from its EU membership for decades. Year after year, net transfers from Brussels have exceeded payments moving in the opposite direction by €3 billion to €6 billion. These numbers, too, have often been suspect. At times, the land area declared for agricultural subsidies was incorrect, and sometimes approval conditions were not met.
Resolute Words
Nevertheless, EU politicians find their hands tied. "The game is over," the chairman of the euro group, Jean-Claude Juncker, declared recently, only to turn around and assure the country of his solidarity. "I don't have the slightest suspicion that Greece could go bankrupt -- anyone speculating that this will happen is deluding himself," says Juncker.
His resolute words were directed at investment bankers in London, Frankfurt and New York. They know full well that Greece is indeed on the brink of bankruptcy, but they don't know whether the EU will, as Juncker insinuated, come to the aid of member state Greece. Juncker's message, in other words, was that those speculating on a bankruptcy could be left out in the cold.
The EU has now begun a tougher approach to Greece. Three weeks ago, the government in Athens received a rebuke from Brussels, followed by another one last week. So far, however, the Greek government has shown little inclination to take any significant steps. It does intend to reduce the deficit, but only to 9.1 percent next year. This is far too little for many European foreign ministers. As the new Greek finance minister, Giorgos Papakonstantinou, recently announced, the country will need at least four years to get its deficit under control "without jeopardizing the economic recovery."
But by then the government deficit will have reached about €400 billion, or about 150 percent of GDP. Servicing that amount of debt, even at current interest rates of about 5 percent, will make up at least one third of government spending.
A London investment banker is betting on the continued decline of prices for Greek bonds in the short term, while simultaneously waiting for the right time to start buying the securities again. He jokes: "If someone has €1,000 in debt, he has a problem. If someone has €10 million in debt, his bank has a problem. And the bank, in this case, is Europe."
As economic indicators have improved, concern about the financial crisis has abated. But the next big problem could be approaching. Greece's public deficit is skyrocketing and the country may become insolvent. The effect on Europe's common currency could be dire.
Josef Ackermann, the CEO of Deutsche Bank, has given the all-clear signal many times in the past. He has repeatedly said that the worst was over, only to see the financial crisis strengthen its grip on the world economy.
Last week, however, Ackermann was singing a completely different tune. Although many indicators are once again pointing skyward, he said at a Berlin summit on the economy, Chancellor Angela Merkel, the assembled cabinet ministers, corporate CEOs and union leaders should not to be deluded. He warned emphatically that the financial situation could deteriorate once again. "A few time bombs" are still ticking, Ackermann told his audience, noting that the growing problems of highly leveraged small countries could lead to new tremors. And then, almost casually, Ackermann mentioned the problem child of the European financial world by name: Greece.
Ackermann isn't alone in his opinion. Practically unnoticed by the public, an issue has returned to the forefront in recent weeks -- one that was a cause for great concern at the height of the financial crisis but then, as optimism about the economy began to grow, was eventually forgotten: the fear of a national bankruptcy in the euro zone. And the question as to whether such a bankruptcy, should it come about, could destroy the common European currency.
Greece was always at the very top of the list of countries at risk. But now the danger appears to be more acute than ever.
Insuring Against Default
The seismographs in the trading rooms at investment banks detected the initial tremors weeks ago. Today, when the code "Greece CDS 10Yr" appears on Bloomberg terminals, a curve at the bottom of the screen points sharply upward. It reflects the price that banks are now charging to insure 10-year Greek government bonds against default.
The price of these securities has jumped dramatically since Greek Finance Minister Giorgos Papakonstantinou announced three weeks ago that his country's budget deficit would reach 12.7 percent of gross domestic product this year, instead of the 6 percent originally forecast -- and well about the 3 percent limit foreseen by European Union rules.
A second curve is the mirror image of the first. It depicts the price of government bonds from the euro-zone country. It points sharply downward.
Greece already pays almost 2 percent more in interest on its debt than Germany. In other words, at a total debt of €270 billion ($402 billion), Greece will be paying €5 billion more in annual interest than it would if it were Germany. And, with rating agencies threatening to downgrade the country's already dismal credit rating, the situation is only likely to get worse.
The finance ministers and central bankers of the euro-zone member states are as alarmed as they are helpless. "The Greek problem," says a senior administration official in Berlin, "will be an acid test for the currency union."
No Buyers Can Be Found
Greece has already accumulated a mountain of debt that will be difficult if not impossible to pay off. The government has borrowed more than 110 percent of the country's economic output over the years, and if investors lose confidence in the bonds, a meltdown could happen as early as next year.
That's when the government borrowers in Athens will be required to refinance €25 billion worth of debt -- that is, repay what they owe using funds borrowed from the financial markets. But if no buyers can be found for its securities, Greece will have no choice but to declare insolvency -- just as Mexico, Ecuador, Russia and Argentina have done in past decades.
This puts Brussels in a predicament. European Union rules preclude the 27-member bloc from lending money to member states to plug holes in their budgets or bridge deficits.
And even if there were a way to circumvent this prohibition, the consequences could be disastrous. The lack of concern over budget discipline in countries like Spain, Italy and Ireland would spread like wildfire across the entire continent. The message would be clear: Why save, if others will eventually foot the bill?
A Domino Effect
On the other hand, if Brussels left the Greeks to their own devices, the consequences would also be dire. Confidence in the euro would be shattered, and the union would face a crucial test. What good is a common currency, many would ask, if some of the member states pay their debts while others do not?
Furthermore, there is a threat of a domino effect. If one euro member falls, speculators will test the stability of other potential bankruptcy candidates. This could destroy the currency union. Because of this systemic risk, say the economists at the Swiss bank UBS, "we believe that if a country is facing a problem with debt repayment or issuance, it will be supported.
A default of a euro-group country doesn't worry the monetary policy hawks at the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank. "So what if Greece stops paying its debts?" one of the executive board members asked at a recent banquet in Frankfurt. "The euro is strong enough to take it." The real threat, he says, is if Brussels comes to the Greeks' aid. "Then the currency union will turn into an inflation union."
But it remains to be seen whether politicians can maintain such an unbending approach. The prices for Greek government bonds plunged once in the past, until then German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück, to the horror of the Bundesbank, publicly pledged to help the Greeks if necessary. There is much to be said for the government taking exactly the same position today.
Can Bankruptcy Be Prevented?
A national bankruptcy in Greece would have a serious impact on Germany, where many banks have invested heavily in the high-yield Greek treasury bonds -- after borrowing the money to buy the bonds from the European Central Bank (ECB) or other central banks at rates of 1-2 percent. Making money doesn't get much easier -- as long as the Greeks remain solvent.
But can a Greek bankruptcy even be prevented anymore? The answer, at least initially, depends heavily on the ECB. Will the custodian of the euro continue to accept Greek bonds as collateral for short-term liquidity assistance, or will it turn down the securities in the future? Another possibility is a compromise, under which the banks would pay additional interest when they submit Greek bonds.
The next meeting of the ECB takes place on Dec. 17. "The subject will be on the agenda," say officials in Frankfurt. Time is of the essence.
Central bankers in the euro zone are already speculating, behind closed doors, what would happen if the Greeks started printing euros without ECB approval. There is no answer to the question, and that makes central bankers from Lisbon to Dublin even more nervous than they are already.
Massaging Budget Figures
And more mistrustful. In 2004, it was discovered, completely by accident, that Greece had only managed to qualify for entry into the currency union by massaging its budget figures. The Greeks have only complied with the Maastricht criteria once since the introduction of the euro, in 2006.
Even those figures may have been doctored. At the time, the Greeks managed to increase their official gross national product by a hefty 25 percent, partly because they included the black market and prostitution in economic output. This brought down the deficit rate -- on paper, at any rate -- to 2.9 percent.
The figures representing Greece's budget deficit are constantly being revised upward. The most recent uptick, by close to 7 percent, is a record for Europe -- and it comes in a country that was relatively unaffected by the financial crisis. This year, the Greek economy will have shrunk by only 1.2 percent, say Greek economists. Next year they expect the economy to return to grown, albeit modest.
Particularly vexing to the remaining EU countries is the fact that Greece has profited from its EU membership for decades. Year after year, net transfers from Brussels have exceeded payments moving in the opposite direction by €3 billion to €6 billion. These numbers, too, have often been suspect. At times, the land area declared for agricultural subsidies was incorrect, and sometimes approval conditions were not met.
Resolute Words
Nevertheless, EU politicians find their hands tied. "The game is over," the chairman of the euro group, Jean-Claude Juncker, declared recently, only to turn around and assure the country of his solidarity. "I don't have the slightest suspicion that Greece could go bankrupt -- anyone speculating that this will happen is deluding himself," says Juncker.
His resolute words were directed at investment bankers in London, Frankfurt and New York. They know full well that Greece is indeed on the brink of bankruptcy, but they don't know whether the EU will, as Juncker insinuated, come to the aid of member state Greece. Juncker's message, in other words, was that those speculating on a bankruptcy could be left out in the cold.
The EU has now begun a tougher approach to Greece. Three weeks ago, the government in Athens received a rebuke from Brussels, followed by another one last week. So far, however, the Greek government has shown little inclination to take any significant steps. It does intend to reduce the deficit, but only to 9.1 percent next year. This is far too little for many European foreign ministers. As the new Greek finance minister, Giorgos Papakonstantinou, recently announced, the country will need at least four years to get its deficit under control "without jeopardizing the economic recovery."
But by then the government deficit will have reached about €400 billion, or about 150 percent of GDP. Servicing that amount of debt, even at current interest rates of about 5 percent, will make up at least one third of government spending.
A London investment banker is betting on the continued decline of prices for Greek bonds in the short term, while simultaneously waiting for the right time to start buying the securities again. He jokes: "If someone has €1,000 in debt, he has a problem. If someone has €10 million in debt, his bank has a problem. And the bank, in this case, is Europe."
Turkey Is Considering Ban on Kurdish Party
By SEBNEM ARSU
ISTANBUL — The Turkish constitutional court in Ankara began hearing arguments on Tuesday in a case that could shut down the only pro-Kurdish party in Parliament and undermine the government’s efforts to end its long-running conflict with the country’s Kurdish minority.
If convicted, 219 members of the Democratic Society Party, including 8 members of Parliament, would face a five-year ban on political activity. Their party would become the latest in a series of Kurdish parties that have been closed down by the court since the 1990s. A verdict is not expected until Friday.
The charges, filed in 2007, accuse the party of undermining national stability by encouraging violence and of cooperating with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., which has been fighting for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey’s southeast for decades.
The conflict has cost more than 40,000 lives, and the P.K.K. has been labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, but the Democratic Society Party refuses to denounce the group.
With an eye to membership in the European Union, the governing Justice and Development Party has worked to normalize relations with the Kurds. Its proposals include unrestricted use of the Kurdish language in the media and in political campaigns and the restoration of Kurdish names to towns in the eastern Kurdish districts of the country. But the Democratic Society Party wants constitutional recognition of Kurds’ ethnic identity and amnesty for most P.K.K. members who want to return to Turkey.
Mithat Sancar, a law professor at Ankara University, said a decision to close down the Democratic Society Party “would only strengthen the hands of those within the P.K.K. who promote violent methods.” He added, “How can we persuade them to come down from the mountains to participate in politics if we close down political channels?”
When unidentified militants killed seven soldiers and wounded three on the outskirts of Tokat, a northern town, on Monday. suspicions were cast on the P.K.K.. But no group has claimed responsibility yet, and the government has made no accusations.
Ahmet Turk, chairman of the Democratic Society Party, condemned the assailants on Tuesday and called the attack an attempt to stir up anti-Kurdish sentiments.
ISTANBUL — The Turkish constitutional court in Ankara began hearing arguments on Tuesday in a case that could shut down the only pro-Kurdish party in Parliament and undermine the government’s efforts to end its long-running conflict with the country’s Kurdish minority.
If convicted, 219 members of the Democratic Society Party, including 8 members of Parliament, would face a five-year ban on political activity. Their party would become the latest in a series of Kurdish parties that have been closed down by the court since the 1990s. A verdict is not expected until Friday.
The charges, filed in 2007, accuse the party of undermining national stability by encouraging violence and of cooperating with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., which has been fighting for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey’s southeast for decades.
The conflict has cost more than 40,000 lives, and the P.K.K. has been labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, but the Democratic Society Party refuses to denounce the group.
With an eye to membership in the European Union, the governing Justice and Development Party has worked to normalize relations with the Kurds. Its proposals include unrestricted use of the Kurdish language in the media and in political campaigns and the restoration of Kurdish names to towns in the eastern Kurdish districts of the country. But the Democratic Society Party wants constitutional recognition of Kurds’ ethnic identity and amnesty for most P.K.K. members who want to return to Turkey.
Mithat Sancar, a law professor at Ankara University, said a decision to close down the Democratic Society Party “would only strengthen the hands of those within the P.K.K. who promote violent methods.” He added, “How can we persuade them to come down from the mountains to participate in politics if we close down political channels?”
