The New York Times
Published: September 29, 2008
After nearly eight years of voting in virtual lock step with President Bush on everything from tax cuts to torture, House Republicans decided on Monday to break ranks on the survival of the nation’s financial system.
The rejected bailout bill that was on the floor after a weekend of hard negotiating was objectionable in many ways, but it was a Republican-generated bill and was improved from the administration’s original version. Sixty percent of House Democrats voted for the bill, enough to easily pass the measure if the Republicans had not decided to put on their display of pique and disarray.
The question now is whether the stock-market plunge that followed the House’s failure to lead — and a renewed credit freeze — will be enough to get the 133 Republicans who voted against the measure to change their minds. And, more important, whether the damage that the no vote has inflicted is readily reversible.
Republican no votes were rooted less in analysis or principle than in political posturing and ideological rigidity. The House minority leader, John Boehner, conceded as much: “While we were able to move the bill drastically to the right, it wasn’t good enough for our members.”
It’s not clear what would be good enough for the Republicans since there was very little talk of substance on Monday after the bill died on the floor of the House. Instead, the Republicans tried to blame their revolt on a speech given before the vote by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who connected the current crisis to the fiscal and economic mismanagement of the Bush years. It may not have been the perfect moment to say that, but it was true.
Republicans were also upset that serial bailouts represent a rejection of free-market principles. They do. That’s because the free market in finance, unregulated and unsupervised, has failed. And, in its failure, it is inflicting greater damage on an already weak economy.
No amount of amendments to the bailout package will change the administration’s disastrous economic record or erase the manifest failure of the Republicans’ free-markets-above-all ideology.
Since last week, this page has urged Congress to take the time to get the bailout right. Over all, lawmakers have given too little consideration, in public at least, to alternatives to the Treasury’s plan to buy up the bad assets from various financial firms.
In the bill rejected on Monday, the unlimited powers that the Treasury Department had initially sought were curbed, and Congressional oversight was added. But judicial review of Treasury’s purchases was not adequately ensured. The courthouse door was not closed entirely; lawyers could still seek effective remedies for actions that violate the Constitution. But that’s a much higher hurdle than the already formidable barriers in place to discourage lawsuits against the government.
Homeowners were also given short shrift with provisions that mainly urged lenders and the Treasury to do more to help them. That’s unconscionable. The financial crisis is as much a problem for homeowners as for Wall Street investment bankers. Appeals to lenders’ better natures have not worked to bring lasting relief to homeowners. If they are still not working in the coming months, Congress will have to revisit the issue.
Taxpayer protections are also iffy, such as a requirement that in five years, the president must give Congress a plan for recouping any losses from financial firms. What will happen then is anyone’s guess. Lawmakers could decide at that point that taxpayers are the only pit bottomless enough to absorb those losses.
Still, the imperfections in this bill are the result of a democratic process that can be rethought, revisited and reworked. It is better than nothing, which is what some backward-looking House Republicans gave Americans on Monday.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Friday, September 26, 2008
Amerikan Çağı’nın sonu mu?
Sami Kohen
25 Eylül Perşembe 2008
BAŞLIKTAKİ soruya bir çırpıda “evet” yanıtını vermek yanlış. Daha doğrusu böyle bir sonuç çıkarmak için zaman henüz erken...İlk bakışta, ABD’yi günlerden beri sarsan mali krizin vahim boyutları karşısında, Washington’un sadece ekonomik değil, siyasal alanda da, dünyadaki “dominan” gücünü ve etkinliğini kaybedeceği akla gelebilir.Wall Street’teki “tsunami”nin ABD’de çok şeyi değiştireceği açık. Bunun ilk belirtileri de ortada. Örneğin Amerikan kapitalizminin medarı iftiharı olan liberal sisteme -geniş çaplı devlet müdahaleleri ile- şimdi bir “rektifikasyon”dan geçiyor... Krizin geniş halk yığınlarında yarattığı sıkıntıların giderilebilmesi için, “sosyal” nitelikli politikaların geliştirilmesi düşünülüyor.Bu kriz, ABD’yi önümüzdeki aylarda -ve belki de yıllarda- ülkedeki ekonomik ve sosyal sorunlarla daha yakından uğraşmak ve sonuçta daha içine kapanmak zorunda bırakacaktır. Buna, ekonomik kaynakları daha “hesaplı” biçimde kullanmak zorunluğu da eklenince, ABD’nin dış politikasının -ve küresel rolünün de- sonuçta mali piyasadaki depremden etkileneceği kuşkusuz...Yükseliş ve düşüş...Ancak bunu “Amerikan çağının sonu” veya “sonunun başlangıcı” olarak değerlendirmek ne kadar doğru?Dünyanın önde gelen analistlerinin bu konuda görüşleri farklı. Kimine göre, ABD’nin potansiyeli, dinamizmi, yetenekleri, pragmatizmi, geçmişte olduğu gibi bu kez de bu krizin üstesinden gelmeye müsait. Dolayısıyla ABD hızla toparlanabilecek... Buna karşılık bu krizin Amerikan toplumunda büyük sarsıntı yaratacağını, sonuçta Washington’un eski ekonomik gücünü olduğu kadar, dünyadaki egemen pozisyonunu zamanla kaybedeceğini düşünenler de var. Bunlara göre, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde tek süper devlet olarak “yükselen” ABD için şimdi “düşüş” dönemi başlıyor...Yukarıda belirttiğimiz gibi, bu konuda kesin bir hükme varmak için zaman erken. Ancak bu aşamada, bazı trendleri tespit etmek mümkün.- Mali krizin nedenleri geniş ölçüde ABD’deki ekonomik ve mali düzendeki bozukluklar veya aksaklıklar ile ilintili olmakla beraber, bu durumun ortaya çıkmasında, Washington’un (özellikle Bush yönetiminin) izlediği dış politikanın ve giriştiği askeri serüvenlerin (Irak gibi) büyük payı var. Beş yıldır süren Irak’ın işgalinin maliyeti günde bir milyar dolar! ABD’nin güçlü ekonomisi dahi, öylesine ağır bir yükü kaldıramaz. Şimdi bu kriz yüzünden yeni mali yükleri omuzlamaya başlayan Amerikan Hazinesi, artık harcamalarda daha “hesaplı“ davranmak zorunda kalacak. Bu da, Washington’un dış bağlantılarını mutlaka etkileyecektir.- Bu kriz, ABD seçimlerinde Barack Obama’nın kazanma şansını artırabilir. Nitekim kamuoyu araştırmaları da bunu gösteriyor. Demokrat yönetim, içeride olduğu gibi, dışarıda da “değişiklik” yapmaya kararlı. Irak’tan çekilme, Ortadoğu’da yeni çatışmaları önleme gibi stratejiler şimdi daha öne çıkabilir.Artçı sarsıntılarSon zamanlarda ABD’nin tek Süper Devlet konumunu korumasına karşın, Rusya’nın ve Çin’in de küresel rolünü ve etkinliğini artırmaya başladığı görüldü. Mali kriz sonucunda ABD’nin eski agresif tutumunu değiştirmesi ve başka ülkelerin gözünde “model“ konumunu kaybetmesi, Rusya, Çin, hatta Fransa gibi rakiplerini daha “atak” davranmaya itebilir.Ne var ki, Wall Street’ten kaynaklanan mali krizin sonuçta bu ülkelere nasıl yansıyacağı ve onların da manevra kabiliyetini ne kadar daraltacağı da sorulmaya değer...
25 Eylül Perşembe 2008
BAŞLIKTAKİ soruya bir çırpıda “evet” yanıtını vermek yanlış. Daha doğrusu böyle bir sonuç çıkarmak için zaman henüz erken...İlk bakışta, ABD’yi günlerden beri sarsan mali krizin vahim boyutları karşısında, Washington’un sadece ekonomik değil, siyasal alanda da, dünyadaki “dominan” gücünü ve etkinliğini kaybedeceği akla gelebilir.Wall Street’teki “tsunami”nin ABD’de çok şeyi değiştireceği açık. Bunun ilk belirtileri de ortada. Örneğin Amerikan kapitalizminin medarı iftiharı olan liberal sisteme -geniş çaplı devlet müdahaleleri ile- şimdi bir “rektifikasyon”dan geçiyor... Krizin geniş halk yığınlarında yarattığı sıkıntıların giderilebilmesi için, “sosyal” nitelikli politikaların geliştirilmesi düşünülüyor.Bu kriz, ABD’yi önümüzdeki aylarda -ve belki de yıllarda- ülkedeki ekonomik ve sosyal sorunlarla daha yakından uğraşmak ve sonuçta daha içine kapanmak zorunda bırakacaktır. Buna, ekonomik kaynakları daha “hesaplı” biçimde kullanmak zorunluğu da eklenince, ABD’nin dış politikasının -ve küresel rolünün de- sonuçta mali piyasadaki depremden etkileneceği kuşkusuz...Yükseliş ve düşüş...Ancak bunu “Amerikan çağının sonu” veya “sonunun başlangıcı” olarak değerlendirmek ne kadar doğru?Dünyanın önde gelen analistlerinin bu konuda görüşleri farklı. Kimine göre, ABD’nin potansiyeli, dinamizmi, yetenekleri, pragmatizmi, geçmişte olduğu gibi bu kez de bu krizin üstesinden gelmeye müsait. Dolayısıyla ABD hızla toparlanabilecek... Buna karşılık bu krizin Amerikan toplumunda büyük sarsıntı yaratacağını, sonuçta Washington’un eski ekonomik gücünü olduğu kadar, dünyadaki egemen pozisyonunu zamanla kaybedeceğini düşünenler de var. Bunlara göre, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde tek süper devlet olarak “yükselen” ABD için şimdi “düşüş” dönemi başlıyor...Yukarıda belirttiğimiz gibi, bu konuda kesin bir hükme varmak için zaman erken. Ancak bu aşamada, bazı trendleri tespit etmek mümkün.- Mali krizin nedenleri geniş ölçüde ABD’deki ekonomik ve mali düzendeki bozukluklar veya aksaklıklar ile ilintili olmakla beraber, bu durumun ortaya çıkmasında, Washington’un (özellikle Bush yönetiminin) izlediği dış politikanın ve giriştiği askeri serüvenlerin (Irak gibi) büyük payı var. Beş yıldır süren Irak’ın işgalinin maliyeti günde bir milyar dolar! ABD’nin güçlü ekonomisi dahi, öylesine ağır bir yükü kaldıramaz. Şimdi bu kriz yüzünden yeni mali yükleri omuzlamaya başlayan Amerikan Hazinesi, artık harcamalarda daha “hesaplı“ davranmak zorunda kalacak. Bu da, Washington’un dış bağlantılarını mutlaka etkileyecektir.- Bu kriz, ABD seçimlerinde Barack Obama’nın kazanma şansını artırabilir. Nitekim kamuoyu araştırmaları da bunu gösteriyor. Demokrat yönetim, içeride olduğu gibi, dışarıda da “değişiklik” yapmaya kararlı. Irak’tan çekilme, Ortadoğu’da yeni çatışmaları önleme gibi stratejiler şimdi daha öne çıkabilir.Artçı sarsıntılarSon zamanlarda ABD’nin tek Süper Devlet konumunu korumasına karşın, Rusya’nın ve Çin’in de küresel rolünü ve etkinliğini artırmaya başladığı görüldü. Mali kriz sonucunda ABD’nin eski agresif tutumunu değiştirmesi ve başka ülkelerin gözünde “model“ konumunu kaybetmesi, Rusya, Çin, hatta Fransa gibi rakiplerini daha “atak” davranmaya itebilir.Ne var ki, Wall Street’ten kaynaklanan mali krizin sonuçta bu ülkelere nasıl yansıyacağı ve onların da manevra kabiliyetini ne kadar daraltacağı da sorulmaya değer...
