By Delphine Strauss
In one of Istanbul’s artier quarters, a second-hand bookshop sells leaves torn from an old school atlas that depict the dominions of the Ottoman empire, all neatly labelled in a flowing script few Turks are now able to read.
The faded pages are a reminder of the heritage long rejected by the modern Turkish state as it sought to forge a new national identity and survive on the frontline of 20th-century geopolitics. Just as the social reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the secular republic, presented European culture as the standard of civilised behaviour, so foreign policy became firmly west-facing as Turkey sought shelter from the Soviet power on its border.
Now, however, the ruling Justice & Development (AK) party is re-engaging with territories once ruled by the sultans, from the Balkans to Baghdad, in a drive to return Turkey to a place among the leadership of the Muslim world and the top ranks of international diplomacy.
Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister and architect of the policy, rejects the expansionist tag of “neo-Ottoman” bandied about by AK critics, preferring his well-used slogan, “zero problems with neighbours”. The US and the European Union praise this unobjectionable aim: to act as a force for stability in an unstable region.
Turkey has long mattered – as Nato ally, friend of Israel, EU applicant and energy route to the west. But its growing economic strength and diplomatic reach give it influence over some of the toughest issues facing Washington and other capitals: from frozen conflicts in the Caucasus to Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the threat of disintegration in Iraq. “We are neither surprised by nor disturbed by an activist Turkish agenda in the Middle East,” Philip Gordon, assistant secretary at the US state department, said in Ankara this month.
Yet the speed and scope of Turkey’s diplomatic endeavours have left both Turkish and western observers wondering whether it can juggle all its new interests. In a month of frenetic activity, Mr Davutoglu has staged a show of friendship with Syria, ending visa restrictions on a border once patrolled by Turkish tanks; paid a high-profile visit to Iraq’s Kurdistan region, long shunned as a threat to Turkish unity; and signed a landmark deal to mend relations with Armenia. “Today we, children of the Ottomans, are here to show interest in the development of Mosul just as our ancestors showed centuries ago,” Zafer Caglayan, trade minister, said as he opened a consulate in the northern Iraqi city last month. Turkish diplomats claim credit, in the last year alone, for mediating between Israel and Syria, hosting talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and liaising with Sunni militants in Iraq.
But Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a prime minister who scorns diplomatic niceties, has shown the potential for new friendships to damage old ones.
“Why is it that...a more prominent Turkey has, it seems, to come at the expense of its relations with Israel?” Robert Wexler, the US congressman, asked recently. US newspaper columnists went further, arguing that Ankara was undermining efforts to put pressure on Iran, or even that illiberal Islamists could no longer be trusted in Nato.
The virulence of the reactions reflects the value attached to Turkish support. Although no longer a bulwark against Soviet power, the threat of radical Islam has given Turkey new weight as a partner to channel western values to the Muslim world – and, by its western alliances, show that a “clash of civilisations” is not an inevitable result of religious difference.
Mr Davutoglu is touring European capitals this month, employing Ottoman-tinged rhetoric to persuade people that Turkey’s European vocation is unchanged. “You cannot understand the history of at least 15 European capitals without exploring the Ottoman archives,” he told an audience in Spain this week.
For Ankara, there is no question of changing orientation. “We have one face to the west and one to the east,” Mr Erdogan said last month as he signed trade deals in Tehran. Yet it is natural for Turkey to keep its options open, given the manifest reluctance in some EU states to admit it to membership. Ankara presents its new friendships as an asset to the EU, giving it a partner to promote western aims in the region. The European Commission’s latest report on Turkey’s accession process endorsed that view, with praise for its foreign policy. But Brussels also makes clear that geostrategic importance cannot replace the domestic judicial, political and human rights reforms required to meet the criteria for membership.
Ankara’s focus, however, is on grander projects than box-ticking compliance with European legislation. A lack of enthusiasm for Herman van Rompuy’s appointment last week as president of the European Council reflects not just worries over his past opposition to Turkey’s candidacy but a preference for a heavyweight leader who would want Europe to play a bigger part on the world stage.
Ibrahim Kalin, Mr Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser, argues that Turkish activism is not a reaction to disappointments in the EU but simply “a fully rational attempt to seize new spaces of opportunity” – including the EU’s virtual absence from geopolitics.