When unidentified militants killed seven soldiers and wounded three on the outskirts of Tokat, a northern town, on Monday. suspicions were cast on the P.K.K.. But no group has claimed responsibility yet, and the government has made no accusations.
Ahmet Turk, chairman of the Democratic Society Party, condemned the assailants on Tuesday and called the attack an attempt to stir up anti-Kurdish sentiments.
Turkey Is Considering Ban on Kurdish Party
By SEBNEM ARSU
ISTANBUL — The Turkish constitutional court in Ankara began hearing arguments on Tuesday in a case that could shut down the only pro-Kurdish party in Parliament and undermine the government’s efforts to end its long-running conflict with the country’s Kurdish minority.
If convicted, 219 members of the Democratic Society Party, including 8 members of Parliament, would face a five-year ban on political activity. Their party would become the latest in a series of Kurdish parties that have been closed down by the court since the 1990s. A verdict is not expected until Friday.
The charges, filed in 2007, accuse the party of undermining national stability by encouraging violence and of cooperating with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., which has been fighting for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey’s southeast for decades.
The conflict has cost more than 40,000 lives, and the P.K.K. has been labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, but the Democratic Society Party refuses to denounce the group.
With an eye to membership in the European Union, the governing Justice and Development Party has worked to normalize relations with the Kurds. Its proposals include unrestricted use of the Kurdish language in the media and in political campaigns and the restoration of Kurdish names to towns in the eastern Kurdish districts of the country. But the Democratic Society Party wants constitutional recognition of Kurds’ ethnic identity and amnesty for most P.K.K. members who want to return to Turkey.
Mithat Sancar, a law professor at Ankara University, said a decision to close down the Democratic Society Party “would only strengthen the hands of those within the P.K.K. who promote violent methods.” He added, “How can we persuade them to come down from the mountains to participate in politics if we close down political channels?”
When unidentified militants killed seven soldiers and wounded three on the outskirts of Tokat, a northern town, on Monday. suspicions were cast on the P.K.K.. But no group has claimed responsibility yet, and the government has made no accusations.
Ahmet Turk, chairman of the Democratic Society Party, condemned the assailants on Tuesday and called the attack an attempt to stir up anti-Kurdish sentiments.
ISTANBUL — The Turkish constitutional court in Ankara began hearing arguments on Tuesday in a case that could shut down the only pro-Kurdish party in Parliament and undermine the government’s efforts to end its long-running conflict with the country’s Kurdish minority.
If convicted, 219 members of the Democratic Society Party, including 8 members of Parliament, would face a five-year ban on political activity. Their party would become the latest in a series of Kurdish parties that have been closed down by the court since the 1990s. A verdict is not expected until Friday.
The charges, filed in 2007, accuse the party of undermining national stability by encouraging violence and of cooperating with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., which has been fighting for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey’s southeast for decades.
The conflict has cost more than 40,000 lives, and the P.K.K. has been labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, but the Democratic Society Party refuses to denounce the group.
With an eye to membership in the European Union, the governing Justice and Development Party has worked to normalize relations with the Kurds. Its proposals include unrestricted use of the Kurdish language in the media and in political campaigns and the restoration of Kurdish names to towns in the eastern Kurdish districts of the country. But the Democratic Society Party wants constitutional recognition of Kurds’ ethnic identity and amnesty for most P.K.K. members who want to return to Turkey.
Mithat Sancar, a law professor at Ankara University, said a decision to close down the Democratic Society Party “would only strengthen the hands of those within the P.K.K. who promote violent methods.” He added, “How can we persuade them to come down from the mountains to participate in politics if we close down political channels?”
When unidentified militants killed seven soldiers and wounded three on the outskirts of Tokat, a northern town, on Monday. suspicions were cast on the P.K.K.. But no group has claimed responsibility yet, and the government has made no accusations.
Ahmet Turk, chairman of the Democratic Society Party, condemned the assailants on Tuesday and called the attack an attempt to stir up anti-Kurdish sentiments.
Cyprus adds obstacles to Turkey EU accession
By Tony Barber in Brussels and Delphine Strauss in Ankara
The Greek Cypriot-led government of Cyprus on Tuesday placed new obstacles in the way of Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union, declaring that it would not permit the start of accession talks in five policy areas unless Turkey changed its stance on the Cyprus dispute.
Although no other EU country supported them, the Greek Cypriots exercised their right under EU rules to announce that they would block talks over free movement of workers; the judiciary and fundamental rights; justice, freedom and security; education and culture; and foreign, security and defence policy.
Markos Kyprianou, foreign minister of Cyprus, described the measures as a “targeted response, not a complete freeze” to Turkey’s membership talks.
However, Turkey warned last week that its accession process could suffer irreparable damage if EU leaders introduced fresh sanctions in retaliation for Ankara’s refusal to open Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic.
After a two-day meeting that ended on Tuesday, EU foreign ministers decided against such sanctions after a majority concluded that discussions on a settlement among Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders were at a delicate stage .
The foreign ministers said they would maintain a freeze on negotiations in eight of the 35 policy areas that Turkey, an official candidate for EU membership since 2004, must complete before it can join the bloc.
Cyprus’s announcement went further, because the policy areas it listed are in addition to the eight where all EU countries agree talks should not proceed.
Turkey opened EU accession talks in 2005 in return for a promise to permit direct transport links with the Greek Cypriots. Turkey has refused to honour the accord, saying the EU has failed to fulfil its commitment to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriot-controlled northern Cyprus.
Suat Kiniklioglu, deputy chair of foreign relations of Turkey’s ruling AK party, said that if Cypriot threats were true, it would indicate “that the Greek Cypriot government’s position is continuing to poison Turkey’s relations with the European Union”.
EU governments are anxious to see progress in a new round of United Nations-sponsored talks on a Cyprus settlement that started in September 2008. With presidential elections in northern Cyprus scheduled for April and a nationalist candidate tipped to win, EU diplomats say the window for a deal is narrowing to between now and late February.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
The Greek Cypriot-led government of Cyprus on Tuesday placed new obstacles in the way of Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union, declaring that it would not permit the start of accession talks in five policy areas unless Turkey changed its stance on the Cyprus dispute.
Although no other EU country supported them, the Greek Cypriots exercised their right under EU rules to announce that they would block talks over free movement of workers; the judiciary and fundamental rights; justice, freedom and security; education and culture; and foreign, security and defence policy.
Markos Kyprianou, foreign minister of Cyprus, described the measures as a “targeted response, not a complete freeze” to Turkey’s membership talks.
However, Turkey warned last week that its accession process could suffer irreparable damage if EU leaders introduced fresh sanctions in retaliation for Ankara’s refusal to open Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic.
After a two-day meeting that ended on Tuesday, EU foreign ministers decided against such sanctions after a majority concluded that discussions on a settlement among Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders were at a delicate stage .
The foreign ministers said they would maintain a freeze on negotiations in eight of the 35 policy areas that Turkey, an official candidate for EU membership since 2004, must complete before it can join the bloc.
Cyprus’s announcement went further, because the policy areas it listed are in addition to the eight where all EU countries agree talks should not proceed.
Turkey opened EU accession talks in 2005 in return for a promise to permit direct transport links with the Greek Cypriots. Turkey has refused to honour the accord, saying the EU has failed to fulfil its commitment to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriot-controlled northern Cyprus.
Suat Kiniklioglu, deputy chair of foreign relations of Turkey’s ruling AK party, said that if Cypriot threats were true, it would indicate “that the Greek Cypriot government’s position is continuing to poison Turkey’s relations with the European Union”.
EU governments are anxious to see progress in a new round of United Nations-sponsored talks on a Cyprus settlement that started in September 2008. With presidential elections in northern Cyprus scheduled for April and a nationalist candidate tipped to win, EU diplomats say the window for a deal is narrowing to between now and late February.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Tough words and and hard budgets for eurozone
By Ralph Atkins in Frankfurt
Greece has been warned by a top European Central Bank policymaker that it has a year to bring public finances back under control or risk having its bonds disqualified for use as collateral by banks borrowing ECB liquidity.
The comments by Axel Weber, Germany’s Bundesbank president, intensify the pressure on the new Socialist government in Athens following revelations that its budget is in a far worse shape than previously feared.
This further blow to the eurozone country came as some of its currency bloc partners, both large and small, felt the full force of the recession. Ireland unveiled its harshest budget in years to try and bring spending under control. Spain, one of the largest economies in the eurozone, had its ratings outlook changed to negative by Standard & Poor’s.
On Tuesday, Fitch cut its rating on Greek debt to BBB plus – the first time in 10 years that a leading ratings agency has rated Greece below the A grade. Standard & Poor’s has also warned that a downgrade is possible.
Prior to the global economic crisis an A minus grade was the minimum requirement for assets put up by eurozone banks when taking part in ECB liquidity boosting operations. The threshold was reduced to BBB minus after the collapse of Lehman Brothers last year threatened to paralyse financial markets, but so far the ECB has only said that the lower standard will apply until the end of 2010.
Speaking to the international club of business journalists in Frankfurt, Mr Weber noted the temporary arrangements “will run out” and added that “the Greek government and those who hold responsibility see the clear need to implement now concrete [fiscal] consolidation steps”.
Mr Weber, an ECB governing council member, was unclear, however, whether the ECB would ever make good any threat to exclude bonds from a eurozone government in its liquidity operations – a step which would be seen as highly-political. Mr Weber assumed Greece would act in response to the pressures being imposed by financial markets and ratings agencies. “The ball lies in Greece’s court,” he said.
European Union authorities are keen to keep up the pressure on Athens to step up efforts to reduce its deficit, which is expected to reach almost 13 per cent of gross domestic product this year.
In February, Germany’s finance ministry hinted that in the worst case, help could be made available to struggling eurozone countries. But that reassurance has not been repeated more recently, fuelling speculation that if Greece eventually faced the threat of default, it would be forced into the hands of the International Monetary Fund.
However, Mr Weber expressed confidence that the EU had the means to force the Greek government to bring its deficit back in line with the region’s “stability and growth pact” – which is supposed to compensate for the lack of a single fiscal authority in the 16-country eurozone. The pact sets a limit of a three percent for public sector deficits.
“Within the stability and growth pact there is no role for the IMF – rightly,” said Mr Weber.
European finance ministers have started proceedings that could eventually result in Greece facing sanctions for repeatedly flouting the stability and growth pact. Frustration with Greece escalated because of the unreliably of its statistics. Earlier this year, the European Commission expected a deficit for 2009 that was above the 3 per cent limit but in November, it had to revise its projections to show a deficit of 12.7 per cent. Greek government debt is expected this year to exceed 112 per cent of GDP.
Meanwhile, its current account deficit reached almost 15 per cent of GDP last year, although it is expected to fall below 9 per cent in 2009.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Greece has been warned by a top European Central Bank policymaker that it has a year to bring public finances back under control or risk having its bonds disqualified for use as collateral by banks borrowing ECB liquidity.
The comments by Axel Weber, Germany’s Bundesbank president, intensify the pressure on the new Socialist government in Athens following revelations that its budget is in a far worse shape than previously feared.
This further blow to the eurozone country came as some of its currency bloc partners, both large and small, felt the full force of the recession. Ireland unveiled its harshest budget in years to try and bring spending under control. Spain, one of the largest economies in the eurozone, had its ratings outlook changed to negative by Standard & Poor’s.
On Tuesday, Fitch cut its rating on Greek debt to BBB plus – the first time in 10 years that a leading ratings agency has rated Greece below the A grade. Standard & Poor’s has also warned that a downgrade is possible.
Prior to the global economic crisis an A minus grade was the minimum requirement for assets put up by eurozone banks when taking part in ECB liquidity boosting operations. The threshold was reduced to BBB minus after the collapse of Lehman Brothers last year threatened to paralyse financial markets, but so far the ECB has only said that the lower standard will apply until the end of 2010.
Speaking to the international club of business journalists in Frankfurt, Mr Weber noted the temporary arrangements “will run out” and added that “the Greek government and those who hold responsibility see the clear need to implement now concrete [fiscal] consolidation steps”.
Mr Weber, an ECB governing council member, was unclear, however, whether the ECB would ever make good any threat to exclude bonds from a eurozone government in its liquidity operations – a step which would be seen as highly-political. Mr Weber assumed Greece would act in response to the pressures being imposed by financial markets and ratings agencies. “The ball lies in Greece’s court,” he said.
European Union authorities are keen to keep up the pressure on Athens to step up efforts to reduce its deficit, which is expected to reach almost 13 per cent of gross domestic product this year.
In February, Germany’s finance ministry hinted that in the worst case, help could be made available to struggling eurozone countries. But that reassurance has not been repeated more recently, fuelling speculation that if Greece eventually faced the threat of default, it would be forced into the hands of the International Monetary Fund.
However, Mr Weber expressed confidence that the EU had the means to force the Greek government to bring its deficit back in line with the region’s “stability and growth pact” – which is supposed to compensate for the lack of a single fiscal authority in the 16-country eurozone. The pact sets a limit of a three percent for public sector deficits.
“Within the stability and growth pact there is no role for the IMF – rightly,” said Mr Weber.