The Ruler of the Pipeline
Jörg Himmelreich
Internationale Politik
March 2007
It used to be tanks and missiles but now it is oil and gas that matter. The Kremlin is deliberately using its energy resources and the dependency of the importing countries as a tool of a new great power policy. The EU can no longer allow itself to be treated in this manner. It should use its power of demand to create a new foundation for future cooperation.
There is no doubt now: EU-Russia relations have soured. Russia's conflict with Belarus, the difficulties to start negotiations towards a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and Putin's final refusal to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty reflects the latest differences between the EU and Russia. It is precisely because Russia is a significant trading partner, and the most important energy supplier of the EU-and Europe's energy dependency on Russia will continue to grow in the years to come- that as a result, the developments in Russia are inevitably going to affect Europe. That is why the EU should be especially interested in fostering cooperation with its most important political and military partner. "Cooperation before confrontation" as the common set diplomatic phrase goes in the end describes very little. Needless to say, that the EU cannot possibly be interested in a confrontation with Russia.
The real challenge of a new European Russia policy consists rather in finding a way how to deal with a country, whose authoritarian democracy, limitations of fundamental rights and the re-nationalization of the energy economy, contradicts both European values and numerous contractual commitments that Russia has with Europe (commitments within the framework of the Council of Europe, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Energy Charter Treaty etc.). At the same time, a constructive collaboration of Russia and the EU is crucial for the stabilization of the East European Neighborhood, the South Caucasus and the Central Asia vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq in the so called Near East quartet. Finally, this cooperation is of great importance in the global context of terrorism abatement and the global energy security policy. Both the European and the American Russia policies are facing this dilemma. The Russian energy policy and the EU Neighborhood Policy towards Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are expressively preferential topics for the Germany's Presidency of the Council of the EU. At the same time they represent divergent interests between Russia and the EU. The oil conflict between Russia and Belarus, as a result of which Germany had for a short time been cut off from Russia's oil supply, demonstrated once again after the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis that Russia's policy towards the neighboring countries has a direct impact both on Germany and the EU. It would be naïve to assume that Russia increased energy prices for Belarus and the Ukraine only to introduce the future WTO regulations and to raise prices to the international market level, thus ending the subsidization of national economies in the neighboring countries. The doubling of the existing tariffs overnight and the reckless way of enforcing new ones contradict all international commercial and diplomatic rules. The increase of oil prices for Belarus was accompanied by the introduction of import duties for the formerly duty free goods that are not marketable in Europe because of their low quality. The Russian-Belarus project of an Economic Union once favored by Boris Jeltsin and expected to serve as a foundation for political integration has now been terminated by the Kremlin. This has put pressure on president Lukashenko within his own country. Moreover, no longer enjoying the support of Putin the "last dictator in Europe" is now externally completely isolated. The Kremlin is trying to apply political and economic pressure to weaken Lukashenko's domestic position. The purpose of this policy is to bring a suitable pro-Kremlin successor to power who would carry out what Lukashenko so far has refused to, namely integrate Belarus into Russia.
The rigid enforcement of the increased gas prices two month before the parliamentary elections to the Verkhavna Rada in March 2006 also put a strain on president Juschenko's governance. From the Russian perspective this raising of prices was a success story. After all, it boosted the position of the Prime Minister Janukovich and his party, who managed to repudiate the Ukrainian President's policy on integration into the EU and NATO in favor of a more Russia-friendly foreign policy. The recent forced resignation of the Ukrainian foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk, who is a vehement advocate of the country's orientation towards the West, is only one of the latest indications of this development. These examples clearly demonstrate that Russia's motives behind the raising of energy prices for the so called "near abroad" countries are far from being purely economic. The introduction of import protection on Georgian goods and entry denial for Georgian citizens into Russia conceal similar intentions.
In the case of Belarus, Beltransneft - the state energy network operator and owner - can only pay the doubled prices by selling some of its shares to the Russian state network operator Transneft. By this means Transneft is going to obtain the controlling interest in the Belarusian transmission network. It is, therefore, quite obvious that another goal of the Russian energy policy is to allow Transneft and Gazprom to obtain a major if not a complete share of the respective transmission networks in the post-soviet neighboring states. The one who owns the pipeline can determine the price and quantity of oil and gas. That is why foreign investment from western energy companies is welcome in the spheres of energy production (upstream), but not in Russian transmission networks (downstream). During the presidency of Boris Jeltsin western companies did receive access to transmission networks within production sharing agreements in some cases. These Western companies such as Shell and Sakhalin are now, however, forced to sell off their majority shares to Gazprom. Securing the transit monopoly for Gazprom is the leverage for Russia's neohegemonic foreign policy towards its neighboring countries as well as its great power pose towards the EU. This foreign policy strategy underlying the energy and trade policy under Putin has long been misconceived both in Germany and in other western European countries due to a short sighted assumption that "energy supply is only a matter of economics". In this connection an argument is brought forward that Russia is also dependent on the EU for energy export revenues from the EU account for over 20 per cent of Russia's total national budget. At the end of the day, the Russian government is going to have it easier, however, making their people refrain from some 100 million Euro revenues than the European heads of states having to deal with a cold, unheated winter.
Power of the Network
The countries aligned with the transportation network from the Soviet times, Russia's neighboring states and the EU States which were former members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria), are still today almost exclusively associated with Gazprom because the individual states can not afford the investment of building an alternative pipeline. This network structure is the base for Russia's political influence in Central Asia, where Gazprom maintains an export and transportation monopoly in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Two projects have already begun: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline running from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey's Ceyhan port in the Mediterranean and an expansion of a parallel running pipeline. These projects are being completed with the purpose of Western diversification and their routes make Russia's energy foreign policies particularly meaningful. These routes strategically open the possibility for Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to become independent of the transportation monopoly by circumventing Russian territory by passing via the Caspian Sea. Recent trips made by German Foreign Secretary Steinmeier emphasize the interests of the federal government to promote the diversification of energy resources in the EU.
The future security of European energy supply will depend upon the extent to which the EU member states succeed in putting their national individual interests on the political back burner and present a united and uniform stance towards Russia, even if such a foreign policy is not an exact element of EU competencies. European endeavors for a common European energy policy approach are currently being hampered by existing bilateral agreements between individual member states and Russia, which weakens the EU negotiating position. Germany has the unique opportunity to strengthen the EU position, by using their influence through their relationship with Russian to present a united European energy security policy.
Foreign and security policy interests have always been the priority for the energy economy, taking precedence over pure energy business interests. The privatization of previously state-owned European energy corporations and the liberalization of the European energy market encourages competition and further promotes efficiency among business. Both efficiency and competition is favorable for consumers. However, this does not release the EU from its obligations of concerning themselves with energy security. They must conceptualize how to preserve the prevailing foreign and security policy interests despite the necessary energy industry privatization; much like how the EU protects higher-ranking public interest in other domains such as restricting monopolies and cartels of through environment protection acts. Therefore it is pertinent that the EU Energy Commission receives coordination and controlling authorization from member states in order to monitor the energy business of private European energy companies who work with third party states and their state-owned corporations. The latter is the best way to enable the EU to preserve energy foreign policy interests.
Reaching for Europe
European energy politics seem to be particularly essential now, ever since Russia refused to ratify the Energy Treaty Charter. It still remains unclear if and when Russia will be ready to accept the binding commitments of reciprocity and transparency in the energy sector in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA). As long as western private corporations are denied access to shares in the Russian transport network, the same should apply to Gazprom's investments in the European distribution system, particularly since Gazprom is currently striving towards access to European customers through the acquisition of the corresponding networks. Such a European response to Russia's refusal of reciprocity can only be assured through corresponding regulatory and coordination authority by the EU Commission. The EU cannot watch from the sidelines as private German energy firms compete for investments in Russian gas production, with the contract awarded to the firm who can guarantee Gazprom a greater share in the German distribution network. The EU also cannot look on as state and private operators of the Nabucco Pipeline - which is being planned in southeast Europe to reduce the dependency of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary on Gazprom and is therefore partly financed by the EBRD - tender once again Gazprom shareholding on this pipeline. These examples show how urgent it is to integrate Europe's private energy companies into a harmonized EU foreign energy policy.
It is up to the EU to limit Moscow's political instrumentalization of the distribution networks of Gazprom and Transneft. This should be accomplished through politically and financially supporting European corporations that invest in such transport networks in the immediate and extended European neighborhood in order to reduce the dependency on Russia as well as directly affect the Russian energy exploration and production. A coordinated European foreign energy policy cannot be limited to the EU, but due to the integration of the networks, must also include the European neighborhood as a transit region. In that way it would constitute a fundamental element in an active European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).