Frictions with the EU may worsen, however, if Turkey engages in rivalry with countries used to seeing it as a junior partner. Western diplomats have noted Mr Davutoglu’s reluctance to support a French attempt at conciliation between Israel and Syria, for example, and say Mr Erdogan’s grandstanding in Iran “is definitely causing irritation”. Turkey thus needs to ascertain how much influence it has, what it is based on, and where new policies may upset old alliances.
Greater regional engagement is in part a response to changing balances of power. The coming American withdrawal from Iraq threatens a vacuum in which Turkey is one of the most plausible counterweights to Iranian influence – its credibility enhanced by its refusal to let the US use its territory to invade in 2003.
Ian Lesser from the Washington-based German Marshall Fund notes that ideas of a “Middle East for Middle Easterners” have been circulating for some time. “The crucial difference is that Turkey is now a much more significant actor in both economic and political terms, and Turkey’s Middle Eastern choices are, rightly or wrongly, seen as linked to the country’s own identity crisis.”
Foreign policy is certainly shaped by a growing affinity with the Islamic world, in a country where religious practice is becoming more visible and public opinion a greater force. Mr Erdogan’s comments on Gaza, or on Iran’s nuclear programme, appear both to recognise and reinforce views on the street: a survey by the GMF found that almost one-third of Turks – compared with only 5 per cent of Americans – would accept a nuclear-armed Iran if diplomacy failed.
Chief AK weapon in its drive eastwards, though, is not religion but trade. Exports to what the country’s official Turkstat agency classifies as the Near and Middle East account for almost 20 per cent of the total so far in 2009, up from 12.5 per cent in 2004. Turkish conglomerates are also stepping up investment in a region where their presence is considered benign.
“We don’t want a cultural bias against us,” says Sureyya Ciliv, chief executive of Turkcell, the mobile operator, which has interests in central Asia, Georgia and Moldova. Anadolu Efes, with almost 10 per cent of Russia’s beer market, wants to start producing non-alcoholic beer in Iran. Limak, a group centred on construction, is seeking projects in the Gulf, north Africa and Europe “east of Vienna”. “It’s a natural development,” says Ferruh Tunc, senior partner in Istanbul for KPMG, the consultancy. “Turkey’s position until the Soviet Union collapsed was unusual – it was like the last stop on a Tube line.”
Yet a previous initiative, reaching out to the Turkic-speaking world after the central Asian states won independence, left Turkey with excellent trade links but limited influence compared with China and Russia. Morton Abramowitz, a former US ambassador to Turkey, warns in this month’s Foreign Affairs journal that in the AKP’s latest diplomatic push as well, “despite the acclaim it showers on itself...symbolic achievements have far exceeded concrete ones”. More-over, Turkey’s opposition this spring to Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s appointment as Nato chief “alienated many Europeans by seeming to favour Muslim sensibilities over liberal democratic values”. Ankara had argued that Denmark’s role in the 2006 controversy over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed had tainted him in the eyes of the Muslim world.
Can Ankara not reach out peacefully on all fronts, as it claims, without repercussions and a risk of overstretch? “You need very judicious fine tuning to be able to deliver this...The danger is of overplaying their hand,” says a western diplomat.
Mending fences with Armenia won praise in the west, for instance, but in Azerbaijan nationalists tore down the Turkish flag, viewing the move as a betrayal of old alliances. Baku may yet take revenge by demanding higher prices to supply gas.
The next test of Turkey’s new foreign policy will be Iran. The AKP claims its opposition to a nuclear-armed Iran is more effective because it delivers the message as a friend and trading partner. Turkey’s interests in trade with Iran are understood but Mr Erdogan may be pressed in Washington and Brussels to explain why he defends Iran’s nuclear programme as “peaceful and humanitarian” and lends the regime credibility rather than backing isolation.
Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform, a London think-tank, says: “As a long-standing Nato member and a country negotiating for EU membership, Turkey is expected to align itself with the US and Europe...As a regional power, Turkey will want to act independently and avoid antagonising its neighbours. It is not clear how long Ankara will be able to avoid tough choices.”
EU membership: ‘There is progress but it’s uneven’
Turkey’s shift in foreign policy reflects its ambition to assume greater responsibility as a regional power, writes Joshua Chaffin. It may also reveal frustration over another ambition that has been delayed, if not thwarted: Istanbul’s bid to join the European Union. Officially, the EU has been committed to full membership since 2005. Yet eight of the 34 negotiating “chapters” remain blocked as a result of Turkey’s long-running conflict with Cyprus. Meanwhile enthusiasm is faint in France and Germany, the bloc’s traditional centres of power. “There is progress but it’s very uneven,” one Commission official says.