European finance ministers have started proceedings that could eventually result in Greece facing sanctions for repeatedly flouting the stability and growth pact. Frustration with Greece escalated because of the unreliably of its statistics. Earlier this year, the European Commission expected a deficit for 2009 that was above the 3 per cent limit but in November, it had to revise its projections to show a deficit of 12.7 per cent. Greek government debt is expected this year to exceed 112 per cent of GDP.
Meanwhile, its current account deficit reached almost 15 per cent of GDP last year, although it is expected to fall below 9 per cent in 2009.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Greeks bearing economic burdens
By Kerin Hope in Athens and Ralph Atkins in Frankfurt
Sotiria rarely complains about her workload. At the office where the Greek public sector employee aged in her forties records value added tax payments, supervisors take a relaxed view of breaks for coffee and shopping, she says. If a family member falls sick, she stays home. “I don’t feel bad, because there are always plenty of other people around to cover for me,” she says. “Nobody here has too much to do.”
Stories of such insouciance in Greece’s bloated state sector are creating alarm across Europe. As the Continent emerges from the worst recession since the 1930s, the precarious and unsustainable state of Greek public finances is threatening a fresh crisis for the region’s 11-year-old monetary union.
Last week, the difference between the interest rates on Greek and German government bonds soared to a seven-month high as financial markets fretted about the possibility of default and the stability of Greece’s banks. If European Union leaders thought they had navigated the storms of the past two years, they could yet be proved wrong.
The EU helped shore up Latvia, Romania and Hungary. But unlike those countries, Greece is a member of the eurozone, Europe’s most successful experiment in financial integration. And for all its treaties, there are no clear rules on how to react. “The EU has elaborate crisis prevention measures; it doesn’t have a crisis management apparatus,” says Jean Pisani-Ferry from the Brussels-based Bruegel think-tank.
But the increasing frustration in Brussels, other capitals and at the European Central Bank in Frankfurt suggests at least a few policymakers might favour throwing the book at Greece. “This is a game of chicken and we don’t know who will lose their nerve first,” says Daniel Gros of the Centre for European Policy Studies, another Brussels research institute.
Is Greece really heading for nemesis? Around the world, governments abandoned fiscal restraint to combat crisis. But elsewhere, for instance in Ireland, governments are now acting to bring budgets back under control. Greece’s crisis has taken on a different dimension, largely because of the behaviour of the Athens government.
Most blatantly, Greece misled the world about the acuteness of its fiscal plight. Back in March, the situation looked bad – but manageable. The European Commission forecast that the Greek public sector deficit this year would be above the 3 per cent limit set under EU rules and “exceed 4 per cent in 2010”. At the time, officials were concerned the actual numbers would be higher. Nobody, however, was prepared for the shock unveiled by the Socialist government elected in October. Statistical revisions showed the public finances so much worse that the Commission changed its projections to a deficit of 12.7 per cent this year and 12.2 per cent in 2010.
Worries have been compounded by the new government’s apparent dithering. Brussels wants George Papaconstantinou, finance minister, to rewrite his 2010 budget, which relies heavily on curbing tax evasion rather than cutting spending. In a letter to the Financial Times published on Wednesday, he said Athens was “fully committed to . . . the necessary steps to restore our credibility and finances”. But his claims that a tax crackdown on wealthy Greeks will be decisive in cutting the deficit next year to 9.1 per cent ring hollow with many – especially as his new revenue collection team has yet to be appointed.
Last December, youth discontent fuelled by the economic situation led to rioting in Athens – and the Socialists are reluctant to reverse a campaign pledge to protect incomes and boost welfare payments.
Moreover, Greece’s economy looked sickly before the events of the past few weeks. Prior to the global slowdown, the country was growing at annual rates of 4 per cent or more, with consumption boosted by the low interest rates it enjoyed as a eurozone member. But Europe’s recession has exposed a massive loss of competitiveness. Unit labour costs have soared more than 40 per cent since Greece joined the eurozone in 2001, while in Germany they remained almost constant before edging up this year.
On almost every measure, Greeks have been living beyond their means. The current account deficit reached almost 15 per cent of gross domestic product last year, making the US deficit of 5 per cent look modest. External public debt now exceeds GDP.
With hindsight, it is clear that a lax fiscal policy was also pumping up an economy based largely on just two sectors – shipping and tourism. Now, “Greece’s mix of problems is unique in the eurozone – a large budget deficit, rising debt and an unsustainable pension system”, says George Pagoulatos, a professor at Athens Economics University.
Since joining the euro, Greece has regularly flouted the deficit and debt limits set in the zone’s “stability and growth pact” that is meant to correct for the lack of a single eurozone fiscal authority. Scant progress has been made in reforming the country’s public sector, which added 50,000 mostly low-skilled employees in 2004-09.
Public sector wages are again set to rise, by 5-7 per cent in 2010. “Wage cuts may not be needed, because the economy isn’t projected to shrink significantly next year, but there should be an immediate freeze on salaries and recruitment,” says Yiannis Stournaras, a former chief economic adviser at the finance ministry and now a professor at Athens University.
On pensions, expected big increases in expenditure relative to the size of its economy make Greece more vulnerable than other EU countries to an ageing population. “It’s the largest of the fiscal imbalances and the system will become unsustainable within a decade,” says Mr Stournaras.
Athens is launching a “dialogue” with trade unions on reducing the number of state pension funds from 13 to three and implementing a long-postponed plan to raise the retirement age for women to an equalised 65. The unions foiled previous pension reform efforts and are gearing up for strikes and street protests. “We’re going to war with the government,” says Aleka Papariga, leader of the still influential Greek Communist party.
What will happen next? European finance ministers on Wednesday issued a fresh reprimand to Greece, pressing ahead with a process that could lead to financial sanctions. One possibility would be for the Commission to withhold “cohesion funds” meant to help Greece catch up with richer countries.
Leaving the eurozone is not an option for Athens: the cost of servicing foreign debt would simply escalate. Beyond that, Greece’s fate will depend on the reaction in the markets and actions taken by Athens.
Nor is timing on its side. The eurozone has a “no bail-out” clause, which prevents collective liability for debts incurred by a member. In February – when the crisis was at its most intense – Peer Steinbrück, then Germany’s finance minister, admitted that in the worst case “we would have to take action”. That eased pressure on the weakest members, including Ireland. But Mr Steinbrück has since been replaced and his promise now carries little weight; in the eyes of conservative European policymakers, it increased the risk of “moral hazard” – rewarding bad behaviour.
“It is one thing if you are in the middle of a systemic crisis. Then you can’t allow anyone to fail and don’t worry about moral hazard,” says Mr Gros at Ceps in Brussels. “Now we are out of the woods and it may be a good time to reduce moral hazard.” In a research note last week, Deutsche Bank economists wrote that Greece’s continuing violation of the rules “may have changed the minds of EU authorities ... We believe that they may have to set an example for other countries in trouble”.
If the cost of servicing debt rose too high, Greece could have to turn to the International Monetary Fund. The rigorous conditionality attached to help given by the Fund could provide a framework to implement reform – and allow the government to deflect the responsibility for harsh but necessary measures.
But Mr Papaconstantinou says it is “out of the question” that Athens would turn to the IMF. “The new government is determined to put the economy back on a path of fiscal sustainability in the context of the EU rules.”
Greece’s small size – it accounts for less than 3 per cent of eurozone GDP – plays to its disadvantage. The Deutsche Bank note argues that the EU could ring-fence Greek debt, using a special fund to reduce the impact of a default beyond its borders.
Still, that is a scenario that EU policymakers would rather not contemplate. Even if containable, a Greek default would send worrying signals about the resilience of monetary union. Instead, the hope is that the markets force Athens to bring public finances under control. The stability pact is still regarded as “an anchor for policymakers”, says Erik Nielsen, economist at Goldman Sachs.
A comfort for EU authorities is that investors’ increased risk awareness means they are – at last – imposing discipline on governments. Prior to the economic crisis, Greece escaped punishment from financial markets. That is no longer the case. It may not be too long before even bored Greek public sector employees notice.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Sotiria rarely complains about her workload. At the office where the Greek public sector employee aged in her forties records value added tax payments, supervisors take a relaxed view of breaks for coffee and shopping, she says. If a family member falls sick, she stays home. “I don’t feel bad, because there are always plenty of other people around to cover for me,” she says. “Nobody here has too much to do.”
Stories of such insouciance in Greece’s bloated state sector are creating alarm across Europe. As the Continent emerges from the worst recession since the 1930s, the precarious and unsustainable state of Greek public finances is threatening a fresh crisis for the region’s 11-year-old monetary union.
Last week, the difference between the interest rates on Greek and German government bonds soared to a seven-month high as financial markets fretted about the possibility of default and the stability of Greece’s banks. If European Union leaders thought they had navigated the storms of the past two years, they could yet be proved wrong.
The EU helped shore up Latvia, Romania and Hungary. But unlike those countries, Greece is a member of the eurozone, Europe’s most successful experiment in financial integration. And for all its treaties, there are no clear rules on how to react. “The EU has elaborate crisis prevention measures; it doesn’t have a crisis management apparatus,” says Jean Pisani-Ferry from the Brussels-based Bruegel think-tank.
But the increasing frustration in Brussels, other capitals and at the European Central Bank in Frankfurt suggests at least a few policymakers might favour throwing the book at Greece. “This is a game of chicken and we don’t know who will lose their nerve first,” says Daniel Gros of the Centre for European Policy Studies, another Brussels research institute.
Is Greece really heading for nemesis? Around the world, governments abandoned fiscal restraint to combat crisis. But elsewhere, for instance in Ireland, governments are now acting to bring budgets back under control. Greece’s crisis has taken on a different dimension, largely because of the behaviour of the Athens government.
Most blatantly, Greece misled the world about the acuteness of its fiscal plight. Back in March, the situation looked bad – but manageable. The European Commission forecast that the Greek public sector deficit this year would be above the 3 per cent limit set under EU rules and “exceed 4 per cent in 2010”. At the time, officials were concerned the actual numbers would be higher. Nobody, however, was prepared for the shock unveiled by the Socialist government elected in October. Statistical revisions showed the public finances so much worse that the Commission changed its projections to a deficit of 12.7 per cent this year and 12.2 per cent in 2010.
Worries have been compounded by the new government’s apparent dithering. Brussels wants George Papaconstantinou, finance minister, to rewrite his 2010 budget, which relies heavily on curbing tax evasion rather than cutting spending. In a letter to the Financial Times published on Wednesday, he said Athens was “fully committed to . . . the necessary steps to restore our credibility and finances”. But his claims that a tax crackdown on wealthy Greeks will be decisive in cutting the deficit next year to 9.1 per cent ring hollow with many – especially as his new revenue collection team has yet to be appointed.
Last December, youth discontent fuelled by the economic situation led to rioting in Athens – and the Socialists are reluctant to reverse a campaign pledge to protect incomes and boost welfare payments.
Moreover, Greece’s economy looked sickly before the events of the past few weeks. Prior to the global slowdown, the country was growing at annual rates of 4 per cent or more, with consumption boosted by the low interest rates it enjoyed as a eurozone member. But Europe’s recession has exposed a massive loss of competitiveness. Unit labour costs have soared more than 40 per cent since Greece joined the eurozone in 2001, while in Germany they remained almost constant before edging up this year.
On almost every measure, Greeks have been living beyond their means. The current account deficit reached almost 15 per cent of gross domestic product last year, making the US deficit of 5 per cent look modest. External public debt now exceeds GDP.
With hindsight, it is clear that a lax fiscal policy was also pumping up an economy based largely on just two sectors – shipping and tourism. Now, “Greece’s mix of problems is unique in the eurozone – a large budget deficit, rising debt and an unsustainable pension system”, says George Pagoulatos, a professor at Athens Economics University.
Since joining the euro, Greece has regularly flouted the deficit and debt limits set in the zone’s “stability and growth pact” that is meant to correct for the lack of a single eurozone fiscal authority. Scant progress has been made in reforming the country’s public sector, which added 50,000 mostly low-skilled employees in 2004-09.
Public sector wages are again set to rise, by 5-7 per cent in 2010. “Wage cuts may not be needed, because the economy isn’t projected to shrink significantly next year, but there should be an immediate freeze on salaries and recruitment,” says Yiannis Stournaras, a former chief economic adviser at the finance ministry and now a professor at Athens University.
On pensions, expected big increases in expenditure relative to the size of its economy make Greece more vulnerable than other EU countries to an ageing population. “It’s the largest of the fiscal imbalances and the system will become unsustainable within a decade,” says Mr Stournaras.
Athens is launching a “dialogue” with trade unions on reducing the number of state pension funds from 13 to three and implementing a long-postponed plan to raise the retirement age for women to an equalised 65. The unions foiled previous pension reform efforts and are gearing up for strikes and street protests. “We’re going to war with the government,” says Aleka Papariga, leader of the still influential Greek Communist party.
What will happen next? European finance ministers on Wednesday issued a fresh reprimand to Greece, pressing ahead with a process that could lead to financial sanctions. One possibility would be for the Commission to withhold “cohesion funds” meant to help Greece catch up with richer countries.