Ever since the European Commission included Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the ENP in May 2004, Russia has recognized that the EU and its soft powers are in competition for attracting their common neighbors. Europe has intensified their attempts to attract states away from Moscow and towards Brussels. Since the EU cannot offer these neighbor countries any prospect of membership at this time, the best preparation for a functional and eventually complete integration of these states within the EU is promoting regional cooperation. Energy provision - as well as environmental protection and the offer of a free trade agreement - are ideal topics for functional integration.
The history of European unification, which began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the collectivization of coal, is a tale of the progressive functional integration of increasingly wider policy areas. Brussels's foreign energy policy for the EU region, as well as for the neighboring areas, is an important aspect of a much more complex Russo-European relationship. It shows how beyond the noble dreams of a "strategic partnership" in concrete policy areas, cooperation with Russia can be offered, as well as how the EU could react in order to overcome obstacles to strive towards cooperation. At the same time, the crucial determinant is that the 27 EU member states muster the political will to agree on a common foreign energy policy and set their national self-interests aside. The best precondition for cooperation with Russia would be such a concerted foreign energy policy through which the EU could use its entire economic and political weight in the PCA negotiations with Moscow.
Internationale Politik
March 2007
It used to be tanks and missiles but now it is oil and gas that matter. The Kremlin is deliberately using its energy resources and the dependency of the importing countries as a tool of a new great power policy. The EU can no longer allow itself to be treated in this manner. It should use its power of demand to create a new foundation for future cooperation.
There is no doubt now: EU-Russia relations have soured. Russia's conflict with Belarus, the difficulties to start negotiations towards a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and Putin's final refusal to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty reflects the latest differences between the EU and Russia. It is precisely because Russia is a significant trading partner, and the most important energy supplier of the EU-and Europe's energy dependency on Russia will continue to grow in the years to come- that as a result, the developments in Russia are inevitably going to affect Europe. That is why the EU should be especially interested in fostering cooperation with its most important political and military partner. "Cooperation before confrontation" as the common set diplomatic phrase goes in the end describes very little. Needless to say, that the EU cannot possibly be interested in a confrontation with Russia.
The real challenge of a new European Russia policy consists rather in finding a way how to deal with a country, whose authoritarian democracy, limitations of fundamental rights and the re-nationalization of the energy economy, contradicts both European values and numerous contractual commitments that Russia has with Europe (commitments within the framework of the Council of Europe, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Energy Charter Treaty etc.). At the same time, a constructive collaboration of Russia and the EU is crucial for the stabilization of the East European Neighborhood, the South Caucasus and the Central Asia vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq in the so called Near East quartet. Finally, this cooperation is of great importance in the global context of terrorism abatement and the global energy security policy. Both the European and the American Russia policies are facing this dilemma. The Russian energy policy and the EU Neighborhood Policy towards Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are expressively preferential topics for the Germany's Presidency of the Council of the EU. At the same time they represent divergent interests between Russia and the EU. The oil conflict between Russia and Belarus, as a result of which Germany had for a short time been cut off from Russia's oil supply, demonstrated once again after the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis that Russia's policy towards the neighboring countries has a direct impact both on Germany and the EU. It would be naïve to assume that Russia increased energy prices for Belarus and the Ukraine only to introduce the future WTO regulations and to raise prices to the international market level, thus ending the subsidization of national economies in the neighboring countries. The doubling of the existing tariffs overnight and the reckless way of enforcing new ones contradict all international commercial and diplomatic rules. The increase of oil prices for Belarus was accompanied by the introduction of import duties for the formerly duty free goods that are not marketable in Europe because of their low quality. The Russian-Belarus project of an Economic Union once favored by Boris Jeltsin and expected to serve as a foundation for political integration has now been terminated by the Kremlin. This has put pressure on president Lukashenko within his own country. Moreover, no longer enjoying the support of Putin the "last dictator in Europe" is now externally completely isolated. The Kremlin is trying to apply political and economic pressure to weaken Lukashenko's domestic position. The purpose of this policy is to bring a suitable pro-Kremlin successor to power who would carry out what Lukashenko so far has refused to, namely integrate Belarus into Russia.
The rigid enforcement of the increased gas prices two month before the parliamentary elections to the Verkhavna Rada in March 2006 also put a strain on president Juschenko's governance. From the Russian perspective this raising of prices was a success story. After all, it boosted the position of the Prime Minister Janukovich and his party, who managed to repudiate the Ukrainian President's policy on integration into the EU and NATO in favor of a more Russia-friendly foreign policy. The recent forced resignation of the Ukrainian foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk, who is a vehement advocate of the country's orientation towards the West, is only one of the latest indications of this development. These examples clearly demonstrate that Russia's motives behind the raising of energy prices for the so called "near abroad" countries are far from being purely economic. The introduction of import protection on Georgian goods and entry denial for Georgian citizens into Russia conceal similar intentions.
In the case of Belarus, Beltransneft - the state energy network operator and owner - can only pay the doubled prices by selling some of its shares to the Russian state network operator Transneft. By this means Transneft is going to obtain the controlling interest in the Belarusian transmission network. It is, therefore, quite obvious that another goal of the Russian energy policy is to allow Transneft and Gazprom to obtain a major if not a complete share of the respective transmission networks in the post-soviet neighboring states. The one who owns the pipeline can determine the price and quantity of oil and gas. That is why foreign investment from western energy companies is welcome in the spheres of energy production (upstream), but not in Russian transmission networks (downstream). During the presidency of Boris Jeltsin western companies did receive access to transmission networks within production sharing agreements in some cases. These Western companies such as Shell and Sakhalin are now, however, forced to sell off their majority shares to Gazprom. Securing the transit monopoly for Gazprom is the leverage for Russia's neohegemonic foreign policy towards its neighboring countries as well as its great power pose towards the EU. This foreign policy strategy underlying the energy and trade policy under Putin has long been misconceived both in Germany and in other western European countries due to a short sighted assumption that "energy supply is only a matter of economics". In this connection an argument is brought forward that Russia is also dependent on the EU for energy export revenues from the EU account for over 20 per cent of Russia's total national budget. At the end of the day, the Russian government is going to have it easier, however, making their people refrain from some 100 million Euro revenues than the European heads of states having to deal with a cold, unheated winter.
Power of the Network
The countries aligned with the transportation network from the Soviet times, Russia's neighboring states and the EU States which were former members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria), are still today almost exclusively associated with Gazprom because the individual states can not afford the investment of building an alternative pipeline. This network structure is the base for Russia's political influence in Central Asia, where Gazprom maintains an export and transportation monopoly in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Two projects have already begun: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline running from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey's Ceyhan port in the Mediterranean and an expansion of a parallel running pipeline. These projects are being completed with the purpose of Western diversification and their routes make Russia's energy foreign policies particularly meaningful. These routes strategically open the possibility for Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to become independent of the transportation monopoly by circumventing Russian territory by passing via the Caspian Sea. Recent trips made by German Foreign Secretary Steinmeier emphasize the interests of the federal government to promote the diversification of energy resources in the EU.
The future security of European energy supply will depend upon the extent to which the EU member states succeed in putting their national individual interests on the political back burner and present a united and uniform stance towards Russia, even if such a foreign policy is not an exact element of EU competencies. European endeavors for a common European energy policy approach are currently being hampered by existing bilateral agreements between individual member states and Russia, which weakens the EU negotiating position. Germany has the unique opportunity to strengthen the EU position, by using their influence through their relationship with Russian to present a united European energy security policy.
Foreign and security policy interests have always been the priority for the energy economy, taking precedence over pure energy business interests. The privatization of previously state-owned European energy corporations and the liberalization of the European energy market encourages competition and further promotes efficiency among business. Both efficiency and competition is favorable for consumers. However, this does not release the EU from its obligations of concerning themselves with energy security. They must conceptualize how to preserve the prevailing foreign and security policy interests despite the necessary energy industry privatization; much like how the EU protects higher-ranking public interest in other domains such as restricting monopolies and cartels of through environment protection acts. Therefore it is pertinent that the EU Energy Commission receives coordination and controlling authorization from member states in order to monitor the energy business of private European energy companies who work with third party states and their state-owned corporations. The latter is the best way to enable the EU to preserve energy foreign policy interests.
Reaching for Europe
European energy politics seem to be particularly essential now, ever since Russia refused to ratify the Energy Treaty Charter. It still remains unclear if and when Russia will be ready to accept the binding commitments of reciprocity and transparency in the energy sector in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA). As long as western private corporations are denied access to shares in the Russian transport network, the same should apply to Gazprom's investments in the European distribution system, particularly since Gazprom is currently striving towards access to European customers through the acquisition of the corresponding networks. Such a European response to Russia's refusal of reciprocity can only be assured through corresponding regulatory and coordination authority by the EU Commission. The EU cannot watch from the sidelines as private German energy firms compete for investments in Russian gas production, with the contract awarded to the firm who can guarantee Gazprom a greater share in the German distribution network. The EU also cannot look on as state and private operators of the Nabucco Pipeline - which is being planned in southeast Europe to reduce the dependency of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary on Gazprom and is therefore partly financed by the EBRD - tender once again Gazprom shareholding on this pipeline. These examples show how urgent it is to integrate Europe's private energy companies into a harmonized EU foreign energy policy.
It is up to the EU to limit Moscow's political instrumentalization of the distribution networks of Gazprom and Transneft. This should be accomplished through politically and financially supporting European corporations that invest in such transport networks in the immediate and extended European neighborhood in order to reduce the dependency on Russia as well as directly affect the Russian energy exploration and production. A coordinated European foreign energy policy cannot be limited to the EU, but due to the integration of the networks, must also include the European neighborhood as a transit region. In that way it would constitute a fundamental element in an active European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).
Ever since the European Commission included Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the ENP in May 2004, Russia has recognized that the EU and its soft powers are in competition for attracting their common neighbors. Europe has intensified their attempts to attract states away from Moscow and towards Brussels. Since the EU cannot offer these neighbor countries any prospect of membership at this time, the best preparation for a functional and eventually complete integration of these states within the EU is promoting regional cooperation. Energy provision - as well as environmental protection and the offer of a free trade agreement - are ideal topics for functional integration.