The most recent update on negotiations came with the Commission’s mixed review of Turkey in last month’s annual enlargement report. Praise forits overtures to its Kurdish minority, and its agreement to reopen its border with Armenia, was tempered by concern over a fine imposed on one of Turkey’s leading media companies. Ostensibly for tax evasion, the $4bn (€2.7bn, £2.4bn) levy was likened by Olli Rehn, EU enlargement commissioner, to “a political sanction”. Some European diplomats expressed surprise, too, at recent comments suggesting Iran – under pressure over its nuclear programme – was being treated unfairly by the international community. Diplomats also say they do not expect breakthroughs from this week’s EU-Turkey ministerial meeting to discuss foreign affairs.
If it is accepted, Turkey will become the first predominantly Muslim EU member and also the most populous, giving it a sizeable number of seats in the parliament and threatening the power of Paris and Berlin. Nicolas Sarkozy, French president, displayed his opposition at an EU-US summit in Prague in May. After Barack Obama, on the eve of his first visit to Turkey, urged his hosts to “anchor” the country more firmly in Europe, Mr Sarkozy promptly suggested the US president mind his own business. Angela Merkel, German chancellor, has been more diplomatic,suggesting Istanbul be addressed instead as a “privileged partner”.
The creation of a full-time EU presidency and foreign policy chief seems unlikely to accelerate accession. In a 2004 speech, Herman Van Rompuy, the Belgian prime minister chosen as president, said Turkey “is not a part of Europe and will never be”. Those remarks proved awkward in the run-up to his selection last week but – as Istanbul no doubt noticed – they did not cost him the job.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Can Cyprus overcome its bloody history?
Chris Summers
More British soldiers were killed during the "Cyprus emergency" in the 1950s than have died in Iraq or Afghanistan. So why has it been forgotten and what hope is there of reuniting the island?
On Remembrance Sunday, about 500 relatives and veterans watched as a new memorial was unveiled in Kyrenia, in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, to recognise the 371 British servicemen who lost their lives on the island between 1956 and 1959.
The unveiling, and the laying of a wreath by the British High Commissioner, Peter Millett, sparked a diplomatic row, with President Demetris Christofias raising the matter when he met UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown a few days later.
One of the names on the memorial is Corporal Mervyn Whurr, 22, killed by a bomb on Kyrenia's Six Mile Beach in September 1956.
His sister, Barbara Hocking, from Millbrook in Cornwall, said: "My mum had a telegram saying he'd been injured, then she got another one saying he had an arm and a leg amputated. A few days later another telegram came saying he'd died."
Unlike those of troops killed in Afghanistan, his body, like those of most of the Cyprus casualties, was not flown home and lies in a cemetery at Wayne's Keep on the island.
Mrs Hocking was at the unveiling of the memorial, where she was joined by Margaret Moncur, whose brother 19-year-old Matt Neely, from Glasgow, was killed in 1956 by a bomb while doing his National Service.
Mrs Moncur said: "He loved his football, he was full of fun, playing jokes and was very popular with his mates.
"For some reason Cyprus has become a forgotten war."
The Cyprus High Commissioner to London, Alexandros Zenon, said the failure to consult the Cyprus government about the memorial was perceived as an "insult".
He said: "In principle we are not against a country honouring its soldiers who fell in service.
"The problem is that the memorial was built and unveiled in the occupied part of Cyprus. It could have been erected in the British sovereign base area.
"We also feel it's politically premature. I understand they want to honour them, but for Greek Cypriots the anti-colonial struggle is still a very sensitive issue."
In the late 1950s the British Empire was trying to cling on to the island, which remained a strategic location, especially around the time of the Suez crisis.
Greek Cypriot fighters belonging to an organisation called Eoka planted bombs and attacked British servicemen on and off duty.
Several civilians were also killed, including Catherine Cutliffe and her daughter Margaret who were shot while buying a wedding dress in Famagusta, although Eoka denied responsibility for that attack.
Eventually in 1960 Cyprus was granted independence, but tensions between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority grew during the next decade.
In July 1974 a Greek nationalist group, Eoka-B, led by Nikos Sampson, carried out a coup backed by the military junta in power in Athens.