Leaving the eurozone is not an option for Athens: the cost of servicing foreign debt would simply escalate. Beyond that, Greece’s fate will depend on the reaction in the markets and actions taken by Athens.
Nor is timing on its side. The eurozone has a “no bail-out” clause, which prevents collective liability for debts incurred by a member. In February – when the crisis was at its most intense – Peer Steinbrück, then Germany’s finance minister, admitted that in the worst case “we would have to take action”. That eased pressure on the weakest members, including Ireland. But Mr Steinbrück has since been replaced and his promise now carries little weight; in the eyes of conservative European policymakers, it increased the risk of “moral hazard” – rewarding bad behaviour.
“It is one thing if you are in the middle of a systemic crisis. Then you can’t allow anyone to fail and don’t worry about moral hazard,” says Mr Gros at Ceps in Brussels. “Now we are out of the woods and it may be a good time to reduce moral hazard.” In a research note last week, Deutsche Bank economists wrote that Greece’s continuing violation of the rules “may have changed the minds of EU authorities ... We believe that they may have to set an example for other countries in trouble”.
If the cost of servicing debt rose too high, Greece could have to turn to the International Monetary Fund. The rigorous conditionality attached to help given by the Fund could provide a framework to implement reform – and allow the government to deflect the responsibility for harsh but necessary measures.
But Mr Papaconstantinou says it is “out of the question” that Athens would turn to the IMF. “The new government is determined to put the economy back on a path of fiscal sustainability in the context of the EU rules.”
Greece’s small size – it accounts for less than 3 per cent of eurozone GDP – plays to its disadvantage. The Deutsche Bank note argues that the EU could ring-fence Greek debt, using a special fund to reduce the impact of a default beyond its borders.
Still, that is a scenario that EU policymakers would rather not contemplate. Even if containable, a Greek default would send worrying signals about the resilience of monetary union. Instead, the hope is that the markets force Athens to bring public finances under control. The stability pact is still regarded as “an anchor for policymakers”, says Erik Nielsen, economist at Goldman Sachs.
A comfort for EU authorities is that investors’ increased risk awareness means they are – at last – imposing discipline on governments. Prior to the economic crisis, Greece escaped punishment from financial markets. That is no longer the case. It may not be too long before even bored Greek public sector employees notice.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Turkey fights calls for greater Afghan role
By Delphine Strauss in Ankara
Turkey is “already doing what it can” in its dispatch of troops to Afghanistan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prime minister, said on Sunday, signalling he would resist US pressure to send a bigger contingent to back the American surge.
He spoke before flying to Washington on an official visit intended to dispel suspicions of an eastwards drift in Turkey’s foreign policy, and show its value as a partner in addressing regional challenges – from stabilising Iraq to ending frozen conflicts in the Caucasus or containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Turkey, a long-standing Nato ally, insists its role in Afghanistan is humanitarian, and that its troops are non-combat. Barack Obama, US president, is likely to ask for more help at Monday’s meeting in the White House, but Mr Erdogan said Turkey, though it would continue training Afghan security forces, had already more than doubled its contingent to 1,750 and ruled out any further increase.
The decision may feed doubts in Washington that Turkey’s pursuit of closer ties with Muslim neighbours could dilute its support of western aims. Mr Erdogan’s visit comes soon after a crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations, and a defence of Iran’s nuclear programme as “peaceful and humanitarian”.
“The US side needs to impress diplomatically on [Mr Erdogan] how much his populist rhetoric in support of anti-western bugbears is damaging Turkey’s position with its key partners and ... in Washington and Brussels,” Hugh Pope, an author on Turkey, wrote in a paper for the Transatlantic Academy.
Despite the criticism, Mr Obama’s administration considers Ankara a vital partner in a difficult region. It supports Mr Erdogan’s drive to broaden rights for Turkey’s Kurdish minority, aiming to end a conflict that has deepened divisions within Turkey and also threatened stability in northern Iraq. The US shares intelligence with Turkey on Kurdish rebels operating from Iraq, and Mr Erdogan is accompanied on the trip by a senior general.
Mr Obama, who before his election promised to recognise Ottoman-era massacres of Armenians as genocide, is also likely to urge Mr Erdogan to speed ratification of a deal to normalise relations with Yerevan.
The agreement, signed after last-minute mediation by Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, is one of Mr Obama’s few tangible successes in foreign policy, but he will face pressure from Armenian groups if it does not take effect before April.
The real test of what Mr Obama has called a “model partnership”, though, will be Iran. Turkish diplomats say they share western fears of Tehran gaining nuclear weapons, and differ only in their approach to preventing it.
But Turkey, which imports gas from Iran and wants to expand trade ties, is against any new sanctions and abstained in last month’s United Nations vote condemning Iran’s nuclear activities, even though China and Russia joined the censure.
Ian Lesser, in a paper for the German Marshall Fund, said Turkish foreign policy was “in the European mainstream” on most issues, but warned its position on Iran’s nuclear programme “holds the potential for a damaging departure”.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Turkey is “already doing what it can” in its dispatch of troops to Afghanistan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prime minister, said on Sunday, signalling he would resist US pressure to send a bigger contingent to back the American surge.
He spoke before flying to Washington on an official visit intended to dispel suspicions of an eastwards drift in Turkey’s foreign policy, and show its value as a partner in addressing regional challenges – from stabilising Iraq to ending frozen conflicts in the Caucasus or containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Turkey, a long-standing Nato ally, insists its role in Afghanistan is humanitarian, and that its troops are non-combat. Barack Obama, US president, is likely to ask for more help at Monday’s meeting in the White House, but Mr Erdogan said Turkey, though it would continue training Afghan security forces, had already more than doubled its contingent to 1,750 and ruled out any further increase.
The decision may feed doubts in Washington that Turkey’s pursuit of closer ties with Muslim neighbours could dilute its support of western aims. Mr Erdogan’s visit comes soon after a crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations, and a defence of Iran’s nuclear programme as “peaceful and humanitarian”.
“The US side needs to impress diplomatically on [Mr Erdogan] how much his populist rhetoric in support of anti-western bugbears is damaging Turkey’s position with its key partners and ... in Washington and Brussels,” Hugh Pope, an author on Turkey, wrote in a paper for the Transatlantic Academy.
Despite the criticism, Mr Obama’s administration considers Ankara a vital partner in a difficult region. It supports Mr Erdogan’s drive to broaden rights for Turkey’s Kurdish minority, aiming to end a conflict that has deepened divisions within Turkey and also threatened stability in northern Iraq. The US shares intelligence with Turkey on Kurdish rebels operating from Iraq, and Mr Erdogan is accompanied on the trip by a senior general.
Mr Obama, who before his election promised to recognise Ottoman-era massacres of Armenians as genocide, is also likely to urge Mr Erdogan to speed ratification of a deal to normalise relations with Yerevan.
The agreement, signed after last-minute mediation by Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, is one of Mr Obama’s few tangible successes in foreign policy, but he will face pressure from Armenian groups if it does not take effect before April.
The real test of what Mr Obama has called a “model partnership”, though, will be Iran. Turkish diplomats say they share western fears of Tehran gaining nuclear weapons, and differ only in their approach to preventing it.
But Turkey, which imports gas from Iran and wants to expand trade ties, is against any new sanctions and abstained in last month’s United Nations vote condemning Iran’s nuclear activities, even though China and Russia joined the censure.
Ian Lesser, in a paper for the German Marshall Fund, said Turkish foreign policy was “in the European mainstream” on most issues, but warned its position on Iran’s nuclear programme “holds the potential for a damaging departure”.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Serbia condemns Kosovo in court
By Neil MacDonald in Belgrade
Serbia on Tuesday condemned Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, as the International Court of Justice held its first public hearings on the issue.
While Serbia’s chief representative, Dusan Batakovic, attacked the “flagrant violation” of international law, Kosovo’s foreign minister, Skender Hyseni, argued that 1990s brutality had invalidated any right by Belgrade to rule the disputed territory.
The then-province’s ethnic Albanian majority declared independence after almost nine years of United Nations post-war government. Kosovo gained rapid backing from the US and most European Union member states, yet without UN endorsement or Serbia’s consent.
Although the ICJ cannot make a binding ruling, Belgrade has sought the UN-backed court’s advisory opinion aiming to stem further international recognition and force Kosovo’s separatists back to negotiations for some “compromise solution”.
“Kosovo is the historic cradle of Serbia,” said Mr Batakovic, head of the delegation and Serbian ambassador to France, alluding partly to the medieval Orthodox monasteries dotted around the territory of 2m people. But he also described the ethnic Albanian secession declaration as “a major challenge to international order”, with potential echoes for any country with a disaffected minority region.
Mr Hyseni, however, said renewed negotiations would be “inconceivable” except between equal sovereign states. Undermining independence “would be highly disruptive and could even spark new conflict in the region,” he said.
Nato warplanes in 1999 ended a crackdown by Serb security forces under Slobodan Milosevic, president of Yugoslavia, which had killed nearly 10,000 and displaced nearly 1m Kosovo Albanians. Belgade today expresses regret over the former regime’s actions.
But Mr Hyseni said elected representatives last year had simply carried out the will of Kosovo’s people, resulting in a state now recognised by 63 others worldwide. Yet the UN Security Council remains divided, with Russia and China defending Serbia’s territorial integrity.
All five permanent Security Council members are to testify, along with 24 other countries, in nine days of hearings in The Hague, with the ruling by the 15-judge panel to come months later.
“Pursuing this case is a futile exercise on the part of Serbia,” said Muhamet Hamiti, Kosovo’s ambassador to the UK.
Yet the outcome “matters in one sense – that a lot of countries still sitting on the fence will [afterwards] opt to recognise the fact of Kosovo’s independence,” Mr Hamiti added. “Hopefully, this should also end of Serbia’s constant state of denial.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Serbia on Tuesday condemned Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, as the International Court of Justice held its first public hearings on the issue.
While Serbia’s chief representative, Dusan Batakovic, attacked the “flagrant violation” of international law, Kosovo’s foreign minister, Skender Hyseni, argued that 1990s brutality had invalidated any right by Belgrade to rule the disputed territory.
The then-province’s ethnic Albanian majority declared independence after almost nine years of United Nations post-war government. Kosovo gained rapid backing from the US and most European Union member states, yet without UN endorsement or Serbia’s consent.
Although the ICJ cannot make a binding ruling, Belgrade has sought the UN-backed court’s advisory opinion aiming to stem further international recognition and force Kosovo’s separatists back to negotiations for some “compromise solution”.
“Kosovo is the historic cradle of Serbia,” said Mr Batakovic, head of the delegation and Serbian ambassador to France, alluding partly to the medieval Orthodox monasteries dotted around the territory of 2m people. But he also described the ethnic Albanian secession declaration as “a major challenge to international order”, with potential echoes for any country with a disaffected minority region.
Mr Hyseni, however, said renewed negotiations would be “inconceivable” except between equal sovereign states. Undermining independence “would be highly disruptive and could even spark new conflict in the region,” he said.
Nato warplanes in 1999 ended a crackdown by Serb security forces under Slobodan Milosevic, president of Yugoslavia, which had killed nearly 10,000 and displaced nearly 1m Kosovo Albanians. Belgade today expresses regret over the former regime’s actions.
But Mr Hyseni said elected representatives last year had simply carried out the will of Kosovo’s people, resulting in a state now recognised by 63 others worldwide. Yet the UN Security Council remains divided, with Russia and China defending Serbia’s territorial integrity.
All five permanent Security Council members are to testify, along with 24 other countries, in nine days of hearings in The Hague, with the ruling by the 15-judge panel to come months later.
“Pursuing this case is a futile exercise on the part of Serbia,” said Muhamet Hamiti, Kosovo’s ambassador to the UK.
Yet the outcome “matters in one sense – that a lot of countries still sitting on the fence will [afterwards] opt to recognise the fact of Kosovo’s independence,” Mr Hamiti added. “Hopefully, this should also end of Serbia’s constant state of denial.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
EU rewards Serbian progress on war crimes
By Tony Barber in Brussels
The European Union on Monday boosted Serbia’s EU membership prospects by unfreezing a trade agreement as reward for improved co-operation with war crimes investigators.
EU foreign ministers approved the decision after evaluating a report from Serge Brammertz, the chief prosecutor of the United Nations’ war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia.
The step paves the way for a formal application for EU entry, which Serbia’s government is expected to submit later this month or in January.
Under EU rules the 27-nation bloc’s governments would then ask the European Commission to draw up an opinion on Serbia’s application. This would lead to the formal start of accession talks, a process that usually lasts several years.
Although Serbian entry is a long way off, the outlook for another round of EU enlargement has brightened over the past six months. Iceland applied for membership in July, and Croatia settled a border dispute with Slovenia in October that had blocked its accession talks for almost a year.
Reykjavik and Zagreb may be able to join the EU in 2012, but some hard work lies ahead for Croatia in areas such as fighting organised crime and corruption.