The history of European unification, which began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the collectivization of coal, is a tale of the progressive functional integration of increasingly wider policy areas. Brussels's foreign energy policy for the EU region, as well as for the neighboring areas, is an important aspect of a much more complex Russo-European relationship. It shows how beyond the noble dreams of a "strategic partnership" in concrete policy areas, cooperation with Russia can be offered, as well as how the EU could react in order to overcome obstacles to strive towards cooperation. At the same time, the crucial determinant is that the 27 EU member states muster the political will to agree on a common foreign energy policy and set their national self-interests aside. The best precondition for cooperation with Russia would be such a concerted foreign energy policy through which the EU could use its entire economic and political weight in the PCA negotiations with Moscow.
FT: Turkiye'de nukleer fiyasko
25/09/2008
Radikal
Financial Times gazetesi, nükleer santral ihalesinde sadece bir teklif yapılmasının Türkiye’yi mahcup ettiğini savundu
LONDRA - Türkiye’de ilk nükleer santral ihalesinde umulan ilgi gösterilmemesi, yurt dışında da yankılandı. Financial Times gazetesi, ihalede sadece bir teklif yapılmasının, “mahcup edici" bir gelişme olduğunu savundu. Gazete, Türkiye’nin fazla acele ettiğini, ek süre taleplerini geri çevirdiğini, bunun da “geri teptiği”ni öne sürdü. Ekonomi gazetesi Financial Times, Delphine Strauss imzasıyla yayımlanan Ankara kaynaklı haberinde Türkiye’nin nükleer ihalesinin fiyasko ile sonuçlandığını belirterek “Türkiye’nin pahalı enerji ithalatına bağımlılığını azaltma çabalarında terslik yaşandıö değerlendirmesini yaptı. OECD Nükleer Enerji Ajansı Direktörü Luis Echevarri’nin “Nükleer (enerji) Türkiye için çok iyi bir seçenekö değerlendirmesine yer verildiği haberde şöyle denildi: “Ancak ilk başta yabancı ve yerli gruplar arasında yaygın bir ilgi uyandıran projeye sönük yanıt, Türkiye’nin ilk santralini 2015 yılına kadar devreye sokma iddiası açısından kuşku yaratacak mahcup edici bir gelişme. “KÜRESEL TÜRBÜLANSA RAĞMEN EK SÜRE VERİLMEDİ” İngiliz gazetesi, Türk hükümetinin bazı şirketlerden hazırlıklar için daha fazla süre verilmesi talebine karşın ihale tarihini değiştirmediğini, küresel piyasalardaki türbülansa rağmen geçen Pazartesi günü Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın da ek süre verilmeyeceğini tekrarladığını kaydetti. Gazete şu görüşleri dile getirdi: “Türkiye’de iktidardaki Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, dikkatleri başka tarafa çeken siyasi olaylarla geçen bir yıldan sonra ekonomik programında ilerleme göstermeye istekli. Aynı zamanda küresel piyasalarda çalkantılar ve yurt içi gerginliklerin, Türkiye’nin yabancı yatırımcıları çekme kabiliyetine zarar vermeyeceğini de kanıtlaması lazım.” “İHALE REFERANS GİBİ GÖRÜLEN ŞİRKETLERİ ÇEKMEDİ” Ancak nükleer santral projesinde acele edilmesinin “geri teptiğiöni öne süren gazete “İhale, sektör için referans gibi görülen, merkezi ABD’de olan Westinghouse veya Fransız Areva gibi şirketlerin ilgisini çekmeye başarmadı. Başka gruplar da, ihale belgelerini satın aldı ancak teklif vermedi” diye yazdı. Financial Times’e konuşan bir uzman da, “Nükleer alanda 2015 yarın demektir. Tedarikçiler, daha fazla süre talep ettiğinde kulak verilir” şeklinde konuştu. Bu arada gazete, İstanbul’daki bir analiste dayanarak gerçek rekabet yokluğu nedeniyle nükleer santral karşıtlarının, daha kolayca hukuki yollara başvurabileceğini belirterek ihalenin askıya alınabileceğini veya iptal edilebileceğini de belirtti.(anka)
Radikal
Financial Times gazetesi, nükleer santral ihalesinde sadece bir teklif yapılmasının Türkiye’yi mahcup ettiğini savundu
LONDRA - Türkiye’de ilk nükleer santral ihalesinde umulan ilgi gösterilmemesi, yurt dışında da yankılandı. Financial Times gazetesi, ihalede sadece bir teklif yapılmasının, “mahcup edici" bir gelişme olduğunu savundu. Gazete, Türkiye’nin fazla acele ettiğini, ek süre taleplerini geri çevirdiğini, bunun da “geri teptiği”ni öne sürdü. Ekonomi gazetesi Financial Times, Delphine Strauss imzasıyla yayımlanan Ankara kaynaklı haberinde Türkiye’nin nükleer ihalesinin fiyasko ile sonuçlandığını belirterek “Türkiye’nin pahalı enerji ithalatına bağımlılığını azaltma çabalarında terslik yaşandıö değerlendirmesini yaptı. OECD Nükleer Enerji Ajansı Direktörü Luis Echevarri’nin “Nükleer (enerji) Türkiye için çok iyi bir seçenekö değerlendirmesine yer verildiği haberde şöyle denildi: “Ancak ilk başta yabancı ve yerli gruplar arasında yaygın bir ilgi uyandıran projeye sönük yanıt, Türkiye’nin ilk santralini 2015 yılına kadar devreye sokma iddiası açısından kuşku yaratacak mahcup edici bir gelişme. “KÜRESEL TÜRBÜLANSA RAĞMEN EK SÜRE VERİLMEDİ” İngiliz gazetesi, Türk hükümetinin bazı şirketlerden hazırlıklar için daha fazla süre verilmesi talebine karşın ihale tarihini değiştirmediğini, küresel piyasalardaki türbülansa rağmen geçen Pazartesi günü Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın da ek süre verilmeyeceğini tekrarladığını kaydetti. Gazete şu görüşleri dile getirdi: “Türkiye’de iktidardaki Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, dikkatleri başka tarafa çeken siyasi olaylarla geçen bir yıldan sonra ekonomik programında ilerleme göstermeye istekli. Aynı zamanda küresel piyasalarda çalkantılar ve yurt içi gerginliklerin, Türkiye’nin yabancı yatırımcıları çekme kabiliyetine zarar vermeyeceğini de kanıtlaması lazım.” “İHALE REFERANS GİBİ GÖRÜLEN ŞİRKETLERİ ÇEKMEDİ” Ancak nükleer santral projesinde acele edilmesinin “geri teptiğiöni öne süren gazete “İhale, sektör için referans gibi görülen, merkezi ABD’de olan Westinghouse veya Fransız Areva gibi şirketlerin ilgisini çekmeye başarmadı. Başka gruplar da, ihale belgelerini satın aldı ancak teklif vermedi” diye yazdı. Financial Times’e konuşan bir uzman da, “Nükleer alanda 2015 yarın demektir. Tedarikçiler, daha fazla süre talep ettiğinde kulak verilir” şeklinde konuştu. Bu arada gazete, İstanbul’daki bir analiste dayanarak gerçek rekabet yokluğu nedeniyle nükleer santral karşıtlarının, daha kolayca hukuki yollara başvurabileceğini belirterek ihalenin askıya alınabileceğini veya iptal edilebileceğini de belirtti.(anka)
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Palin’s American Exception
By Roger Cohen
Published: September 25, 2008
The New York Times
I have to hand it to Palin, she may be onto something in her batty way: the election is very much about American exceptionalism.
This is the idea, around since the founding fathers, and elaborated on by Alexis de Toqueville, that the United States is a nation unlike any other with a special mission to build the “city upon a hill” that will serve as liberty’s beacon for mankind.
But exceptionalism has taken an ugly twist of late. It’s become the angry refuge of the America that wants to deny the real state of the world.
From an inspirational notion, however flawed in execution, that has buttressed the global spread of liberty, American exceptionalism has morphed into the fortress of those who see themselves threatened by “one-worlders” (read Barack Obama) and who believe it’s more important to know how to dress moose than find Mumbai.
That’s Palinism, a philosophy delivered without a passport and with a view (on a clear day) of Russia.
Behind Palinism lies anger. It’s been growing as America’s relative decline has become more manifest in falling incomes, imploding markets, massive debt and rising new centers of wealth and power from Shanghai to Dubai.
The damn-the-world, God-chose-us rage of that America has sharpened as U.S. exceptionalism has become harder to square with the 21st-century world’s interconnectedness. How exceptional can you be when every major problem you face, from terrorism to nuclear proliferation to gas prices, requires joint action?
Very exceptional, insists Palin, and so does John McCain by choosing her. (He has said: “I do believe in American exceptionalism. We are the only nation I know that really is deeply concerned about adhering to the principle that all of us are created equal.”)
America is distinct. Its habits and attitudes with respect to religion, patriotism, voting and the death penalty, for example, differ from much of the rest of the developed world. It is more ideological than other countries, believing still in its manifest destiny. At its noblest, it inspires still.
But, let’s face it, from Baghdad to Bear Stearns the last eight years have been a lesson in the price of exceptionalism run amok.
To persist with a philosophy grounded in America’s separateness, rather than its connectedness, would be devastating at a time when the country faces two wars, a financial collapse unseen since 1929, commodity inflation, a huge transfer of resources to the Middle East, and the imperative to develop new sources of energy.
Enough is enough.
The basic shift from the cold war to the new world is from MAD (mutual assured destruction) to MAC (mutual assured connectedness). Technology trumps politics. Still, Bush and Cheney have demonstrated that politics still matter.
Which brings us to the first debate — still scheduled for Friday — between Obama and McCain on foreign policy. It will pit the former’s universalism against the latter’s exceptionalism.
I’m going to try to make this simple. On the Democratic side you have a guy whose campaign has been based on the Internet, who believes America may have something to learn from other countries (like universal health care) and who’s unafraid in 2008 to say he’s a “proud citizen of the United States and a fellow citizen of the world.”
On the Republican side, you have a guy who, in 2008, is just discovering the Net and Google and whose No. 2 is a woman who got a passport last year and believes she understands Russia because Alaska is closer to Siberia than Alabama.
If I were Obama, I’d put it this way: “Senator McCain, the world you claim to understand is the world of yesterday. A new century demands new thinking. Our country cannot be made fundamentally secure by a man who thought our economy was fundamentally sound.”
American exceptionalism, taken to extremes, leaves you without the allies you need (Iraq), without the influence you want (Iran) and without any notion of risk (Wall Street). The only exceptionalism that resonates, as Obama put it to me last year, is one “based on our Constitution, our principles, our values and our ideals.”