Sampson promised to unite Cyprus with Greece in so-called "enosis".
Turkey sent its army to the northern part of the island, ostensibly to protect Turkish Cypriots.
The idea of enosis evaporated and the moderate Archbishop Makarios returned to power.
But the Turkish Army has remained ever since and the island is still separated, with a UN buffer zone running right through the heart of Nicosia, the world's last remaining divided city.
In 2004 the United Nations came up with the Annan Plan - named after the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan - which suggested a bi-zonal federated state.
But, although it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in a referendum, another poll in the south rejected it.
Cyprus was then admitted into the EU, which many Turkish Cypriots opposed believing it removed an incentive for the Greek Cypriot side to reach a solution.
But fresh momentum was injected with the election of Mr Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, president of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Both are leftists elected on a platform of reconciliation.
Negotiations are ongoing, but one of the major stumbling blocks is the question of how to deal with Greek Cypriots who claim land and property in the north.
Some of this has been sold to some of the 6,000 British expats in northern Cyprus.
In what could prove to be a test case, a court in Cyprus ruled against a couple, David and Linda Orams, who bought land originally belonging to a Greek Cypriot, Meletis Apostolides.
There are fears that if no deal is reached before elections in the TRNC in April what Mr Brown referred to as a "unique opportunity" could be lost.
Mr Zenon said: "The likely opponent of Mr Talat is a hardliner and if he is elected, things will not be made easier. But we will not create artificial deadlines which, as with the Annan Plan, have proved disastrous."
Mr Talat himself, in an interview with the BBC, admitted: "If somebody who is not in favour of a bi-zonal solution is elected then the negotiations will not continue easily."
He said of the negotiations: "The positions of the two sides are not very close, but we are making progress."
Mr Brown recently renewed an offer to hand back just under half of the UK's sovereign base areas on the island - around Akrotiri and Dhekelia - if a deal could be reached between the two sides.
Andrew Dismore, Labour MP for Hendon in north London, feels the timing of the Kyrenia memorial was unfortunate.
He represents more than 3,000 Greek Cypriot constituents and recently led a debate in Parliament about the island.
Mr Dismore said: "Of course, there should be a memorial, but this is neither the time or place, at such a sensitive time in the talks.
"It just serves to remind Greek Cypriots of the UK's less than glorious role as the colonial power, when we are trying to be positive in our support for the talks."
But Mr Talat said the memorial was a "humanitarian" issue and should not have become "politicised".
Mrs Hocking said it was sad the memorial had led to a row and she said of her brother's death: "Was it worth it? The two governments are still not talking. Was it worth all those lives being wasted? It's just like Afghanistan."
More British soldiers were killed during the "Cyprus emergency" in the 1950s than have died in Iraq or Afghanistan. So why has it been forgotten and what hope is there of reuniting the island?
On Remembrance Sunday, about 500 relatives and veterans watched as a new memorial was unveiled in Kyrenia, in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, to recognise the 371 British servicemen who lost their lives on the island between 1956 and 1959.
The unveiling, and the laying of a wreath by the British High Commissioner, Peter Millett, sparked a diplomatic row, with President Demetris Christofias raising the matter when he met UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown a few days later.
One of the names on the memorial is Corporal Mervyn Whurr, 22, killed by a bomb on Kyrenia's Six Mile Beach in September 1956.
His sister, Barbara Hocking, from Millbrook in Cornwall, said: "My mum had a telegram saying he'd been injured, then she got another one saying he had an arm and a leg amputated. A few days later another telegram came saying he'd died."
Unlike those of troops killed in Afghanistan, his body, like those of most of the Cyprus casualties, was not flown home and lies in a cemetery at Wayne's Keep on the island.
Mrs Hocking was at the unveiling of the memorial, where she was joined by Margaret Moncur, whose brother 19-year-old Matt Neely, from Glasgow, was killed in 1956 by a bomb while doing his National Service.
Mrs Moncur said: "He loved his football, he was full of fun, playing jokes and was very popular with his mates.
"For some reason Cyprus has become a forgotten war."
The Cyprus High Commissioner to London, Alexandros Zenon, said the failure to consult the Cyprus government about the memorial was perceived as an "insult".
He said: "In principle we are not against a country honouring its soldiers who fell in service.
"The problem is that the memorial was built and unveiled in the occupied part of Cyprus. It could have been erected in the British sovereign base area.