Meanwhile, the Commission is preparing opinions on the membership bids of Albania and Montenegro.
In a further sign of progress, EU governments agreed last week to allow visa-free travel in the bloc for citizens of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia from December 19.
The countries facing the biggest obstacles to joining the EU are Bosnia-Herzegovina, paralysed by internal nationalist rivalries, Macedonia, locked in a dispute with Greece over its name, and Turkey, which is an official candidate for membership but whose bid is opposed by Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, and Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor.
The EU and Serbia signed their trade deal last year but the Netherlands blocked its implementation on the grounds that Belgrade was not co-operating fully with the war crimes tribunal – in particular, by not arresting Ratko Mladic, the fugitive Bosnian Serb general accused of committing atrocities in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war.
The Dutch government agreed to unfreeze the trade accord in recognition of Mr Brammertz’s assessment, delivered to the Security Council last week, that Serbia’s co-operation with his office had “continued to progress”.
Mr Brammertz stopped short of stating Serbia was “fully co-operating” with the tribunal. Belgrade’s path to EU membership therefore remains tied to the question of Mr Mladic and Goran Hadzic, another fugitive war crimes suspect.
“Pressure must be maintained in order for the two remaining fugitives to be found and extradited to The Hague,” Maxime Verhagen, Dutch foreign minister, said last week.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
The European Union on Monday boosted Serbia’s EU membership prospects by unfreezing a trade agreement as reward for improved co-operation with war crimes investigators.
EU foreign ministers approved the decision after evaluating a report from Serge Brammertz, the chief prosecutor of the United Nations’ war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia.
The step paves the way for a formal application for EU entry, which Serbia’s government is expected to submit later this month or in January.
Under EU rules the 27-nation bloc’s governments would then ask the European Commission to draw up an opinion on Serbia’s application. This would lead to the formal start of accession talks, a process that usually lasts several years.
Although Serbian entry is a long way off, the outlook for another round of EU enlargement has brightened over the past six months. Iceland applied for membership in July, and Croatia settled a border dispute with Slovenia in October that had blocked its accession talks for almost a year.
Reykjavik and Zagreb may be able to join the EU in 2012, but some hard work lies ahead for Croatia in areas such as fighting organised crime and corruption.
Meanwhile, the Commission is preparing opinions on the membership bids of Albania and Montenegro.
In a further sign of progress, EU governments agreed last week to allow visa-free travel in the bloc for citizens of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia from December 19.
The countries facing the biggest obstacles to joining the EU are Bosnia-Herzegovina, paralysed by internal nationalist rivalries, Macedonia, locked in a dispute with Greece over its name, and Turkey, which is an official candidate for membership but whose bid is opposed by Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, and Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor.
The EU and Serbia signed their trade deal last year but the Netherlands blocked its implementation on the grounds that Belgrade was not co-operating fully with the war crimes tribunal – in particular, by not arresting Ratko Mladic, the fugitive Bosnian Serb general accused of committing atrocities in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war.
The Dutch government agreed to unfreeze the trade accord in recognition of Mr Brammertz’s assessment, delivered to the Security Council last week, that Serbia’s co-operation with his office had “continued to progress”.
Mr Brammertz stopped short of stating Serbia was “fully co-operating” with the tribunal. Belgrade’s path to EU membership therefore remains tied to the question of Mr Mladic and Goran Hadzic, another fugitive war crimes suspect.
“Pressure must be maintained in order for the two remaining fugitives to be found and extradited to The Hague,” Maxime Verhagen, Dutch foreign minister, said last week.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Greece can expect no gifts from Europe
By Wolfgang Münchau
After Dubai, will Greece be next? This question is technically a category error, since Dubai World is not a state but a state-owned company. But many investors rightly do not care about the difference. Last week investors started to fret about sovereign default in earnest. So what about Greece?
We were already wondering about a Greek default at the beginning of this year, when eurozone bond spreads suddenly widened. In February Peer Steinbrück, the former German finance minister, abruptly ended the speculation by saying the eurozone would act if someone got into trouble. There was no concrete action plan. No work had been done to amend European treaties. There was no budgetary appropriation. Just a sentence. Investors believed him and all was well – for a while.
The speculation is now back, but there is one difference. The eurozone will not come to the rescue this time, verbally or otherwise, unless Greece meets a number of conditions the European Union is likely to impose in the coming months.
The EU’s authorities, rightly or wrongly, are more afraid of the moral hazard of a bail-out than the possible spillover effect of a hypothetical Greek default to other eurozone countries. If faced with a choice between preserving the integrity of the stability pact and the integrity of Greece, they are currently minded to choose the former. To safeguard what is left of the stability pact, they are determined to link any help to a country’s willingness to comply. Otherwise the EU fears it might lose all leverage over budgetary processes elsewhere in the eurozone. And no country in the eurozone has flouted the pact more than Greece.
Here are the numbers. This year, the budget deficit will rise to 12.7 per cent of gross domestic product – and this assumes there are no further accounting tricks to be uncovered. Deutsche Bank calculated in a recent research note that the country’s public debt-to-GDP ratio is headed for 135 per cent. Gross external debt – private and public sector debt owed to foreign creditors – was 149.2 per cent at the end of last year. The real exchange rate has gone up by 17 per cent since 2006, which means the country is losing competitiveness at an incredible rate. Had Greece not been in the eurozone, it would be heading straight for default.
The government’s 2010 draft budget foresees a deficit reduction to about 9.1 per cent of GDP. But the number is misleading. The lion’s share of the total deficit reduction effort is earmarked to come from tax measures, and most of those from the fight against tax evasion. Tax evasion is always the item first on the list of desperate governments. The European Commission and Europe’s finance ministers, who have heard this story before, are rightly asking for genuine deficit reduction. So is George Provopoulos, the Greek central bank governor, who demanded that two-thirds of the entire deficit reduction effort should come in the form of spending cuts. If the Greek parliament confirms the government’s soft budget next month, the European Commission will almost certainly judge the effort insufficient and demand a supplementary budget. It might also ask for structural reform, including pension reform.
If the Greek government refused to comply, which is quite possible, the next step could be the penalty procedure under the stability pact. So instead of helping Greece, the EU might be asking Greece to pay a penalty. This in turn would aggravate Greece’s financial position in the unlikely event that the government would agree to pay it.
The current strategy of the EU is to raise the political pressure – perhaps even provoke a political crisis – with the strategic objective that the Greek government might eventually relent. It is a dangerous strategy that could easily backfire. Even if George Papandreou, the Greek prime minister, were sympathetic to the EU’s demand, he would face enormous political headwinds if he tried to implement draconian austerity measures. This would be the very opposite of what he promised during the recent election. The real problem is that the Greek people have not been prepared by their political leaders for what lies ahead.
So what happens if Greece cannot meet a payment on its bonds, or fails to roll over existing debt? About two-thirds of Greece’s public debt is held by foreigners. According to calculations from Deutsche Bank, Greece is looking to raise some €31bn ($46bn, £28bn) in new borrowing and €16bn to roll over existing debt next year. In the absence of help from the eurozone, the Greek government would have to resort to the International Monetary Fund if it were to encounter difficulties refinancing the debt. Unlike Argentina, Greece cannot devalue, and leaving the eurozone is not a realistic policy option either. Latvian-style austerity could thus come one way or the other, with or without default. But it might be politically easier for the present government to have austerity imposed on it from the outside than from the inside. This is another reason why the EU would be happy to let the IMF take a lead.
Just as the Greek people are unprepared for austerity, investors are unprepared for what awaits them. I would still bet that outright default is unlikely. But I wonder whether the current Greek bond spreads reflect the true risks.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
After Dubai, will Greece be next? This question is technically a category error, since Dubai World is not a state but a state-owned company. But many investors rightly do not care about the difference. Last week investors started to fret about sovereign default in earnest. So what about Greece?
We were already wondering about a Greek default at the beginning of this year, when eurozone bond spreads suddenly widened. In February Peer Steinbrück, the former German finance minister, abruptly ended the speculation by saying the eurozone would act if someone got into trouble. There was no concrete action plan. No work had been done to amend European treaties. There was no budgetary appropriation. Just a sentence. Investors believed him and all was well – for a while.
The speculation is now back, but there is one difference. The eurozone will not come to the rescue this time, verbally or otherwise, unless Greece meets a number of conditions the European Union is likely to impose in the coming months.
The EU’s authorities, rightly or wrongly, are more afraid of the moral hazard of a bail-out than the possible spillover effect of a hypothetical Greek default to other eurozone countries. If faced with a choice between preserving the integrity of the stability pact and the integrity of Greece, they are currently minded to choose the former. To safeguard what is left of the stability pact, they are determined to link any help to a country’s willingness to comply. Otherwise the EU fears it might lose all leverage over budgetary processes elsewhere in the eurozone. And no country in the eurozone has flouted the pact more than Greece.
Here are the numbers. This year, the budget deficit will rise to 12.7 per cent of gross domestic product – and this assumes there are no further accounting tricks to be uncovered. Deutsche Bank calculated in a recent research note that the country’s public debt-to-GDP ratio is headed for 135 per cent. Gross external debt – private and public sector debt owed to foreign creditors – was 149.2 per cent at the end of last year. The real exchange rate has gone up by 17 per cent since 2006, which means the country is losing competitiveness at an incredible rate. Had Greece not been in the eurozone, it would be heading straight for default.
The government’s 2010 draft budget foresees a deficit reduction to about 9.1 per cent of GDP. But the number is misleading. The lion’s share of the total deficit reduction effort is earmarked to come from tax measures, and most of those from the fight against tax evasion. Tax evasion is always the item first on the list of desperate governments. The European Commission and Europe’s finance ministers, who have heard this story before, are rightly asking for genuine deficit reduction. So is George Provopoulos, the Greek central bank governor, who demanded that two-thirds of the entire deficit reduction effort should come in the form of spending cuts. If the Greek parliament confirms the government’s soft budget next month, the European Commission will almost certainly judge the effort insufficient and demand a supplementary budget. It might also ask for structural reform, including pension reform.
If the Greek government refused to comply, which is quite possible, the next step could be the penalty procedure under the stability pact. So instead of helping Greece, the EU might be asking Greece to pay a penalty. This in turn would aggravate Greece’s financial position in the unlikely event that the government would agree to pay it.
The current strategy of the EU is to raise the political pressure – perhaps even provoke a political crisis – with the strategic objective that the Greek government might eventually relent. It is a dangerous strategy that could easily backfire. Even if George Papandreou, the Greek prime minister, were sympathetic to the EU’s demand, he would face enormous political headwinds if he tried to implement draconian austerity measures. This would be the very opposite of what he promised during the recent election. The real problem is that the Greek people have not been prepared by their political leaders for what lies ahead.
So what happens if Greece cannot meet a payment on its bonds, or fails to roll over existing debt? About two-thirds of Greece’s public debt is held by foreigners. According to calculations from Deutsche Bank, Greece is looking to raise some €31bn ($46bn, £28bn) in new borrowing and €16bn to roll over existing debt next year. In the absence of help from the eurozone, the Greek government would have to resort to the International Monetary Fund if it were to encounter difficulties refinancing the debt. Unlike Argentina, Greece cannot devalue, and leaving the eurozone is not a realistic policy option either. Latvian-style austerity could thus come one way or the other, with or without default. But it might be politically easier for the present government to have austerity imposed on it from the outside than from the inside. This is another reason why the EU would be happy to let the IMF take a lead.
Just as the Greek people are unprepared for austerity, investors are unprepared for what awaits them. I would still bet that outright default is unlikely. But I wonder whether the current Greek bond spreads reflect the true risks.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Energy: Success of oil pipeline depends on whims of Moscow
By David O’Byrne
At 30km long but just 700m wide at its narrowest, Istanbul’s Bosphorus strait is one of world’s most crowded and potentially hazardous waterways, where even with state-of-the-art radar monitoring, transiting ships are still obliged to take on a pilot.
Fringed with forests and villages on its upper reaches, and the palaces and mosques of Istanbul at its lower end, it is also one of the most beautiful.
It is no surprise then that with oil tanker traffic through the straits having more than doubled since 1995 and expected to double again in the next decade on the back of fast-rising oil production in Russia and the Caspian basin, Turkey is keen to provide an alternative export route.
“Traffic through the strait already presents an unacceptable risk to the population of Istanbul, and any oil pipeline that can relieve the pressure will be welcome,” says Burak Ozugergin, spokesman for Turkey’s foreign ministry which has long warned of the dangers posed by too much tanker traffic.
Turkey’s own proposed solution is the Samsun-Ceyhan, or Trans Anatolian pipeline, planned to carry oil from Turkey’s Black Sea coast, 550km across the country to the Mediterranean coast, bypassing the crowded Bosphorus.
Sponsored by a consortium of Turkey’s Calik Enerji and Eni of Italy it is designed to carry up to 1.5m barrels per day.
It is also expected to help kickstart a new petroleum refining, petrochemicals and manufacturing sector at the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, which Turkey has long harboured ambitions of turning into a major regional energy hub.