In a superb recent piece on the declining global influence of the Supreme Court, my colleague Adam Liptak quoted an article by Steven Calabresi, a law professor at Northwestern: “Like it or not, Americans really are a special people with a special ideology that sets us apart from all other peoples.”
Palinism has its intellectual roots. But it’s dangerous for a country in need of realism not rage. I’m sure Henry Kissinger tried to instill Realpolitik in the governor of Alaska this week, but the angry exceptionalism that is Palinism is not in the reason game.
Monday, September 22, 2008
McCain's Palin Problem
Thursday, September 18, 2008
The 7-10: Palmer on Politics - Independent political analysis, insight, and commentary.
After a rough two weeks, Barack Obama seems to be edging his way back into the lead in several battleground states. In addition to having a renewed focus on the economy and a few gifts from John McCain and some of his surrogates, he has someone else to thank for his recent political fortunes: Sarah Palin, the very person who gave his campaign heartburn earlier this month.The Obama vs. Palin debate over experience turned out to be a draw in that a consensus will never be reached. However, Obama does have one significant advantage over Palin in this regard: Exposure. And this is what is working against Sarah Palin right now.Obama has been tested on the national stage numerous times over the course of the campaign season in about 20 high profile debates and several candidate forums. He has won millions of votes and competed in more than 50 primaries and caucuses. He may be an inexperienced candidate, but the voters are the ones who acquitted him. Reporters and his political opponents have spent months examining Obama, his biography, and his record. Some of what has surfaced has not been kind to the junior senator from Illinois (e.g., Jeremiah Wright, flag pins, "typical White person," "clinging to guns and religion"), and he has had to confront these stories directly and publicly.Sarah Palin, on the other hand, was (and is) largely unknown to voters. After a successful debut in which she energized the Republican base and was assisted by anti-media sentiment in the days thereafter, the McCain campaign inadequately prepared itself for the inevitable scrutiny that would follow. By keeping Palin away from the cameras, they were essentially giving free license for the media to uncover anything they could about her on their own. McCain essentially left an unknown candidate to be defined by an investigative media without allowing this unknown candidate to confront the media directly and shoot these media stories down. As a result, the media's portrayal of Sarah Palin is different and potentially more salient than the McCain campaign's portrayal of Sarah Palin, but the McCain campaign is what allowed this to happen.While the media were investigating Palin's records and controversies in Alaska, the public's views about her were beginning to change. She clearly had the nation's attention, but did not take advantage of it. Instead, she stuck to her script and didn't take questions from anyone, be they the media or regular voters at her campaign events. But likability and flair alone cannot sustain a candidate in this political climate. (Even Karl Rove acknowledged that the excitement surrounding her couldn't last forever.) As Palin continued to avoid taking questions while her surrogates inadvertently diminished her (e.g., "Sarah Palin can see Russia from Alaska. She is not qualified to run a company."), the same doubts they had about Obama began to surface about her. Voters who were looking for some measure of depth to match her style began to grow impatient.Now the risk for McCain is that Palin may be exposed as a gimmick. At a recent joint town hall event, Palin took questions from the audience for the first time. One woman asked her to identify which specific foreign policy qualifications she had. Palin answered the question by not answering it:
"I have that readiness and if you want specifics with specific policy or countries, go ahead. You can ask. You can play 'stump the candidate' if you want to. But we are ready to serve."This response is at the very heart of why the Palin bounce is no more. Yes, there are other reasons, such as the renewed focus on the economy. However, her inability to clearly articulate the case for her candidacy in a friendly environment is giving many voters pause. It is worth noting that the audience at that town hall event was screened and the person who asked the question about foreign policy credentials was a woman, so blaming an overzealous and biased media or complaining about sexism will not work. And they shouldn't work because this is a legitimate question that any responsible voter or media organization should ask.Palin has certainly been a short term success for John McCain. But her long term prospects look considerably less promising. After her strong convention speech, Palin has avoided the media, been lampooned on Saturday Night Live, sat for an interview with Charlie Gibson which had mixed reviews, and sat for another interview with conservative ally Sean Hannity. And now she is equating asking legitimate questions with playing "stump the candidate." That's exactly what the moderator will attempt to do at the debate next month, so she will need to find a better response.During the primaries, it was okay for Obama to not have to display his grasp of the issues as quickly because there was lots of time left in the campaign season and fewer voters were paying attention. But now it's the middle of September. Summer vacation is over, the economy is in trouble, and everyone is tuning into the race. To voters who are not solidly in McCain's camp, Palin is coming across as trying to fake her way to the vice presidency.Several prominent conservatives have already expressed their reservations about Palin. Chuck Hagel is the latest one to give her a thumbs down. Base voters may still be excited about her, but it would seem that her appeal among soft Republicans, Democrats, and independents is weakening because she is not closing the sale with them. And the longer Palin stays away from giving interviews, the fewer chances she will have to make new impressions with voters. The McCain campaign had better take her upcoming debate against Joe Biden seriously because that will be her last and best chance to erase these doubts.Palin recently quipped that Barack Obama probably regretted not choosing Hillary Clinton as his running mate. But in light of her inability to assuage voters about her experience and her capacity to lead at a time when the stock market is falling and the economy is the main issue in this race, perhaps John McCain is now having second thoughts about not choosing Mitt Romney.
Copyright 2007-2008 by Anthony Palmer. All rights reserved.
The 7-10: Palmer on Politics - Independent political analysis, insight, and commentary.
After a rough two weeks, Barack Obama seems to be edging his way back into the lead in several battleground states. In addition to having a renewed focus on the economy and a few gifts from John McCain and some of his surrogates, he has someone else to thank for his recent political fortunes: Sarah Palin, the very person who gave his campaign heartburn earlier this month.The Obama vs. Palin debate over experience turned out to be a draw in that a consensus will never be reached. However, Obama does have one significant advantage over Palin in this regard: Exposure. And this is what is working against Sarah Palin right now.Obama has been tested on the national stage numerous times over the course of the campaign season in about 20 high profile debates and several candidate forums. He has won millions of votes and competed in more than 50 primaries and caucuses. He may be an inexperienced candidate, but the voters are the ones who acquitted him. Reporters and his political opponents have spent months examining Obama, his biography, and his record. Some of what has surfaced has not been kind to the junior senator from Illinois (e.g., Jeremiah Wright, flag pins, "typical White person," "clinging to guns and religion"), and he has had to confront these stories directly and publicly.Sarah Palin, on the other hand, was (and is) largely unknown to voters. After a successful debut in which she energized the Republican base and was assisted by anti-media sentiment in the days thereafter, the McCain campaign inadequately prepared itself for the inevitable scrutiny that would follow. By keeping Palin away from the cameras, they were essentially giving free license for the media to uncover anything they could about her on their own. McCain essentially left an unknown candidate to be defined by an investigative media without allowing this unknown candidate to confront the media directly and shoot these media stories down. As a result, the media's portrayal of Sarah Palin is different and potentially more salient than the McCain campaign's portrayal of Sarah Palin, but the McCain campaign is what allowed this to happen.While the media were investigating Palin's records and controversies in Alaska, the public's views about her were beginning to change. She clearly had the nation's attention, but did not take advantage of it. Instead, she stuck to her script and didn't take questions from anyone, be they the media or regular voters at her campaign events. But likability and flair alone cannot sustain a candidate in this political climate. (Even Karl Rove acknowledged that the excitement surrounding her couldn't last forever.) As Palin continued to avoid taking questions while her surrogates inadvertently diminished her (e.g., "Sarah Palin can see Russia from Alaska. She is not qualified to run a company."), the same doubts they had about Obama began to surface about her. Voters who were looking for some measure of depth to match her style began to grow impatient.Now the risk for McCain is that Palin may be exposed as a gimmick. At a recent joint town hall event, Palin took questions from the audience for the first time. One woman asked her to identify which specific foreign policy qualifications she had. Palin answered the question by not answering it:
"I have that readiness and if you want specifics with specific policy or countries, go ahead. You can ask. You can play 'stump the candidate' if you want to. But we are ready to serve."This response is at the very heart of why the Palin bounce is no more. Yes, there are other reasons, such as the renewed focus on the economy. However, her inability to clearly articulate the case for her candidacy in a friendly environment is giving many voters pause. It is worth noting that the audience at that town hall event was screened and the person who asked the question about foreign policy credentials was a woman, so blaming an overzealous and biased media or complaining about sexism will not work. And they shouldn't work because this is a legitimate question that any responsible voter or media organization should ask.Palin has certainly been a short term success for John McCain. But her long term prospects look considerably less promising. After her strong convention speech, Palin has avoided the media, been lampooned on Saturday Night Live, sat for an interview with Charlie Gibson which had mixed reviews, and sat for another interview with conservative ally Sean Hannity. And now she is equating asking legitimate questions with playing "stump the candidate." That's exactly what the moderator will attempt to do at the debate next month, so she will need to find a better response.During the primaries, it was okay for Obama to not have to display his grasp of the issues as quickly because there was lots of time left in the campaign season and fewer voters were paying attention. But now it's the middle of September. Summer vacation is over, the economy is in trouble, and everyone is tuning into the race. To voters who are not solidly in McCain's camp, Palin is coming across as trying to fake her way to the vice presidency.Several prominent conservatives have already expressed their reservations about Palin. Chuck Hagel is the latest one to give her a thumbs down. Base voters may still be excited about her, but it would seem that her appeal among soft Republicans, Democrats, and independents is weakening because she is not closing the sale with them. And the longer Palin stays away from giving interviews, the fewer chances she will have to make new impressions with voters. The McCain campaign had better take her upcoming debate against Joe Biden seriously because that will be her last and best chance to erase these doubts.Palin recently quipped that Barack Obama probably regretted not choosing Hillary Clinton as his running mate. But in light of her inability to assuage voters about her experience and her capacity to lead at a time when the stock market is falling and the economy is the main issue in this race, perhaps John McCain is now having second thoughts about not choosing Mitt Romney.
Copyright 2007-2008 by Anthony Palmer. All rights reserved.