"We also feel it's politically premature. I understand they want to honour them, but for Greek Cypriots the anti-colonial struggle is still a very sensitive issue."
In the late 1950s the British Empire was trying to cling on to the island, which remained a strategic location, especially around the time of the Suez crisis.
Greek Cypriot fighters belonging to an organisation called Eoka planted bombs and attacked British servicemen on and off duty.
Several civilians were also killed, including Catherine Cutliffe and her daughter Margaret who were shot while buying a wedding dress in Famagusta, although Eoka denied responsibility for that attack.
Eventually in 1960 Cyprus was granted independence, but tensions between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority grew during the next decade.
In July 1974 a Greek nationalist group, Eoka-B, led by Nikos Sampson, carried out a coup backed by the military junta in power in Athens.
Sampson promised to unite Cyprus with Greece in so-called "enosis".
Turkey sent its army to the northern part of the island, ostensibly to protect Turkish Cypriots.
The idea of enosis evaporated and the moderate Archbishop Makarios returned to power.
But the Turkish Army has remained ever since and the island is still separated, with a UN buffer zone running right through the heart of Nicosia, the world's last remaining divided city.
In 2004 the United Nations came up with the Annan Plan - named after the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan - which suggested a bi-zonal federated state.
But, although it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in a referendum, another poll in the south rejected it.
Cyprus was then admitted into the EU, which many Turkish Cypriots opposed believing it removed an incentive for the Greek Cypriot side to reach a solution.
But fresh momentum was injected with the election of Mr Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, president of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Both are leftists elected on a platform of reconciliation.
Negotiations are ongoing, but one of the major stumbling blocks is the question of how to deal with Greek Cypriots who claim land and property in the north.
Some of this has been sold to some of the 6,000 British expats in northern Cyprus.
In what could prove to be a test case, a court in Cyprus ruled against a couple, David and Linda Orams, who bought land originally belonging to a Greek Cypriot, Meletis Apostolides.
There are fears that if no deal is reached before elections in the TRNC in April what Mr Brown referred to as a "unique opportunity" could be lost.
Mr Zenon said: "The likely opponent of Mr Talat is a hardliner and if he is elected, things will not be made easier. But we will not create artificial deadlines which, as with the Annan Plan, have proved disastrous."
Mr Talat himself, in an interview with the BBC, admitted: "If somebody who is not in favour of a bi-zonal solution is elected then the negotiations will not continue easily."
He said of the negotiations: "The positions of the two sides are not very close, but we are making progress."
Mr Brown recently renewed an offer to hand back just under half of the UK's sovereign base areas on the island - around Akrotiri and Dhekelia - if a deal could be reached between the two sides.
Andrew Dismore, Labour MP for Hendon in north London, feels the timing of the Kyrenia memorial was unfortunate.
He represents more than 3,000 Greek Cypriot constituents and recently led a debate in Parliament about the island.
Mr Dismore said: "Of course, there should be a memorial, but this is neither the time or place, at such a sensitive time in the talks.
"It just serves to remind Greek Cypriots of the UK's less than glorious role as the colonial power, when we are trying to be positive in our support for the talks."
But Mr Talat said the memorial was a "humanitarian" issue and should not have become "politicised".
Mrs Hocking said it was sad the memorial had led to a row and she said of her brother's death: "Was it worth it? The two governments are still not talking. Was it worth all those lives being wasted? It's just like Afghanistan."
Heritage deal’s end a blow to Genel Enerji
By Delphine Strauss
For Genel Enerji, it has been a brutal reversal of fortune. In June, the Turkish exploration group was celebrating the start of exports from northern Iraq’s Taq Taq field, after a breakthrough in talks between Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities.
The flow of oil, promising a revenue stream to fund development of other fields, was the key to the merger with Heritage Oil, under which Genel would gain a London listing and a 50 per cent share in assets valued at up to $6bn (£3.6bn).
In six months, the twists of Iraqi politics have obliterated those prospects. With Erbil and Baghdad deadlocked on how to pay contractors, Genel has halted exports and lost its main appeal to potential partners – its fortunes reflecting the rise and fall of investors’ interest in the Kurdistan region as a whole.
“It leaves them in a fairly difficult position,” said one analyst, noting that Genel had planned to use Heritage shares to settle a $1.1bn debt to the Kurdish authorities, while most other potential partners in the region were also under financial strain.