However despite presiding over a ground-breaking ceremony at Ceyhan in 2007, Calik and Eni have struggled to secure sufficient commitments of oil to ensure the line will be commercially viable.
Eni can supply oil from the giant Kashagan field in Kazakhstan which it is developing in partnership with Kazakh state oil company KazMunaiGaz, but the line also needs oil from Russian or Kazakh producers.
Support has been slow in coming, however, with Russia having long backed a rival project to build a pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece – a far shorter route, and Kazakhstan having long declined to commit to any of the competing schemes.
That situation has now changed with a recent agreement between Turkey, Italy and Russia committing the three countries to work together on this and other regional energy projects.
Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin also announced that he had secured Kazakh support for the project – a claim yet to be confirmed by Almaty.
“The agreement allows for Russian oil companies Rosneft and Tatneft to join the project either by committing oil or by becoming partners,” says Mustafa Aksoy, Calik Holding’s Director of Projects and Investments.
“With these two companies on board the project we expect to be able to make the final investment decision by the end of 2010,” he adds.
It is an important step, but there is still no definite commitment of oil to the Samsun-Ceyhan line. It also confirms that Moscow can make or break the project.
“Shipping oil by tanker through the strait is always going to be cheaper than any pipeline,” says John Roberts, Caspian analyst at Platts.
“Ultimately Russia controls the oil routes from the Caspian to the Black Sea, and only Russia can ensure the line has enough oil to make it viable.”
Such a move by Russia would come at a price, he cautions, pointing out that the recently signed agreements make only one definite commitment – for Turkey to allow Eni and Russia’s Gazprom to conduct a feasibility study for a by-pass line of their own.
They plan to construct that line, the South Stream gas pipeline, across the Black Sea to export Russian gas to Europe, by-passing Ukraine which has previously attempted to leverage its location on Russia’s gas export route to obtain cheap gas.
Russia is also hoping to co-operate with Turkey on other pipelines, including a second gas line across the Black Sea and an extension of an existing gas line south across Turkey to Ceyhan and on to Israel that would also allow for the development of gas-based industries at Ceyhan.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
At 30km long but just 700m wide at its narrowest, Istanbul’s Bosphorus strait is one of world’s most crowded and potentially hazardous waterways, where even with state-of-the-art radar monitoring, transiting ships are still obliged to take on a pilot.
Fringed with forests and villages on its upper reaches, and the palaces and mosques of Istanbul at its lower end, it is also one of the most beautiful.
It is no surprise then that with oil tanker traffic through the straits having more than doubled since 1995 and expected to double again in the next decade on the back of fast-rising oil production in Russia and the Caspian basin, Turkey is keen to provide an alternative export route.
“Traffic through the strait already presents an unacceptable risk to the population of Istanbul, and any oil pipeline that can relieve the pressure will be welcome,” says Burak Ozugergin, spokesman for Turkey’s foreign ministry which has long warned of the dangers posed by too much tanker traffic.
Turkey’s own proposed solution is the Samsun-Ceyhan, or Trans Anatolian pipeline, planned to carry oil from Turkey’s Black Sea coast, 550km across the country to the Mediterranean coast, bypassing the crowded Bosphorus.
Sponsored by a consortium of Turkey’s Calik Enerji and Eni of Italy it is designed to carry up to 1.5m barrels per day.
It is also expected to help kickstart a new petroleum refining, petrochemicals and manufacturing sector at the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, which Turkey has long harboured ambitions of turning into a major regional energy hub.
However despite presiding over a ground-breaking ceremony at Ceyhan in 2007, Calik and Eni have struggled to secure sufficient commitments of oil to ensure the line will be commercially viable.
Eni can supply oil from the giant Kashagan field in Kazakhstan which it is developing in partnership with Kazakh state oil company KazMunaiGaz, but the line also needs oil from Russian or Kazakh producers.
Support has been slow in coming, however, with Russia having long backed a rival project to build a pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece – a far shorter route, and Kazakhstan having long declined to commit to any of the competing schemes.
That situation has now changed with a recent agreement between Turkey, Italy and Russia committing the three countries to work together on this and other regional energy projects.
Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin also announced that he had secured Kazakh support for the project – a claim yet to be confirmed by Almaty.
“The agreement allows for Russian oil companies Rosneft and Tatneft to join the project either by committing oil or by becoming partners,” says Mustafa Aksoy, Calik Holding’s Director of Projects and Investments.
“With these two companies on board the project we expect to be able to make the final investment decision by the end of 2010,” he adds.
It is an important step, but there is still no definite commitment of oil to the Samsun-Ceyhan line. It also confirms that Moscow can make or break the project.
“Shipping oil by tanker through the strait is always going to be cheaper than any pipeline,” says John Roberts, Caspian analyst at Platts.
“Ultimately Russia controls the oil routes from the Caspian to the Black Sea, and only Russia can ensure the line has enough oil to make it viable.”
Such a move by Russia would come at a price, he cautions, pointing out that the recently signed agreements make only one definite commitment – for Turkey to allow Eni and Russia’s Gazprom to conduct a feasibility study for a by-pass line of their own.
They plan to construct that line, the South Stream gas pipeline, across the Black Sea to export Russian gas to Europe, by-passing Ukraine which has previously attempted to leverage its location on Russia’s gas export route to obtain cheap gas.
Russia is also hoping to co-operate with Turkey on other pipelines, including a second gas line across the Black Sea and an extension of an existing gas line south across Turkey to Ceyhan and on to Israel that would also allow for the development of gas-based industries at Ceyhan.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Athens set for anniversary of fatal police shooting
More than 6,000 police will be on the streets of Athens this weekend as the city marks the first anniversary of the fatal shooting of a 15-year-old boy.
The teenager's death at the hands of police in December last year sparked Greece's worst riots in decades.
In the run-up to the anniversary, dozens of schools and university campuses have been occupied by students preparing to mark the uprising.
Greece's government says it will have a zero tolerance policy towards violence.
"We want to send a clear message, we won't tolerate a repeat of the violence and terror scene in central Athens, we won't hand Athens to vandals," said Citizen Protection Minister Mihalis Chrysohoidis.
Memorial service
Family and friends of teenager Alexandros Grigoropoulos will hold a memorial service on Sunday to mark a year since his killing.
They have appealed for calm, but posters have appeared in the capital saying: "We won't forget, we won't forgive."
Police said they expect about 150 foreign anarchists to arrive this weekend from Italy, France and other European countries.
Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou has acknowledged that the weekend is a "crucial moment" for his new socialist government and for the nation.
"All of us, citizens, political leaders, parties, students representatives, we must protect Athens," he said.
Shop owners in the Greek capital are braced for trouble although some believe it will not be as bad as last year.
"Like all other shops on this street, we have put [up] steel shutters," said Athens music store manager George Stouraitis.
"But I don't think anything major will happen this year because the government is still young."
The BBC's Malcolm Brabant, in Athens, says police hope to repeat the success they had with an annual demonstration two weeks ago which normally ends in violence.
Officers managed to contain trouble by briefly detaining 300 youngsters, he says.
Two police officers have been charged with the murder and attempted murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos and their trial is due to begin in the New Year.
The teenager's death at the hands of police in December last year sparked Greece's worst riots in decades.
In the run-up to the anniversary, dozens of schools and university campuses have been occupied by students preparing to mark the uprising.
Greece's government says it will have a zero tolerance policy towards violence.
"We want to send a clear message, we won't tolerate a repeat of the violence and terror scene in central Athens, we won't hand Athens to vandals," said Citizen Protection Minister Mihalis Chrysohoidis.
Memorial service
Family and friends of teenager Alexandros Grigoropoulos will hold a memorial service on Sunday to mark a year since his killing.
They have appealed for calm, but posters have appeared in the capital saying: "We won't forget, we won't forgive."
Police said they expect about 150 foreign anarchists to arrive this weekend from Italy, France and other European countries.
Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou has acknowledged that the weekend is a "crucial moment" for his new socialist government and for the nation.
"All of us, citizens, political leaders, parties, students representatives, we must protect Athens," he said.
Shop owners in the Greek capital are braced for trouble although some believe it will not be as bad as last year.
"Like all other shops on this street, we have put [up] steel shutters," said Athens music store manager George Stouraitis.
"But I don't think anything major will happen this year because the government is still young."
The BBC's Malcolm Brabant, in Athens, says police hope to repeat the success they had with an annual demonstration two weeks ago which normally ends in violence.
Officers managed to contain trouble by briefly detaining 300 youngsters, he says.
Two police officers have been charged with the murder and attempted murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos and their trial is due to begin in the New Year.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Turkey: Ottoman mission
By Delphine Strauss
In one of Istanbul’s artier quarters, a second-hand bookshop sells leaves torn from an old school atlas that depict the dominions of the Ottoman empire, all neatly labelled in a flowing script few Turks are now able to read.
The faded pages are a reminder of the heritage long rejected by the modern Turkish state as it sought to forge a new national identity and survive on the frontline of 20th-century geopolitics. Just as the social reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the secular republic, presented European culture as the standard of civilised behaviour, so foreign policy became firmly west-facing as Turkey sought shelter from the Soviet power on its border.
Now, however, the ruling Justice & Development (AK) party is re-engaging with territories once ruled by the sultans, from the Balkans to Baghdad, in a drive to return Turkey to a place among the leadership of the Muslim world and the top ranks of international diplomacy.
Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister and architect of the policy, rejects the expansionist tag of “neo-Ottoman” bandied about by AK critics, preferring his well-used slogan, “zero problems with neighbours”. The US and the European Union praise this unobjectionable aim: to act as a force for stability in an unstable region.
Turkey has long mattered – as Nato ally, friend of Israel, EU applicant and energy route to the west. But its growing economic strength and diplomatic reach give it influence over some of the toughest issues facing Washington and other capitals: from frozen conflicts in the Caucasus to Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the threat of disintegration in Iraq. “We are neither surprised by nor disturbed by an activist Turkish agenda in the Middle East,” Philip Gordon, assistant secretary at the US state department, said in Ankara this month.
Yet the speed and scope of Turkey’s diplomatic endeavours have left both Turkish and western observers wondering whether it can juggle all its new interests. In a month of frenetic activity, Mr Davutoglu has staged a show of friendship with Syria, ending visa restrictions on a border once patrolled by Turkish tanks; paid a high-profile visit to Iraq’s Kurdistan region, long shunned as a threat to Turkish unity; and signed a landmark deal to mend relations with Armenia. “Today we, children of the Ottomans, are here to show interest in the development of Mosul just as our ancestors showed centuries ago,” Zafer Caglayan, trade minister, said as he opened a consulate in the northern Iraqi city last month. Turkish diplomats claim credit, in the last year alone, for mediating between Israel and Syria, hosting talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and liaising with Sunni militants in Iraq.
But Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a prime minister who scorns diplomatic niceties, has shown the potential for new friendships to damage old ones.
“Why is it that...a more prominent Turkey has, it seems, to come at the expense of its relations with Israel?” Robert Wexler, the US congressman, asked recently. US newspaper columnists went further, arguing that Ankara was undermining efforts to put pressure on Iran, or even that illiberal Islamists could no longer be trusted in Nato.
The virulence of the reactions reflects the value attached to Turkish support. Although no longer a bulwark against Soviet power, the threat of radical Islam has given Turkey new weight as a partner to channel western values to the Muslim world – and, by its western alliances, show that a “clash of civilisations” is not an inevitable result of religious difference.
Mr Davutoglu is touring European capitals this month, employing Ottoman-tinged rhetoric to persuade people that Turkey’s European vocation is unchanged. “You cannot understand the history of at least 15 European capitals without exploring the Ottoman archives,” he told an audience in Spain this week.
For Ankara, there is no question of changing orientation. “We have one face to the west and one to the east,” Mr Erdogan said last month as he signed trade deals in Tehran. Yet it is natural for Turkey to keep its options open, given the manifest reluctance in some EU states to admit it to membership. Ankara presents its new friendships as an asset to the EU, giving it a partner to promote western aims in the region. The European Commission’s latest report on Turkey’s accession process endorsed that view, with praise for its foreign policy. But Brussels also makes clear that geostrategic importance cannot replace the domestic judicial, political and human rights reforms required to meet the criteria for membership.
Ankara’s focus, however, is on grander projects than box-ticking compliance with European legislation. A lack of enthusiasm for Herman van Rompuy’s appointment last week as president of the European Council reflects not just worries over his past opposition to Turkey’s candidacy but a preference for a heavyweight leader who would want Europe to play a bigger part on the world stage.
Ibrahim Kalin, Mr Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser, argues that Turkish activism is not a reaction to disappointments in the EU but simply “a fully rational attempt to seize new spaces of opportunity” – including the EU’s virtual absence from geopolitics.
Frictions with the EU may worsen, however, if Turkey engages in rivalry with countries used to seeing it as a junior partner. Western diplomats have noted Mr Davutoglu’s reluctance to support a French attempt at conciliation between Israel and Syria, for example, and say Mr Erdogan’s grandstanding in Iran “is definitely causing irritation”. Turkey thus needs to ascertain how much influence it has, what it is based on, and where new policies may upset old alliances.