Saturday, September 20, 2008
Cold comfort
Sep 4th 2008
From The Economist print edition
From The Economist print edition
DEPENDING where you live in Europe and whom you blame for the Russian-Georgian war, the European Union’s emergency summit meeting on September 1st was a triumph, a failure or just the best that could be expected. Against objections from some Russia-friendly quarters, chiefly Italy’s prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, the EU condemned Russian actions in Georgia, agreed to step up efforts to help ex-Soviet countries under threat and blocked talks on a new partnership deal.
Even agreeing that was tricky. Britain had been demanding a “root and branch” re-examination of the EU’s relationship with Russia—a critical viewpoint shared with Poland, the Baltic states and Sweden, whose foreign minister, Carl Bildt, has explicitly compared Russia’s tactics with Germany’s in the 1930s. Most of the big European countries are a lot more cautious. They blame Georgia, seen as an irresponsible American protégé, for starting the war but object to Russia’s precipitate diplomatic recognition of Georgia’s two breakaway territories, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the lingering Russian military presence in buffer zones. Above all, they are glad that a row with an important trading partner has cooled.
The hope is that France’s president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who is visiting Russia on September 8th, will bring back agreement on a Russian withdrawal in accordance with the ceasefire he brokered. Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, has promised this on at least four occasions. But Russia’s prime minister, Vladimir Putin, has declared that the port of Poti, a long way from the separatist regions, is part of Russia’s self-declared “security zone”. His spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said that Russian troops (now labelled peacekeepers) would maintain their “temporary presence”. Even so, optimists think that it will soon be business as usual, particularly as Russia starts to count the economic cost of the war, which has sent shares plunging and encouraged capital flight.
Maybe, but what is happening in practice is another story. Even the details of implementing the ceasefire are unclear. One reason is that the document itself is so vague. Veterans of the many ceasefire negotiations during the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were aghast when they saw the text, which exists in multiple inconsistent versions and lacks the vital specifics of dates and placenames, leaving far too much wiggle room. Russian officials now say that their forces will move back only when Georgia also abides by the agreement as they define it. They are demanding that Western countries observe an arms embargo on Georgia, the “aggressor” party. That leaves plenty of scope for quibbling and delay.
A second problem is the role of the international monitors from the EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a Vienna-based international body that supposedly defuses the continent’s conflicts. Will these people be allowed to move freely inside all of what the West regards as Georgia, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia where Russian-backed militias are engaged in purges of the ethnic Georgian population? Russia, at present, says that it is too dangerous to allow this. But if they are allowed in, on what terms will that be? Foreign journalists and diplomats are repeatedly told that they need documents issued by the separatist authorities—or in some cases, as shockingly happened to the French ambassador to Georgia, Russian visas. Georgia and its allies will vigorously resist the application of such rules to international officials.
It is still unclear what Russia really wants in Georgia—or elsewhere. In Moscow, the mood is defiant, unrepentant and uncompromising. Mr Medvedev and a raft of top officials have scoffed at talk of serious punitive action. “Bring it on” appears to be their devil-may-care mantra. Convinced that the days of a unipolar Washington-centric world are dead and buried, Russia believes it has a privileged place at the top table of a fast-changing multipolar world. Any attempt to mete out punishment will backfire. “The G8 will be practically unable to function without Russia,” Mr Medvedev calmly told Italian television. “That’s why we don’t fear being expelled.” On NATO’s freezing of ties with Russia, he remarked: “We don’t see anything dramatic or difficult about suspending our relations…But I think our partners will lose more from that.” Unmentioned but clearly meant was NATO’s reliance on Russia to supply its forces in Afghanistan.
The EU’s mild rebuke and tentative sanctions brought an outright welcome. The freezing of talks on a new deal with the EU, already much delayed, is seen as of little importance. Though junior officials expressed irritation at “biased statements” in the EU declaration, Mr Medvedev hailed the union’s avoidance of real sanctions as “reasonable” and “realistic”. The president seemed to put all disagreement with Russia down to a temporary misunderstanding: it was “not fatal” because “things change in the world.”
Political corpse
But not, it seems, as far as talks with the Georgian leadership is concerned. “President [Mikheil] Saakashvili no longer exists in our eyes,” said Mr Medvedev. “He is a political corpse.” Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, advised Europe to decide its policy towards Russia based on its own “core interests” (ie, without America) in a speech larded with snide remarks about American arrogance and unilateralism. “The phantom of the Great Game wanders again in the Caucasus,” he said. If America and its allies chose to side with what he called “Saakashvili’s regime” it would be a “mistake of truly historic proportions”.
That fits with earlier Russian demands for a change of Georgian leadership. Russia has said that its prosecutors are collecting evidence in South Ossetia with which to indict Mr Saakashvili as a war criminal. Many of Georgia’s Western friends would be delighted if someone with an easier personality (and greater readiness to listen to advice) were in charge. But they want that to happen as part of Georgia’s normal internal politics, not as a putsch dictated by Moscow. As the box on the last page of this section points out, Georgian politicians now think the same.
The double-act between Mr Medvedev and Mr Putin creates extra scope for manoeuvre. Mr Medvedev promises to calm things down. Then Mr Putin stirs them up again, accusing in all seriousness the Bush administration of staging the war to boost John McCain’s election chances.
Part of the motive for the war may have been to distract attention from problems inside Russia, such as inflation, corruption, squabbling inside the circles of power and the failure to distribute fairly the proceeds of the oil and gas bonanza of past years. As the oil price falls towards $100 a barrel, the focus on that will sharpen.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the most unpleasant side of Russian politics is leaking to its near neighbours. Over the weekend, Mr Medvedev said that protecting the lives and dignity of Russian citizens abroad was an “unquestionable priority”, as well as protecting the interests of Russian businesses there. He also spoke of “countries with which we share special historical relations” where Russia has “privileged interests”. Though Mr Medvedev stressed the need for friendly relations, he also implied that such countries might not have the option of following policies that Russia deemed unfriendly (such as wanting to join NATO or host American bases). It would have been hard to find anything more likely to make the fears of Russia’s neighbours seem justified, to stoke Western support for them and to undermine those who think that Russia will soon return to “normal”.
Diplomatic support for Russia has been scanty, even among close allies. No country, Russia apart, has given the two statelets formal diplomatic recognition. Belarus and Tajikistan say they will do so, but the former, which is being squeezed by Russia over energy supplies, spoke in notably lukewarm terms and only after Russia’s ambassador to Minsk decried the government’s “incomprehensible silence”.
Perhaps most significant has been the critical reaction from the intergovernmental Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, which Russia has been building up as a counterweight to American influence. A statement from its meeting last week supported Russian peacekeeping efforts but stressed the importance of territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This was a clear snub that showed a startling lack of support for Russia’s actions both from the four Central Asian members of the SCO and from China.
Chill from China
China’s leaders have enjoyed unnerving America by flirting with Russia, but this has always stopped well short of any hint of confrontation. Although China’s state-run media has avoided criticising Russia, and has highlighted the West’s discomfort at Georgia’s defeat, China’s official position on Russia’s recognition of the breakaway regions has been surprisingly chilly. A Chinese spokesman said his country was “concerned” and called for “dialogue and consultation”. That reflects both China’s pragmatic desire for good economic relations with the West, and also its dislike of both separatism and interference in other countries’ internal affairs. With Tibet, Taiwan and restive Muslims to contend with, China takes a dim view of anybody chopping up other countries and declaring the results to be independent states.
The same thinking has marred Russia’s image in normally friendly countries such as Greece and Cyprus (which bristles about the Turkish-backed “pseudo-state”) and Spain (which is twitchy about Basque and Catalan separatism). All this suggests a degree of miscalculation in Moscow. Over the past decade, the future of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a useful bargaining chip. Now it has been cashed in, without much benefit.
Cooking up new Russia policies will take time. The result may well not be to the Kremlin’s taste. “We are back to square one,” says Alexander Stubb, Finland’s foreign minister. Many Western countries are now reassessing their relations with Russia in ways that range from the need for higher defence spending to a reduction in dependence on Russian energy. Mr Sarkozy says that France, which holds the EU presidency, will launch a big new defence initiative in October.
The EU is better at giving carrots than wielding sticks. It will find it easier to provide generous support for the reconstruction of Georgia than do anything that might be seen as punishing Russia. Even so, timid as this response may seem, it is also something of a watershed: for the first time the EU’s 27 countries got together and agreed on sharp public criticism of Russia.
The United States has announced a $1 billion aid package for Georgia. The International Monetary Fund has agreed to lend the country $750m. Underlining Georgia’s importance as an energy corridor, America’s vice-president, Dick Cheney, visited the region this week. He hopes to get Azerbaijan to commit gas exports to the €8 billion ($11.5 billion) Nabucco project, which extends a gas pipeline to Europe from Georgia and Turkey. But Nabucco’s chances are looking increasingly slim. This week Russia stepped up its energy diplomacy, agreeing on a deal with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on a new pipeline via Russia that would entrench the Kremlin’s hold on east-west gas supplies. Though the EU is Russia’s largest customer, individual countries’ dependency (see chart) has undermined the union’s collective bargaining power.
America is also supporting Georgia’s demand for a tough non-recognition policy towards South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. Companies doing business in the two self-proclaimed countries will find that their managers and shareholders cannot get American or European visas, officials say. But will big European countries such as Germany go along with that? Outsiders will be scrutinising closely the atmosphere at the annual German-Russian intergovernmental meeting in October—an occasion normally marked by warm rhetoric about the two countries’ mutual interdependence.
The mood in NATO is noticeably more hawkish than in the EU. A senior official says that the days when it was regarded as “taboo” to discuss any military threat from Russia in the alliance’s contingency planning are all but over. When NATO defence ministers meet in London on September 18th, a big question will be how to defend existing members, chiefly the Baltic states, which are small, weak and on Russia’s border. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the alliance in 2004, when such questions were dismissed as too theoretical to worry about (or alternatively too provocative to consider). Now they are unavoidable.
Minorities as ammunition
The potential flashpoint, as with the war in Georgia, is a legacy of the Soviet Union (see table). Russia says that the language and citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia discriminate against Russian-speakers. The hundreds of thousands of people (mainly from Russia) who moved to these countries during the Soviet occupation did not automatically become citizens when Estonia and Latvia regained independence. Many were naturalised in the 1990s, and a steady trickle continue to pass the language exams and apply for citizenship. But an alienated minority of stateless people, and tens of thousands who carry Russian passports, are a potential nightmare for the Baltic states and their friends. Disturbances in the Estonian capital, Tallinn, last year over a clumsy government decision to move a Soviet war memorial inflamed feelings that have not yet subsided.