Mehmet Sepil, Genel’s chief executive and co-founder, declined to comment on Monday, only confirming that the merger had fallen through because there was no foreseeable prospect of receiving any payment for its Kurdish exports.
But the merger talks were complicated by a Financial Services Authority investigation that Heritage had said could prevent executives from Genel or its unlisted parent Cukurova joining the management of the new company.
Genel’s ties with the Kurdish administration also came under scrutiny this summer when Norwegian authorities began a probe into its dealings in shares of DNO, another Kurdistan-focused exploration group.
It is not clear how the end of talks will affect the partnership at the Miran oilfield in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Heritage has a controlling stake and Genel owns a 25 per cent share.
Analysts say there are concerns Heritage could find the going tougher if its relations with Genel or with the regional authorities have soured.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
For Genel Enerji, it has been a brutal reversal of fortune. In June, the Turkish exploration group was celebrating the start of exports from northern Iraq’s Taq Taq field, after a breakthrough in talks between Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities.
The flow of oil, promising a revenue stream to fund development of other fields, was the key to the merger with Heritage Oil, under which Genel would gain a London listing and a 50 per cent share in assets valued at up to $6bn (£3.6bn).
In six months, the twists of Iraqi politics have obliterated those prospects. With Erbil and Baghdad deadlocked on how to pay contractors, Genel has halted exports and lost its main appeal to potential partners – its fortunes reflecting the rise and fall of investors’ interest in the Kurdistan region as a whole.
“It leaves them in a fairly difficult position,” said one analyst, noting that Genel had planned to use Heritage shares to settle a $1.1bn debt to the Kurdish authorities, while most other potential partners in the region were also under financial strain.
Mehmet Sepil, Genel’s chief executive and co-founder, declined to comment on Monday, only confirming that the merger had fallen through because there was no foreseeable prospect of receiving any payment for its Kurdish exports.
But the merger talks were complicated by a Financial Services Authority investigation that Heritage had said could prevent executives from Genel or its unlisted parent Cukurova joining the management of the new company.
Genel’s ties with the Kurdish administration also came under scrutiny this summer when Norwegian authorities began a probe into its dealings in shares of DNO, another Kurdistan-focused exploration group.
It is not clear how the end of talks will affect the partnership at the Miran oilfield in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Heritage has a controlling stake and Genel owns a 25 per cent share.
Analysts say there are concerns Heritage could find the going tougher if its relations with Genel or with the regional authorities have soured.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Kosovo PM claims poll victory
By Neil MacDonald
Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s prime minister and leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), has claimed victory in the country’s first elections as an independent state, although the election commission has delayed releasing final results.
Mr Thaci said his party had won at least 20 out of 36 contested municipalities. But the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the lesser ruling coalition partner and still a competitor to Mr Thaci, won the mayor’s race and captured the assembly for Pristina, the capital.
The elections took place peacefully, with the ethnic Serb minority visibly opting to participate in some areas despite calls from Belgrade for a boycott.
Final turnout exceeded 45 per cent, compared with only 40 per cent in the last, pre-independence parliamentary elections two years ago, Kosovo’s election commission announced after polls closed. Turnout in Serb districts, although lower, came to nearly 31 per cent in Strpce, a majority-Serb municipality in the south.
Serbs in isolated southern enclaves – feeling weakening support from the Serbian government in the economic downturn – turned up in larger numbers than in past elections, observers said. But those in the north, where Belgrade exerts stronger influence, still disregarded the contest for municipal councils and mayors in the predominantly ethnic Albanian state.
Hashim Thaci, prime minister, said he appreciated involvement by the disaffected minority group, which makes up about 5 per cent of Kosovo’s 2 million people. He also said, however, that free elections would boost the drive for recognition as a sovereign state.
“Full success [of these elections] will reflect well on the country in the continuing process of Kosovo’s international recognition”, Mr Thaci said. “This is a great step forward for the sovereign state.”
In Gracanica, an enclave outside the capital, Pristina, 28 per cent of Serbs wanted to vote, while 32 per cent refused and 40 per cent remained undecided, said Kontakt, a non-governmental organisation. Running for municipal office would not mean recognising independence, Serb candidates insisted.
Organisers decided to postpone voting in two other Serb municipalities at least until next year, partly to avoid hollow victories by ethnic Albanian candidates, international officials said. New municipal boundaries would bolster Serb autonomy as part of a western-backed plan decentralisation plan.
Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and gained prompt recognition from the US and most EU members. New Zealand last week became the 63rd UN member state to extend recognition. But Serbia, backed by Russia, has blocked any endorsement at the UN Security Council.
Fraud allegations marred the final days of campaigning, as rival ethnic Albanian parties accused Mr Thaci’s ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of manipulating the Central Elections Commission.
Pieter Feith, chief international supervisor and European Union envoy, called for careful scrutiny of ballot transport after the voting. The European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations (ENEMO) has sent more than 100 monitors to help to ensure international standards.
The election commission did not give regular updates, and election monitors said they would not disclose further turnout figures until the final count.
Prior to independence, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organised elections in the disputed territory, which the UN governed as a protectorate for nine years following the 1998-1999 war.
● Church bells in Serb enclaves rang to mark the death of Pavle, the 95-year-old patriarch of the Serb Orthodox church in Belgrade, the same morning. His potential successors are deeply divided about whether to work with EU officials to help the remote minority villages survive.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s prime minister and leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), has claimed victory in the country’s first elections as an independent state, although the election commission has delayed releasing final results.
Mr Thaci said his party had won at least 20 out of 36 contested municipalities. But the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the lesser ruling coalition partner and still a competitor to Mr Thaci, won the mayor’s race and captured the assembly for Pristina, the capital.
The elections took place peacefully, with the ethnic Serb minority visibly opting to participate in some areas despite calls from Belgrade for a boycott.
Final turnout exceeded 45 per cent, compared with only 40 per cent in the last, pre-independence parliamentary elections two years ago, Kosovo’s election commission announced after polls closed. Turnout in Serb districts, although lower, came to nearly 31 per cent in Strpce, a majority-Serb municipality in the south.
Serbs in isolated southern enclaves – feeling weakening support from the Serbian government in the economic downturn – turned up in larger numbers than in past elections, observers said. But those in the north, where Belgrade exerts stronger influence, still disregarded the contest for municipal councils and mayors in the predominantly ethnic Albanian state.
Hashim Thaci, prime minister, said he appreciated involvement by the disaffected minority group, which makes up about 5 per cent of Kosovo’s 2 million people. He also said, however, that free elections would boost the drive for recognition as a sovereign state.
“Full success [of these elections] will reflect well on the country in the continuing process of Kosovo’s international recognition”, Mr Thaci said. “This is a great step forward for the sovereign state.”
In Gracanica, an enclave outside the capital, Pristina, 28 per cent of Serbs wanted to vote, while 32 per cent refused and 40 per cent remained undecided, said Kontakt, a non-governmental organisation. Running for municipal office would not mean recognising independence, Serb candidates insisted.
Organisers decided to postpone voting in two other Serb municipalities at least until next year, partly to avoid hollow victories by ethnic Albanian candidates, international officials said. New municipal boundaries would bolster Serb autonomy as part of a western-backed plan decentralisation plan.
Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and gained prompt recognition from the US and most EU members. New Zealand last week became the 63rd UN member state to extend recognition. But Serbia, backed by Russia, has blocked any endorsement at the UN Security Council.
Fraud allegations marred the final days of campaigning, as rival ethnic Albanian parties accused Mr Thaci’s ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of manipulating the Central Elections Commission.
Pieter Feith, chief international supervisor and European Union envoy, called for careful scrutiny of ballot transport after the voting. The European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations (ENEMO) has sent more than 100 monitors to help to ensure international standards.
The election commission did not give regular updates, and election monitors said they would not disclose further turnout figures until the final count.
Prior to independence, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organised elections in the disputed territory, which the UN governed as a protectorate for nine years following the 1998-1999 war.
● Church bells in Serb enclaves rang to mark the death of Pavle, the 95-year-old patriarch of the Serb Orthodox church in Belgrade, the same morning. His potential successors are deeply divided about whether to work with EU officials to help the remote minority villages survive.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Ukraine
Europe is on tenterhooks over whether Russia will shut off gas to Ukraine and leave it shivering in January. If that happens, however, blame will fall on Kiev, not Moscow.
Recession-ravaged Ukraine’s political squabbling and populism has hit fever pitch ahead of presidential elections on January 17. That has led the International Monetary Fund to suspend co-operation and delay a $3.8bn loan payment, due on Sunday. The government had already backed off from commitments to increase long-subsidised domestic gas prices. The final straw was President Viktor Yushchenko signing into law, against IMF objections, a parliamentary bill that will raise minimum wages and pensions by 20 per cent – costing 7 per cent of economic output in 2010.