Greater regional engagement is in part a response to changing balances of power. The coming American withdrawal from Iraq threatens a vacuum in which Turkey is one of the most plausible counterweights to Iranian influence – its credibility enhanced by its refusal to let the US use its territory to invade in 2003.
Ian Lesser from the Washington-based German Marshall Fund notes that ideas of a “Middle East for Middle Easterners” have been circulating for some time. “The crucial difference is that Turkey is now a much more significant actor in both economic and political terms, and Turkey’s Middle Eastern choices are, rightly or wrongly, seen as linked to the country’s own identity crisis.”
Foreign policy is certainly shaped by a growing affinity with the Islamic world, in a country where religious practice is becoming more visible and public opinion a greater force. Mr Erdogan’s comments on Gaza, or on Iran’s nuclear programme, appear both to recognise and reinforce views on the street: a survey by the GMF found that almost one-third of Turks – compared with only 5 per cent of Americans – would accept a nuclear-armed Iran if diplomacy failed.
Chief AK weapon in its drive eastwards, though, is not religion but trade. Exports to what the country’s official Turkstat agency classifies as the Near and Middle East account for almost 20 per cent of the total so far in 2009, up from 12.5 per cent in 2004. Turkish conglomerates are also stepping up investment in a region where their presence is considered benign.
“We don’t want a cultural bias against us,” says Sureyya Ciliv, chief executive of Turkcell, the mobile operator, which has interests in central Asia, Georgia and Moldova. Anadolu Efes, with almost 10 per cent of Russia’s beer market, wants to start producing non-alcoholic beer in Iran. Limak, a group centred on construction, is seeking projects in the Gulf, north Africa and Europe “east of Vienna”. “It’s a natural development,” says Ferruh Tunc, senior partner in Istanbul for KPMG, the consultancy. “Turkey’s position until the Soviet Union collapsed was unusual – it was like the last stop on a Tube line.”
Yet a previous initiative, reaching out to the Turkic-speaking world after the central Asian states won independence, left Turkey with excellent trade links but limited influence compared with China and Russia. Morton Abramowitz, a former US ambassador to Turkey, warns in this month’s Foreign Affairs journal that in the AKP’s latest diplomatic push as well, “despite the acclaim it showers on itself...symbolic achievements have far exceeded concrete ones”. More-over, Turkey’s opposition this spring to Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s appointment as Nato chief “alienated many Europeans by seeming to favour Muslim sensibilities over liberal democratic values”. Ankara had argued that Denmark’s role in the 2006 controversy over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed had tainted him in the eyes of the Muslim world.
Can Ankara not reach out peacefully on all fronts, as it claims, without repercussions and a risk of overstretch? “You need very judicious fine tuning to be able to deliver this...The danger is of overplaying their hand,” says a western diplomat.
Mending fences with Armenia won praise in the west, for instance, but in Azerbaijan nationalists tore down the Turkish flag, viewing the move as a betrayal of old alliances. Baku may yet take revenge by demanding higher prices to supply gas.
The next test of Turkey’s new foreign policy will be Iran. The AKP claims its opposition to a nuclear-armed Iran is more effective because it delivers the message as a friend and trading partner. Turkey’s interests in trade with Iran are understood but Mr Erdogan may be pressed in Washington and Brussels to explain why he defends Iran’s nuclear programme as “peaceful and humanitarian” and lends the regime credibility rather than backing isolation.
Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform, a London think-tank, says: “As a long-standing Nato member and a country negotiating for EU membership, Turkey is expected to align itself with the US and Europe...As a regional power, Turkey will want to act independently and avoid antagonising its neighbours. It is not clear how long Ankara will be able to avoid tough choices.”
EU membership: ‘There is progress but it’s uneven’
Turkey’s shift in foreign policy reflects its ambition to assume greater responsibility as a regional power, writes Joshua Chaffin. It may also reveal frustration over another ambition that has been delayed, if not thwarted: Istanbul’s bid to join the European Union. Officially, the EU has been committed to full membership since 2005. Yet eight of the 34 negotiating “chapters” remain blocked as a result of Turkey’s long-running conflict with Cyprus. Meanwhile enthusiasm is faint in France and Germany, the bloc’s traditional centres of power. “There is progress but it’s very uneven,” one Commission official says.
The most recent update on negotiations came with the Commission’s mixed review of Turkey in last month’s annual enlargement report. Praise forits overtures to its Kurdish minority, and its agreement to reopen its border with Armenia, was tempered by concern over a fine imposed on one of Turkey’s leading media companies. Ostensibly for tax evasion, the $4bn (€2.7bn, £2.4bn) levy was likened by Olli Rehn, EU enlargement commissioner, to “a political sanction”. Some European diplomats expressed surprise, too, at recent comments suggesting Iran – under pressure over its nuclear programme – was being treated unfairly by the international community. Diplomats also say they do not expect breakthroughs from this week’s EU-Turkey ministerial meeting to discuss foreign affairs.
If it is accepted, Turkey will become the first predominantly Muslim EU member and also the most populous, giving it a sizeable number of seats in the parliament and threatening the power of Paris and Berlin. Nicolas Sarkozy, French president, displayed his opposition at an EU-US summit in Prague in May. After Barack Obama, on the eve of his first visit to Turkey, urged his hosts to “anchor” the country more firmly in Europe, Mr Sarkozy promptly suggested the US president mind his own business. Angela Merkel, German chancellor, has been more diplomatic,suggesting Istanbul be addressed instead as a “privileged partner”.
The creation of a full-time EU presidency and foreign policy chief seems unlikely to accelerate accession. In a 2004 speech, Herman Van Rompuy, the Belgian prime minister chosen as president, said Turkey “is not a part of Europe and will never be”. Those remarks proved awkward in the run-up to his selection last week but – as Istanbul no doubt noticed – they did not cost him the job.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
In one of Istanbul’s artier quarters, a second-hand bookshop sells leaves torn from an old school atlas that depict the dominions of the Ottoman empire, all neatly labelled in a flowing script few Turks are now able to read.
The faded pages are a reminder of the heritage long rejected by the modern Turkish state as it sought to forge a new national identity and survive on the frontline of 20th-century geopolitics. Just as the social reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the secular republic, presented European culture as the standard of civilised behaviour, so foreign policy became firmly west-facing as Turkey sought shelter from the Soviet power on its border.
Now, however, the ruling Justice & Development (AK) party is re-engaging with territories once ruled by the sultans, from the Balkans to Baghdad, in a drive to return Turkey to a place among the leadership of the Muslim world and the top ranks of international diplomacy.
Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister and architect of the policy, rejects the expansionist tag of “neo-Ottoman” bandied about by AK critics, preferring his well-used slogan, “zero problems with neighbours”. The US and the European Union praise this unobjectionable aim: to act as a force for stability in an unstable region.
Turkey has long mattered – as Nato ally, friend of Israel, EU applicant and energy route to the west. But its growing economic strength and diplomatic reach give it influence over some of the toughest issues facing Washington and other capitals: from frozen conflicts in the Caucasus to Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the threat of disintegration in Iraq. “We are neither surprised by nor disturbed by an activist Turkish agenda in the Middle East,” Philip Gordon, assistant secretary at the US state department, said in Ankara this month.
Yet the speed and scope of Turkey’s diplomatic endeavours have left both Turkish and western observers wondering whether it can juggle all its new interests. In a month of frenetic activity, Mr Davutoglu has staged a show of friendship with Syria, ending visa restrictions on a border once patrolled by Turkish tanks; paid a high-profile visit to Iraq’s Kurdistan region, long shunned as a threat to Turkish unity; and signed a landmark deal to mend relations with Armenia. “Today we, children of the Ottomans, are here to show interest in the development of Mosul just as our ancestors showed centuries ago,” Zafer Caglayan, trade minister, said as he opened a consulate in the northern Iraqi city last month. Turkish diplomats claim credit, in the last year alone, for mediating between Israel and Syria, hosting talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and liaising with Sunni militants in Iraq.
But Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a prime minister who scorns diplomatic niceties, has shown the potential for new friendships to damage old ones.
“Why is it that...a more prominent Turkey has, it seems, to come at the expense of its relations with Israel?” Robert Wexler, the US congressman, asked recently. US newspaper columnists went further, arguing that Ankara was undermining efforts to put pressure on Iran, or even that illiberal Islamists could no longer be trusted in Nato.
The virulence of the reactions reflects the value attached to Turkish support. Although no longer a bulwark against Soviet power, the threat of radical Islam has given Turkey new weight as a partner to channel western values to the Muslim world – and, by its western alliances, show that a “clash of civilisations” is not an inevitable result of religious difference.
Mr Davutoglu is touring European capitals this month, employing Ottoman-tinged rhetoric to persuade people that Turkey’s European vocation is unchanged. “You cannot understand the history of at least 15 European capitals without exploring the Ottoman archives,” he told an audience in Spain this week.
For Ankara, there is no question of changing orientation. “We have one face to the west and one to the east,” Mr Erdogan said last month as he signed trade deals in Tehran. Yet it is natural for Turkey to keep its options open, given the manifest reluctance in some EU states to admit it to membership. Ankara presents its new friendships as an asset to the EU, giving it a partner to promote western aims in the region. The European Commission’s latest report on Turkey’s accession process endorsed that view, with praise for its foreign policy. But Brussels also makes clear that geostrategic importance cannot replace the domestic judicial, political and human rights reforms required to meet the criteria for membership.
Ankara’s focus, however, is on grander projects than box-ticking compliance with European legislation. A lack of enthusiasm for Herman van Rompuy’s appointment last week as president of the European Council reflects not just worries over his past opposition to Turkey’s candidacy but a preference for a heavyweight leader who would want Europe to play a bigger part on the world stage.
Ibrahim Kalin, Mr Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser, argues that Turkish activism is not a reaction to disappointments in the EU but simply “a fully rational attempt to seize new spaces of opportunity” – including the EU’s virtual absence from geopolitics.
Frictions with the EU may worsen, however, if Turkey engages in rivalry with countries used to seeing it as a junior partner. Western diplomats have noted Mr Davutoglu’s reluctance to support a French attempt at conciliation between Israel and Syria, for example, and say Mr Erdogan’s grandstanding in Iran “is definitely causing irritation”. Turkey thus needs to ascertain how much influence it has, what it is based on, and where new policies may upset old alliances.
Greater regional engagement is in part a response to changing balances of power. The coming American withdrawal from Iraq threatens a vacuum in which Turkey is one of the most plausible counterweights to Iranian influence – its credibility enhanced by its refusal to let the US use its territory to invade in 2003.
Ian Lesser from the Washington-based German Marshall Fund notes that ideas of a “Middle East for Middle Easterners” have been circulating for some time. “The crucial difference is that Turkey is now a much more significant actor in both economic and political terms, and Turkey’s Middle Eastern choices are, rightly or wrongly, seen as linked to the country’s own identity crisis.”
Foreign policy is certainly shaped by a growing affinity with the Islamic world, in a country where religious practice is becoming more visible and public opinion a greater force. Mr Erdogan’s comments on Gaza, or on Iran’s nuclear programme, appear both to recognise and reinforce views on the street: a survey by the GMF found that almost one-third of Turks – compared with only 5 per cent of Americans – would accept a nuclear-armed Iran if diplomacy failed.
Chief AK weapon in its drive eastwards, though, is not religion but trade. Exports to what the country’s official Turkstat agency classifies as the Near and Middle East account for almost 20 per cent of the total so far in 2009, up from 12.5 per cent in 2004. Turkish conglomerates are also stepping up investment in a region where their presence is considered benign.
“We don’t want a cultural bias against us,” says Sureyya Ciliv, chief executive of Turkcell, the mobile operator, which has interests in central Asia, Georgia and Moldova. Anadolu Efes, with almost 10 per cent of Russia’s beer market, wants to start producing non-alcoholic beer in Iran. Limak, a group centred on construction, is seeking projects in the Gulf, north Africa and Europe “east of Vienna”. “It’s a natural development,” says Ferruh Tunc, senior partner in Istanbul for KPMG, the consultancy. “Turkey’s position until the Soviet Union collapsed was unusual – it was like the last stop on a Tube line.”
Yet a previous initiative, reaching out to the Turkic-speaking world after the central Asian states won independence, left Turkey with excellent trade links but limited influence compared with China and Russia. Morton Abramowitz, a former US ambassador to Turkey, warns in this month’s Foreign Affairs journal that in the AKP’s latest diplomatic push as well, “despite the acclaim it showers on itself...symbolic achievements have far exceeded concrete ones”. More-over, Turkey’s opposition this spring to Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s appointment as Nato chief “alienated many Europeans by seeming to favour Muslim sensibilities over liberal democratic values”. Ankara had argued that Denmark’s role in the 2006 controversy over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed had tainted him in the eyes of the Muslim world.
Can Ankara not reach out peacefully on all fronts, as it claims, without repercussions and a risk of overstretch? “You need very judicious fine tuning to be able to deliver this...The danger is of overplaying their hand,” says a western diplomat.