Lithuania’s problems are different (it has a small Russian minority which gained automatic citizenship in 1991). But it is a transit route for Russian troops to the exclave of Kaliningrad. That offers plenty of scope for provocation. Russia has cut off oil supplies, ostensibly because the pipeline is decrepit (but has refused a Lithuanian offer to pay for its repair). And populist parties led by politicians with strong Kremlin links are doing well in the run-up to a general election in October.
The Baltic armed forces are tiny and are configured to support NATO efforts in faraway countries such as Afghanistan, not to defend the region against a real attack from Russia. NATO’s military presence consists only of a handful of fighter aircraft (currently four from Germany) based at an air base in Lithuania. It also has a cyber-defence centre in Estonia, and all three countries have NATO-standard radars that can look deep into Russia.
Beefing that up without feeding Russian paranoia will be tricky. “Don’t expect a fanfare,” says the NATO official. “We will do it in a low-key, professional way.” The Baltic states themselves will be expected to spend more on defence—no easy task as a sharp economic slowdown bites.
Another question for NATO is how much help to offer in restoring Georgia’s armed forces. Although Western military advisers have been surprised, and even scandalised, by the poor showing of the Georgian army, which retreated in poor order, dumping huge quantities of donated American equipment and ammunition, Georgia itself is optimistic about rebuilding it.
The other country most threatened by Russia is Ukraine. Mr Putin said in April that it risked dismemberment if it tried to join NATO, and opinion inside the country is deeply divided on the issue. Politics is unstable too: this week Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko, threatened to call a snap election to defend himself against what he termed a “putsch” by parliament, which wants to strip him of his powers. The West will tread gingerly into that, though NATO may step up its fairly uncontroversial defence training activities.
Yet NATO is barely less divided than the EU. It is not just that European countries blocked the American plan to give Ukraine and Georgia a clear path to potential membership at the alliance’s summit in April. Turkey, the most important NATO member in the Black Sea region, is torn between the competing claims of strategic partnership with America and its strong trading links with Russia (which supplies most of its gas). Although Turkey has helped to train Georgia’s armed forces (evidently not very successfully), it did not share radar and other military data with Georgia during the series of pinprick attacks by Russia that preceded the full-scale war.
Turkey is pushing its own regional initiative, involving Russia and the Caucasus countries but not America. That might help settle another lingering conflict, between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But Georgia regards anything that excludes the United States as unacceptable. For now, the hottest issue for Turkey is whether to allow America to send more warships through the Bosporus straits into the Black Sea, something that Russia vigorously opposes.
Having caught the West napping (or at least on holiday), Russia scored a pleasant victory over a weak and unpopular adversary. But now it has to deal with the consequences: war fever at home plus alienated allies and stronger critics abroad. Will Russia’s leaders respond to this by raising the stakes, in the hope of showing their opponents’ underlying weakness? The West’s leaders worriedly hope not.
Less than white?
Sep 18th 2008 | ANKARA
From The Economist print edition
A growing row over claims of government corruption
LEADERS of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development (AK) party like to boast that their acronym means “white” or “clean” in Turkish. No longer so. A succession of corruption allegations is sullying AK’s image of probity.
Much mud is being flung over a scandal involving a Turkish charity, Deniz Feneri (“Lighthouse” in Turkish). On September 17th a German court convicted three Turkish men involved in the charity of siphoning off €18.6m ($26m). The money had been raised ostensibly to help needy Muslims, among them Palestinians, Turkish slum-dwellers and refugees in Pakistan. Instead the court found that some funds went to buy real estate in Turkey.
Opponents of the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, claim that some money was funnelled to Kanal 7, an Istanbul-based television channel with close ties to the government. The court, however, found no evidence of links to AK.
Mr Erdogan has turned his ire on Aydin Dogan, the owner of Turkey’s biggest media conglomerate, whose newspapers and television channels have led the way in reporting the Lighthouse scandal. Mr Erdogan claims the media group is stirring up the controversy because AK refused to grant Mr Dogan favours for his other business interests, including a permit to build luxury residences on land around Istanbul’s Hilton hotel. The prime minister has denounced Mr Dogan’s journalists as “dishonourable” and “lowly sell-outs”. Such has been his vehemence that one bemused European ambassador wondered: “Might it be that Ramadan fasting has weakened his nerves?”
The Dogan group has in the past been accused of using its media muscle for commercial advantage. Moreover, some Dogan titles, notably the flagship daily,Hürriyet, had been among the biggest cheerleaders of the secularists’ political campaign against AK. In July the party narrowly avoided a ban for breaching constitutional rules against Islamism.
Now some claims of corruption are beginning to stick. Earlier this month an AK deputy, Saban Disli, resigned from a top party post after being accused of receiving a million-dollar kickback from a land developer. “This is just the tip of the iceberg,” asserts Yilmaz Ates, a deputy for the main opposition Republican People’s Party, which unearthed the deal.
Ali Bulac, a prominent Islamist intellectual, says the Lighthouse scandal has “triggered trauma” among Mr Erdogan’s core of pious supporters. Matters have not been helped by his attempts to promote Mr Dogan’s rivals. These include Calik Holding, which recently acquired Turkey’s second largest media group, Sabah-ATV, thanks to generous loans from a state-owned bank. Mr Erdogan’s 29-year-old son-in-law is Calik’s chief executive.
Despite the uproar, opinion polls suggest that Mr Erdogan’s popularity far outstrips that of his rivals, with around 50% of the vote. Meanwhile, shares in Dogan Holding have fallen sharply as investors worry that the row with the government could damage its $8 billion empire.
Friday, September 19, 2008
Blame the dollar
Massoud Hedeshi
The US economic power horse is running out of ideas and cash as it jostles with a massive national debt, housing and financial crises, rising inflation, and a depreciating currency.
This has all contributed to a growing tendency to live off credit amassed through petrodollars and foreign loans, leaving repayment for future generations.
Today, in much of America, communities and suburbs are dealing with a drastic increase in foreclosures and short sales. This has not been helped by the fact that gas is selling at over $1 a litre ($4 a gallon).
Standard monetary tools such as lowering or increasing interest rates can no longer provide quick fixes to the situation for both economic and political reasons.
Raising interest rates would compound the mortgage crisis while lowering it would drive the value of the US dollar abroad even lower.
But exercising control over the money supply could also damage the US economy: increasing the supply would lower the dollar's value even more, while decreasing supply would exacerbate the loans crisis.
In any case, control over the money supply would be anathema to US economic policy given the country's 'addiction' to deficit financing and run-away consumerism in recent decades.
So the US Federal Reserve is left virtually helpless.
It has, however, tried to help Wall Street by becoming a temporary lender and allow many investment firms the opportunity to avoid bankruptcy. Such an action by the Fed has not happened since the stock market fiascos in the 1930s.
The US government, however, can apply one clear fix to the situation - cut back overspending on a massive scale.
But this option too is off the table in an election year where 'victory' is being promised in endless wars on 'terrorism'.
And it is the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have contributed the lion's share to sapping America's resources.
Plunge of the dollar
As America struggles to avoid recession, the world economic order appears to be heading for a drastic overhaul. 
Increased energy demands from developing nations fuelled a rise in oil prices [EPA]
Despite a trend by some economists and politicians to blame the current food and energy commodity price hikes on Opec or overpopulation, there is a clear picture emerging of deep structural problems in the world economy.
In particular, the main currency used for global trade in commodities, the US dollar, has been in steady decline not just against the Euro, but also against most other convertible currencies.
According to the US Federal Reserve, the dollar has dropped by around 65 per cent against the Euro, 31 per cent against the British Sterling, 45 per cent against the Canadian Dollar, and by 59 per cent against the Australian Dollar over the eight-year period since June 2000.
While the causes for this slide are debatable (and largely attributed to poor fundamentals in the US economy), the global impact of such a major drop in the value of the dollar is undeniable for two important reasons.
First, most global commodities traders utilise - and favour - the greenback over other currencies, despite a severe decline in its purchasing power.
Secondly, most countries - mainly in east Asia and among the major oil and gas exporters of the Arab Middle East - use the dollar as their reserve currency.
But they are paying the price. Despite their booming economies and elevated public spending, they are experiencing depreciating terms of trade and rising inflation.
More importantly, they have seen the value of their strategic currency reserves drop with the dollar's waning global strength.
Rising prosperity
The situation is ironically exacerbated by a significant rise in prosperity and consequently in the volume of global trade in recent years.
According to a 2007 Handbook of Statistics published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad), global merchandise export and import volumes have grown at over 10 per cent a year over the 45-year period 1960-2005 in US dollar terms and based on current prices.
After the economic shocks of 1998 (caused by the Asian financial crisis of the time) and 2001 (following the terrorist attacks on 9/11), export and import growth rates for world merchandise accelerated to almost 17 per cent a year between 2003 and 2006.
Such a huge rise in demand for commodities would inevitably result in inflationary pressure on prices, particularly when the currency used for transactions - the dollar - is consistently losing its underlying value.
Global revolution
Furthermore, there has been significant and robust growth in the economies of developing countries in the past half century.
Developing country export growth outpaced the global average rate by 1 per cent in the 1960-2005 period, and outpaced the developed world by 1.2 per cent over the same period, according to Unctad.
And the differential between developing (including India, China, UAE) and developed nations (such as Japan, US, France, Germany, UK) has increased with time: 1.4 per cent for 1970-2005; 1.4 per cent for 1980-2005; 3.6 per cent for 1990-2005; and 4.8 per cent for the period 2000-2005.
The fall of the Soviet Union and its satellites is also adding to growing market demands and the push for prosperity
Former Warsaw Pact countries, which are now known as 'economies in transition', have in recent years outpaced developing countries' export growth rates by close to 6 per cent over 2000-2005, according to UNCTAD.
This has changed the economic dynamic of north-south and east-west dialogue. Some 50 years ago, 80 per cent of the world's population lived in low-income countries. Today, that proportion has been turned on its head with four billion - around 65 per cent - living in middle and high-income countries.
What we now have in effect is a quiet global revolution beginning to bear fruit following a 50-year period shift in economic foci and decolonisation.
