Kurdistan: the other Iraq

By Anna Fifield

Published: November 11 2008 20:08 | Last updated: November 11 2008 20:08

In one of the oldest tea houses in Irbil, a cavernous room of hissing kettles that spills into the spice and shampoo shops of the souq, Ali and his friend Mohammad personify the Kurdish dilemma. Ali, a Kurd with a plush moustache dressed in the region’s traditional baggy open suit, sits on a bench drinking tea with Mohammad, an Arab electrical goods merchant who has driven from Baghdad in search of cheaper supplies.

Audio slideshow: The Kurdish share their stories and concerns with the FT’s Anna Fifield

“Kirkuk is Kurdish – the population is Kurdish, so Kirkuk is Kurdish,” says Ali, referring to the oil-rich city that lies just outside the northern Iraqi province but was historically part of Kurdistan. Asked his opinion, Mohammad looks around warily as the half-dozen tea-drinking Kurds stop their conservations to listen in and simply says: “I think our leaders know better than I do.”

This diplomatic answer belies the potential of Kirkuk to become the next big flashpoint in Iraq. For while sectarian violence has dropped sharply this year, stemming the slide into civil war and relieving pressure on the US military, the dispute over Kirkuk underlines the fragility of the country and the challenge that Barack Obama, the president-elect, will face in Iraq.

Whether Mr Obama will be able to fulfil his campaign promise of bringing US troops home within 16 months of taking office will partly depend on what happens in the oil-rich city – and therefore on the ability of the US to mediate a lasting compromise over Kirkuk’s status.

But tensions are rising over whether the city belongs in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region or in Iraq proper. “For many Kurds, it has become a rallying point for an autonomous Kurdistan and for the rights of Kurdish people inside Iraq. And for many Arabs, it has become a rallying cry for the unity of the country,” says a senior US official in Baghdad. “The challenge is to get both sides to calm down and have a rational discussion.”

This will become a pressing foreign policy concern for the next US administration not just because the Kirkuk dispute has the potential to pit Arab against Kurd and provoke intervention from neighbouring states. It could also harm Washington’s relations with its closest allies in Iraq – the Kurdish authorities.

Kirkuk, together with other nearby oil towns, was “Arabised” by Saddam Hussein, who forced Kurds to leave and moved in Arabs from Iraq’s south in an effort to change the demographics. Now Kurdistan, whose people were killed by the thousands under Saddam, wants the cities back. “For us it’s not about the oil – the oil revenue will go back to the Iraqi people – it’s symbolic, it’s about the injustices that have been done to us,” says Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to Masoud Barzani, the Kurdish president. “When we think about the situation of Kirkuk, we all feel Kirkuki.”

Kurdistan, a fertile, rocky region where Iraq meets Iran and Turkey, already has several big oil deposits but several more lie just outside its current borders. The Kirkuk field is thought to have a production capacity of about 1m barrels a day. Under the constitution’s revenue-sharing formula, Kurdistan receives 17 per cent of all Iraqi oil revenue, but many Kurds think their economy deserves more. Some Arab politicians, meanwhile, are calling for the Kurds’ share to be reduced to 12 per cent.

The Kurdistan regional government is pushing for a vote to allow Kirkuk residents to decide whether they become part of the northern region. But the disputed territory has become so sensitive that Kirkuk will be excluded from nationwide provincial polls due to be held before January 31 as an Iraqi parliamentary commission examines the demographic changes that have taken place there. It is due to report back by March.

Rochdi Younsi, Middle East analyst at the Eurasia Group think-tank, says the electoral delay benefits the Kurds, who will retain control over the disputed areas during the deadlock. “Unless there is a concrete international effort to address the Kirkuk question, the risk of instability in the northern part of Iraq will heighten and the dispute among various sectarian groups claiming historical ownership of the city will erupt again,” Mr Younsi wrote recently.

The disputes have stoked ethnic tensions in northern Iraq. Kurdish troops, known as peshmerga, have reportedly moved beyond the boundaries of the Kurdistan region and into ethnically mixed areas, erecting Kurdish flags at checkpoints in acts that worry Arab residents of these areas.

Some diplomats in Irbil question suggestions of any land grab, saying peshmerga have been patrolling outside the region’s boundaries for some time. Mr Hussein, the president’s aide, says that Kurds simply serve in the national security forces. He characterises the common view as: “When a Kurd is in the police, he is a peshmerga, but when an Arab is there, he is an Iraqi soldier.”

The United Nations has suggested giving 32 per cent of the Kirkuk council to Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, leaving 4 per cent for Christians. Kurdish factions would also get the first pick for governor, deputy governor, and head of the provincial council.