Mending fences with Armenia won praise in the west, for instance, but in Azerbaijan nationalists tore down the Turkish flag, viewing the move as a betrayal of old alliances. Baku may yet take revenge by demanding higher prices to supply gas.
The next test of Turkey’s new foreign policy will be Iran. The AKP claims its opposition to a nuclear-armed Iran is more effective because it delivers the message as a friend and trading partner. Turkey’s interests in trade with Iran are understood but Mr Erdogan may be pressed in Washington and Brussels to explain why he defends Iran’s nuclear programme as “peaceful and humanitarian” and lends the regime credibility rather than backing isolation.
Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform, a London think-tank, says: “As a long-standing Nato member and a country negotiating for EU membership, Turkey is expected to align itself with the US and Europe...As a regional power, Turkey will want to act independently and avoid antagonising its neighbours. It is not clear how long Ankara will be able to avoid tough choices.”
EU membership: ‘There is progress but it’s uneven’
Turkey’s shift in foreign policy reflects its ambition to assume greater responsibility as a regional power, writes Joshua Chaffin. It may also reveal frustration over another ambition that has been delayed, if not thwarted: Istanbul’s bid to join the European Union. Officially, the EU has been committed to full membership since 2005. Yet eight of the 34 negotiating “chapters” remain blocked as a result of Turkey’s long-running conflict with Cyprus. Meanwhile enthusiasm is faint in France and Germany, the bloc’s traditional centres of power. “There is progress but it’s very uneven,” one Commission official says.
The most recent update on negotiations came with the Commission’s mixed review of Turkey in last month’s annual enlargement report. Praise forits overtures to its Kurdish minority, and its agreement to reopen its border with Armenia, was tempered by concern over a fine imposed on one of Turkey’s leading media companies. Ostensibly for tax evasion, the $4bn (€2.7bn, £2.4bn) levy was likened by Olli Rehn, EU enlargement commissioner, to “a political sanction”. Some European diplomats expressed surprise, too, at recent comments suggesting Iran – under pressure over its nuclear programme – was being treated unfairly by the international community. Diplomats also say they do not expect breakthroughs from this week’s EU-Turkey ministerial meeting to discuss foreign affairs.
If it is accepted, Turkey will become the first predominantly Muslim EU member and also the most populous, giving it a sizeable number of seats in the parliament and threatening the power of Paris and Berlin. Nicolas Sarkozy, French president, displayed his opposition at an EU-US summit in Prague in May. After Barack Obama, on the eve of his first visit to Turkey, urged his hosts to “anchor” the country more firmly in Europe, Mr Sarkozy promptly suggested the US president mind his own business. Angela Merkel, German chancellor, has been more diplomatic,suggesting Istanbul be addressed instead as a “privileged partner”.
The creation of a full-time EU presidency and foreign policy chief seems unlikely to accelerate accession. In a 2004 speech, Herman Van Rompuy, the Belgian prime minister chosen as president, said Turkey “is not a part of Europe and will never be”. Those remarks proved awkward in the run-up to his selection last week but – as Istanbul no doubt noticed – they did not cost him the job.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Can Cyprus overcome its bloody history?
Chris Summers
More British soldiers were killed during the "Cyprus emergency" in the 1950s than have died in Iraq or Afghanistan. So why has it been forgotten and what hope is there of reuniting the island?
On Remembrance Sunday, about 500 relatives and veterans watched as a new memorial was unveiled in Kyrenia, in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, to recognise the 371 British servicemen who lost their lives on the island between 1956 and 1959.
The unveiling, and the laying of a wreath by the British High Commissioner, Peter Millett, sparked a diplomatic row, with President Demetris Christofias raising the matter when he met UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown a few days later.
One of the names on the memorial is Corporal Mervyn Whurr, 22, killed by a bomb on Kyrenia's Six Mile Beach in September 1956.
His sister, Barbara Hocking, from Millbrook in Cornwall, said: "My mum had a telegram saying he'd been injured, then she got another one saying he had an arm and a leg amputated. A few days later another telegram came saying he'd died."
Unlike those of troops killed in Afghanistan, his body, like those of most of the Cyprus casualties, was not flown home and lies in a cemetery at Wayne's Keep on the island.
Mrs Hocking was at the unveiling of the memorial, where she was joined by Margaret Moncur, whose brother 19-year-old Matt Neely, from Glasgow, was killed in 1956 by a bomb while doing his National Service.
Mrs Moncur said: "He loved his football, he was full of fun, playing jokes and was very popular with his mates.
"For some reason Cyprus has become a forgotten war."
The Cyprus High Commissioner to London, Alexandros Zenon, said the failure to consult the Cyprus government about the memorial was perceived as an "insult".
He said: "In principle we are not against a country honouring its soldiers who fell in service.
"The problem is that the memorial was built and unveiled in the occupied part of Cyprus. It could have been erected in the British sovereign base area.
"We also feel it's politically premature. I understand they want to honour them, but for Greek Cypriots the anti-colonial struggle is still a very sensitive issue."
In the late 1950s the British Empire was trying to cling on to the island, which remained a strategic location, especially around the time of the Suez crisis.
Greek Cypriot fighters belonging to an organisation called Eoka planted bombs and attacked British servicemen on and off duty.
Several civilians were also killed, including Catherine Cutliffe and her daughter Margaret who were shot while buying a wedding dress in Famagusta, although Eoka denied responsibility for that attack.
Eventually in 1960 Cyprus was granted independence, but tensions between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority grew during the next decade.
In July 1974 a Greek nationalist group, Eoka-B, led by Nikos Sampson, carried out a coup backed by the military junta in power in Athens.
Sampson promised to unite Cyprus with Greece in so-called "enosis".
Turkey sent its army to the northern part of the island, ostensibly to protect Turkish Cypriots.
The idea of enosis evaporated and the moderate Archbishop Makarios returned to power.
But the Turkish Army has remained ever since and the island is still separated, with a UN buffer zone running right through the heart of Nicosia, the world's last remaining divided city.
In 2004 the United Nations came up with the Annan Plan - named after the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan - which suggested a bi-zonal federated state.
But, although it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in a referendum, another poll in the south rejected it.
Cyprus was then admitted into the EU, which many Turkish Cypriots opposed believing it removed an incentive for the Greek Cypriot side to reach a solution.
But fresh momentum was injected with the election of Mr Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, president of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Both are leftists elected on a platform of reconciliation.
Negotiations are ongoing, but one of the major stumbling blocks is the question of how to deal with Greek Cypriots who claim land and property in the north.
Some of this has been sold to some of the 6,000 British expats in northern Cyprus.
In what could prove to be a test case, a court in Cyprus ruled against a couple, David and Linda Orams, who bought land originally belonging to a Greek Cypriot, Meletis Apostolides.
There are fears that if no deal is reached before elections in the TRNC in April what Mr Brown referred to as a "unique opportunity" could be lost.
Mr Zenon said: "The likely opponent of Mr Talat is a hardliner and if he is elected, things will not be made easier. But we will not create artificial deadlines which, as with the Annan Plan, have proved disastrous."
Mr Talat himself, in an interview with the BBC, admitted: "If somebody who is not in favour of a bi-zonal solution is elected then the negotiations will not continue easily."
He said of the negotiations: "The positions of the two sides are not very close, but we are making progress."
Mr Brown recently renewed an offer to hand back just under half of the UK's sovereign base areas on the island - around Akrotiri and Dhekelia - if a deal could be reached between the two sides.
Andrew Dismore, Labour MP for Hendon in north London, feels the timing of the Kyrenia memorial was unfortunate.
He represents more than 3,000 Greek Cypriot constituents and recently led a debate in Parliament about the island.
Mr Dismore said: "Of course, there should be a memorial, but this is neither the time or place, at such a sensitive time in the talks.
"It just serves to remind Greek Cypriots of the UK's less than glorious role as the colonial power, when we are trying to be positive in our support for the talks."
But Mr Talat said the memorial was a "humanitarian" issue and should not have become "politicised".
Mrs Hocking said it was sad the memorial had led to a row and she said of her brother's death: "Was it worth it? The two governments are still not talking. Was it worth all those lives being wasted? It's just like Afghanistan."
More British soldiers were killed during the "Cyprus emergency" in the 1950s than have died in Iraq or Afghanistan. So why has it been forgotten and what hope is there of reuniting the island?
On Remembrance Sunday, about 500 relatives and veterans watched as a new memorial was unveiled in Kyrenia, in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, to recognise the 371 British servicemen who lost their lives on the island between 1956 and 1959.
The unveiling, and the laying of a wreath by the British High Commissioner, Peter Millett, sparked a diplomatic row, with President Demetris Christofias raising the matter when he met UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown a few days later.
One of the names on the memorial is Corporal Mervyn Whurr, 22, killed by a bomb on Kyrenia's Six Mile Beach in September 1956.
His sister, Barbara Hocking, from Millbrook in Cornwall, said: "My mum had a telegram saying he'd been injured, then she got another one saying he had an arm and a leg amputated. A few days later another telegram came saying he'd died."
Unlike those of troops killed in Afghanistan, his body, like those of most of the Cyprus casualties, was not flown home and lies in a cemetery at Wayne's Keep on the island.
Mrs Hocking was at the unveiling of the memorial, where she was joined by Margaret Moncur, whose brother 19-year-old Matt Neely, from Glasgow, was killed in 1956 by a bomb while doing his National Service.
Mrs Moncur said: "He loved his football, he was full of fun, playing jokes and was very popular with his mates.
"For some reason Cyprus has become a forgotten war."
The Cyprus High Commissioner to London, Alexandros Zenon, said the failure to consult the Cyprus government about the memorial was perceived as an "insult".
He said: "In principle we are not against a country honouring its soldiers who fell in service.
"The problem is that the memorial was built and unveiled in the occupied part of Cyprus. It could have been erected in the British sovereign base area.
"We also feel it's politically premature. I understand they want to honour them, but for Greek Cypriots the anti-colonial struggle is still a very sensitive issue."
In the late 1950s the British Empire was trying to cling on to the island, which remained a strategic location, especially around the time of the Suez crisis.
Greek Cypriot fighters belonging to an organisation called Eoka planted bombs and attacked British servicemen on and off duty.
Several civilians were also killed, including Catherine Cutliffe and her daughter Margaret who were shot while buying a wedding dress in Famagusta, although Eoka denied responsibility for that attack.
Eventually in 1960 Cyprus was granted independence, but tensions between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority grew during the next decade.
In July 1974 a Greek nationalist group, Eoka-B, led by Nikos Sampson, carried out a coup backed by the military junta in power in Athens.
Sampson promised to unite Cyprus with Greece in so-called "enosis".
Turkey sent its army to the northern part of the island, ostensibly to protect Turkish Cypriots.
The idea of enosis evaporated and the moderate Archbishop Makarios returned to power.
But the Turkish Army has remained ever since and the island is still separated, with a UN buffer zone running right through the heart of Nicosia, the world's last remaining divided city.
In 2004 the United Nations came up with the Annan Plan - named after the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan - which suggested a bi-zonal federated state.
But, although it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in a referendum, another poll in the south rejected it.
Cyprus was then admitted into the EU, which many Turkish Cypriots opposed believing it removed an incentive for the Greek Cypriot side to reach a solution.
But fresh momentum was injected with the election of Mr Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, president of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Both are leftists elected on a platform of reconciliation.
Negotiations are ongoing, but one of the major stumbling blocks is the question of how to deal with Greek Cypriots who claim land and property in the north.
Some of this has been sold to some of the 6,000 British expats in northern Cyprus.
In what could prove to be a test case, a court in Cyprus ruled against a couple, David and Linda Orams, who bought land originally belonging to a Greek Cypriot, Meletis Apostolides.
There are fears that if no deal is reached before elections in the TRNC in April what Mr Brown referred to as a "unique opportunity" could be lost.
Mr Zenon said: "The likely opponent of Mr Talat is a hardliner and if he is elected, things will not be made easier. But we will not create artificial deadlines which, as with the Annan Plan, have proved disastrous."
Mr Talat himself, in an interview with the BBC, admitted: "If somebody who is not in favour of a bi-zonal solution is elected then the negotiations will not continue easily."
He said of the negotiations: "The positions of the two sides are not very close, but we are making progress."
Mr Brown recently renewed an offer to hand back just under half of the UK's sovereign base areas on the island - around Akrotiri and Dhekelia - if a deal could be reached between the two sides.
Andrew Dismore, Labour MP for Hendon in north London, feels the timing of the Kyrenia memorial was unfortunate.
He represents more than 3,000 Greek Cypriot constituents and recently led a debate in Parliament about the island.
Mr Dismore said: "Of course, there should be a memorial, but this is neither the time or place, at such a sensitive time in the talks.
"It just serves to remind Greek Cypriots of the UK's less than glorious role as the colonial power, when we are trying to be positive in our support for the talks."
But Mr Talat said the memorial was a "humanitarian" issue and should not have become "politicised".
Mrs Hocking said it was sad the memorial had led to a row and she said of her brother's death: "Was it worth it? The two governments are still not talking. Was it worth all those lives being wasted? It's just like Afghanistan."
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