The impact of decolonisation is not to be underestimated. Those 'peripheral' areas of the world - such as India and China - exploited for centuries by a self-serving 'metropolis' have developed a self-consciousness emanating from a technological, economic and political revolution.
Dumping the dollar
The growth of global economies - some of which had not been international players until recently - creates a proportional need for energy and food resources and consequently the crises we face today.
As the crises that emanate from growing prosperity develop, they fuel a hunger for increased commodity production, a reduction in waste, and an urgent need to locate alternative energy sources.
However, there is also a need to take immediate measures to protect the growth in global prosperity.
World leaders, particularly among major oil and gas producers and those in East Asia and elsewhere with large foreign currency reserves, are coming under pressure to ditch one of the greatest causes of global inflation today -the fast-declining US dollar.
Though many have been resistant to this idea, sooner or later economic realities will overcome political interests that negate its rationale.
Iran has spearheaded this idea with its own Oil Bourse that trades mainly in Euros and Yen, and by converting its reserves to other currencies.
While Iran is already reaping the benefits of these moves, it however lacks the financial muscle to make a real dent in world trade trends.
The country that is most likely to realise this idea with both impact and impunity - and has some outstanding scores to settle with the US - is Russia.
Mother Russia?
Why would Russia continue to amass a rapidly deteriorating currency in its reserves at a time when its own economy is stronger than most others? Why indeed would any country want to continue trading in a currency that harms its terms of trade? 
Will Russia use its military and economic muscle to dump the dollar? [AFP]
The slightest hint of a move by Russia to ditch the dollar substantially would fuel speculation by a number of unstoppably powerful agents: national central banks, currency speculators and those same global corporations that emanated from the West.
They would not betray their profit motive if greater profitability is achieved through trading in other currencies. Even the consistently timid Arab oil exporters would join the fray once a trend is started.
Ironically, the inevitable dumping of the US Dollar is not such good news for the EU in the long run, as the continuing rise of the Euro is detrimental for the continent's exports, and will weaken European manufacturing almost as rapidly as the Euro's rise.
Furthermore, reliance on the services sector is no solution either, as rising global prices coupled with the rise of the Euro reduce demand for luxuries-oriented European goods and services - such as designer goods and tourism - even harder.
For these reasons, it is prudent to concentrate on the use of other currencies too.
A positive outcome
We are witnessing the birth pangs of a new, more equal world economic order with the particularly notable rise of Asia (but not just Asia) and with Russia as its most likely midwife.
Despite short-term difficulties ahead, there are good reasons for optimism since greater economic equality leads to a greater rule of law, dialogue, respect and cooperation among nations.
To borrow a classic liberal axiom: greater economic equality leads to greater democracy and the rule of law. This holds as much among more equal nations as it does for individuals 'competing freely' in a market.
By extension, we can also add that greater economic equality among nations would lead to greater international dialogue, respect and cooperation in the conduct of international relations.
This should also more successfully reduce the support base for extremism and fundamentalism in the West and the East.
Massoud Hedeshi is an international development consultant.
DTP davası, Türk ve Tuğluk
Hakki Devrim
19/09/2008
– Vahametini kabul ettiğimiz, uğruna şehitler vermeyi bir süre için olsun erteleyemediğimiz, önleyemediğimiz bu felaketin çözümüne yol açabilecek, DTP dışında düşünebildiğimiz bir başka çare var mı? Çözümü, bütün bir bölgede ekonomik ve sosyal ihtiyaçların bihakkın karşılanır hale gelmesine kadar ertelememiz mümkün mü?
Haftanın birçok günü gazetelerimizin birinci sayfaları şehit cenazelerine dair haber ve fotoğraflarla dolup taşsın ve DTP’yi kapatma davasından sıra savunmaya gelmişken, biz neredeyse hiç oralı olmayalım. İz’ana sığar hal midir bu?
O gün duruşmaya DTP Genel Başkanı Ahmet Türk ile Batman Milletvekili ve Hukuk Komisyonu Başkanı Bengi Yıldız girdiler. Nasıl savundular partilerini demeden önce, neyle suçlandıkları konusunda anlaşalım.
– PKK terörünü lanetlemedikleri ve Abdullah Öcalan’ı toptan red ve inkâr etmedikleri için, değil mi?
DTP adına konuşanlar duruşmada bu suale açıkça cevap verdiler. (Haberdar olduğunuzdan emin değilim, biraz anlatayım.)
– DTP’nin PKK ile herhangi bir örgütsel bağlantısı ve ilişkisi yoktur, dediler. PKK’nın, Kürtleri inkâr ve özümseme siyasetine bir tepki olarak meydana geldiğini, 12 Eylül’ün yol açtığı baskı, yasak ve işkence ortamında geliştiğini, bu yüzden geniş bir taban bulduğunu söylediler. Ve dediler ki: Kürt meselesinden kaynaklanan Devlet-PKK çatışması, bir asayiş, güvenlik ve terör olgusuna indirgenemeyecek kadar çok yönlü ve kapsamlı bir hadisedir.
Devam ettiler:
– Öcalan’ı ve PKK’yı terörist ilan edin baskısı, partimizin ilkesel politikalarına aykırı düşmektedir. Bu söylemi benimsersek, militarist yöntemleri savunmak dışında hiçbir politika üretemez hale geliriz.
Bu dediklerine, Öcalan’ın İmralı yargılamaları boyunca Kürt meselesinin siyasî, barışçıl ve demokratik çözümünü savunduğunu ilave etmeye de özen gösterdiler. Bu yaklaşımı partimizin tartışmaya değer bulması normal karşılanmalıdır, diye noktaladılar savunmalarını.
*
Partide bir ikinci ve farklı eğilim de var. Daha bir süre de olacaktır. Ben Ahmet Türk gibi, Aysel Tuğluk gibi sözcülerin dediğini ve bu şartlarda düşünüp de şimdilik söylemeyi faydalı bulmadıklarını birbirinden ayırmakta güçlük çekmiyorum.
Kamuoyumuzun bu savunmayı bütünüyle ve anlayışla karşılaması beklenemez. Onu etkileyebilen güçlerin, bu yönde gayret sarfettiğini de söyleyemeyiz zaten. Ben Anayasa Mahkemesi hâkimlerimizin bu savunmayı gerçekçi bir adalet anlayışıyla değerlendireceklerini ümit ediyorum.
Ahmet Türk-Aysel Tuğluk çizgisini güçlendirmek, bizi Kürt meselesinin çözümüne götürecek en gerçekçi yoldur, diye düşünüyorum. Böyle!
Thursday, September 18, 2008
Avrupa Birliği Nabucco'dan sonrasını düşünmeli
ABD'nin Avrupa Birliği nezdindeki temsilcisi C. Boyden Gray, AB'nin Türkiye'den geçen Nabucco doğalgaz boru hattı ve Hazar doğalgazının Avrupa'ya nasıl getirileceği konusunda açık fikirli olması gerektiğini söyledi. Avrupa Birliği (AB) Rusya'ya olan doğalgaz bağımlılığını azaltacak olan Nabucco hattını destekliyor. Hattın inşasının ne kadar öncelikli olduğu geçen ay Rusya'nın Gürcistan'ı işgali ardından daha da belli oldu. Nabucco hattıyla senede 30 milyar metreküp Hazar ve Ortadoğu doğalgazı Türkiye, Bulgaristan, Romanya ve Macaristan üzerinden Avusturya'ya taşınacak. Gray, Türkiye ve Hazar Denizi çevresindeki ülkelere yaptığı ziyaretlerin ardından yaptığı açıklamada Türkiye'nin Hazar doğalgazına erişimin vazgeçilmez bir parçası olduğunu söylerken, Avrupa'ya Türkiye üzerinden geçecek hatların daha hızlı geliştirilebileceğini söyledi. NABUCCO'NUN ALTERNATİFİ YUNATİSTAN TÜRKİYE HATTI Reuters ile yaptığı söyleşide Gray, "Nabucco'yu bir proje değil de bir mecaz olarak düşünün" dedi ve ekledi "Hattı inşa edecek olanlara politikalarımızda söz hakkı verebilirsek boru hatlarının geçmesi gereken en uygun noktaları bize söyleyeceklerdir ... bırakın hattın nereden geçmesi gerektiğine ve kapasitesine onlar karar versinler." Nabucco'nun alternatifleri arasında doğalgazı sıvı şekilde tanker ile taşımak veya Yunanistan-Türkiye arasındaki boru hattını genişletmek bulunuyor. Gray ayrıca "Eğer Türkiye'deki boru hatları geliştirilebilir ve batıdaki hatlarla daha bağlantılı hale getirilirse Türkiye'deki mevcut altyapı da kullanılabilir ... bu işi gerçekleştirmek için tek bir yol yok" dedi. Doğalgazın Azerbaycan ve Türkmenistan'dan Avrupa'ya getirilmesi için yeni projeler de son haftalarda tartışılmaya başlandı. Bu projelerden biri de Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki hatla da birleşecek Yeni Avrupa Sevkıyat Sistemi (New Europe Transmission System - NETS) projesi. IRAK'TAKİ GELİŞMELER YAKINDAN TAKİP EDİLİYOR Gray, "Kısa vadede önemli olan Azerbaycan ve Türkmenistan konusunda gelişmelerin sağlanabilmesi ve geçiş koşullarının Türkiye için uygun olması" dedi. Analistler, Türkiye'nin daha yüksek geçiş ücretleri ve hattan geçen doğalgazın ticaretini yapma hakkını almak için anlaşma sürecini ağırdan aldığını söylemişlerdi. Ancak Türkiye tarafından Temmuz'da yapılan bir açıklamada birkaç ay içinde bir sonuca ulaşılabileceği belirtilmişti. Irak doğalgazının piyasalara ulaşması sonrasında Türkiye'yi güvenli geçiş yapılabilecek ülkelerden biri olarak güvenceye alması AB'ye yardımcı olacak. Irak, Akkas sahasının iki üç sene içinde faaliyete geçmesiyle AB'ye 5 milyar metreküp doğalgaz verebileceğini söylemiş, miktarın daha sonra artırılabileceğini belirtmişti. Gray, "Herkes Irak'taki gelişmeleri yakından takip ediyor ... Türkler Irak'taki çatışmaların azalmasıyla Irak'a çok daha iyimser bir gözle bakmaya başladılar. Bunu çok yakından takip etmeliyiz" dedi. |
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