But Kurds oppose any power-sharing arrangement that would not reflect what they believe is their majority. Kurdish officials are acutely aware of the issue’s potential to explode. “We have made a lot of concessions for the sake of greater Iraq but now, instead of supporting us, some people are trying to blame the Kurds for the problem remaining unsolved,” says Falah Mustafa, head of the department of foreign relations.

Kurdish leaders have long held up their region as a role model for the rest of Iraq. It has functioning democratic institutions, the government is relatively secular and its economy is ticking over. Irbil became a partner in the US-backed central government in Baghdad following the 2003 invasion of Iraq – the national president, Jalal Talabani, is Kurdish – and the US wanted to champion Kurdistan as an example of how democracy could be made to work in the Middle East.

But, five years after the invasion, Kurds are feeling short-changed by the Bush administration, which they say has not sufficiently rewarded them for their support. “They have done nothing for us,” says one senior Kurdish official, calling for Washington to encourage American companies to invest. “We are the success story of the US in Iraq. All of Iraq could be like us.”

Washington cites a lack of democratic development and endemic corruption as threats for the future of Kurdistan. “A lot of people in Baghdad are looking at Kurdistan not as a model for the future but for the mistakes they have to avoid,” says one senior American official in Baghdad. The Kurds, he adds, are “without a doubt . . . in the best position in their history. The big question among Kurds right now is, what next for us?”

The way that Irbil exercised its authority in Kirkuk has not been encouraging. Analysts say that the Kurdish government was given an opportunity to prove its ability to govern when the US in effect handed them control of the city in 2003. But the Kurdish authorities sidelined the Arab and Turkmen minorities rather than bringing them into the fold.

The extent of corruption has undermined confidence in the Kurdish parties ruling the north. Ordinary Kurds privately complain that, to succeed, they must belong to one of the “two circles” – that revolving around the Talabani family and their Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or that associated with the Barzanis and the Kurdistan Democratic party.

The two families largely control business and politics in the region, offering preferential treatment for their relatives and allies. “Some people are living the high life but other people are so desperate,” Ali says in the tea shop. “Kurds don’t like it but what can we do about it?”

So sensitive has the issue become, even foreigners know where the red lines are. One British businessman working in Irbil becomes visibly angry when asked about corruption. “Why do you ask such questions?” he asks, his voice rising several decibels. “These kinds of questions can create a lot of problems for us.”

The government says it will introduce laws and educational programmes to tackle the problem. But Karam Rahim, editor of Hawlati, the region’s biggest independent paper, suggests the US could have an influence when provincial and regional parliamentary elections are due to be held.

“We thought that the Americans would make our government more democratic and more transparent,” says Mr Rahim. “The US must choose between two options – they can support Talabani and Barzani, or they can support the Kurdish people.”




TEHRAN STRENGTHENS ECONOMIC TIES

By backing Shia groups, Iran has long exerted influence over Iraqi politics. But the parties of Iraqi Kurdistan have also been allies of Tehran, whose reach is growing. “There is a lot of concern about Iran and Iran’s interests in Kurdistan,” says one US official.

Of the $7bn (£4.5bn, €5.6bn) in goods that Iran sent to Iraq last year, about $1.2bn-worth was destined for Kurdistan, according to Iran’s Fars News Agency. The figure is projected to rise to $3bn this year. Two of the three transit routes between Iran and Iraq are in Iraqi Kurdistan. Flights between Irbil and Urumia, capital of the Iranian province of Western Azerbaijan, are set to begin soon.

The US accuses Tehran of sending arms into Iraq, which Iran denies. Kurdish officials say they welcome the right involvement. “If they can help the people of Iraq, then that’s one issue,” says Falah Mustafa, head of the department for foreign relations. “But if they meddle in Iraqi affairs, we don’t believe that is in keeping with our policies of non-interference.”







A LONG SEARCH FOR STATEHOOD

● An estimated 15m to 20m Kurds, a largely Sunni Muslim people, live in the area straddling Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey and Armenia.


● Iraqi Kurdistan – slightly larger than the Netherlands and with a population of 4m – enjoys relative economic stability, helped by investment in construction and oil.


● Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds in retaliation for their support of Iran during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.

● After the 1991 Gulf war, Iraqi Kurds gained significant autonomy; this was later formalised under Iraq’s 2005 constitution.


● Rivalry between the Kurdish Democratic party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led to civil war in the mid-1990s. In 1998 the two sides came to a power-sharing agreement.



● Kurdistan is a cause of friction between Iraq and Turkey, which has carried out military raids on northern Iraq against the separatist Kurdish Workers’ party (PKK).

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008