Since Ukraine is reliant on IMF funding to make ends meet, it could struggle to pay its next two monthly gas bills – leading to another winter shut-off. It only just scraped together October’s payment. Yet, for all its bluster, Russia would rather keep the taps open. The Kremlin has belatedly realised the damage to its reputation from shut-offs, and last January’s interruption to European supplies cost state-run Gazprom dearly. Hence Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s exhortation that Brussels extend a loan to Ukraine.
And why meddle in Ukraine’s electoral process this time? Moscow’s bogeyman, Mr Yushchenko, trails badly in the polls. Either frontrunner, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or Viktor Yanukovich, is more acceptable to Russia.
Ukraine still has $28bn in foreign currency reserves; the central bank will probably allow some to be used to pay for gas. A bigger question is whether it will plug the budgetary gap by printing money. If so, inflation will result; if not, wage arrears beckon. Either option may put pressure on Ukraine’s currency and asset prices. Europe’s gas consumers must hope they do not become collateral damage.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
Recession-ravaged Ukraine’s political squabbling and populism has hit fever pitch ahead of presidential elections on January 17. That has led the International Monetary Fund to suspend co-operation and delay a $3.8bn loan payment, due on Sunday. The government had already backed off from commitments to increase long-subsidised domestic gas prices. The final straw was President Viktor Yushchenko signing into law, against IMF objections, a parliamentary bill that will raise minimum wages and pensions by 20 per cent – costing 7 per cent of economic output in 2010.
Since Ukraine is reliant on IMF funding to make ends meet, it could struggle to pay its next two monthly gas bills – leading to another winter shut-off. It only just scraped together October’s payment. Yet, for all its bluster, Russia would rather keep the taps open. The Kremlin has belatedly realised the damage to its reputation from shut-offs, and last January’s interruption to European supplies cost state-run Gazprom dearly. Hence Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s exhortation that Brussels extend a loan to Ukraine.
And why meddle in Ukraine’s electoral process this time? Moscow’s bogeyman, Mr Yushchenko, trails badly in the polls. Either frontrunner, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or Viktor Yanukovich, is more acceptable to Russia.
Ukraine still has $28bn in foreign currency reserves; the central bank will probably allow some to be used to pay for gas. A bigger question is whether it will plug the budgetary gap by printing money. If so, inflation will result; if not, wage arrears beckon. Either option may put pressure on Ukraine’s currency and asset prices. Europe’s gas consumers must hope they do not become collateral damage.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
How Europe can be heard in Washington
By Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney
As Europeans gossip and conspire over the new post-Lisbon appointments to represent the European Union’s external face, they know only too well how global power is slipping away from them. European elites agonise over the spectre of irrelevance.
No doubt it was this anxiety that impelled EU leaders to press for the EU/US summit meeting in Washington earlier this month. With the guard about to change in Brussels, this was never going to be a productive encounter. The visitors got what they deserved – 90 minutes of the president’s time, and a lunch with Vice- President Joe Biden.
At least the experience may help Europeans take on board two important truths about Barack Obama, the man whose election so delighted them a year ago. First, his foreign policy strategy is to reposition America for the post-American world. Understanding that the US’s brief moment of global dominance has come and gone, he aims to ensure America gets its way by forging tactical alliances. He will work with China on the global economy, with Russia on nuclear disarmament, and with anyone else who can help serve the US’s interest.
Second, his self-declared pragmatism means a rigorous approach to how he allocates his time and energy. He will attend to those who can be useful, not the merely sympathetic. Glad-handing Europeans with nothing to offer will be a low priority.
For Europeans these are difficult truths to absorb. But they will not again carry weight in Washington until they grasp that a post-American world requires a post-American Europe. Such a Europe must discard a set of damaging illusions that, 20 years on from the end of the cold war, still shape its approaches to the US.
The first such illusion is of continuing dependence on US protection. With the Russian military a shadow of its Soviet predecessor, this is no longer the case. But it underlies Europe’s habitual deference to the US.
The second illusion is to mistake shared values for a transatlantic identity of interests. This encourages the widespread European belief that if Americans act in uncongenial ways this is a product of their naiveté – requiring Europeans tactfully to set them back on course.
These two misperceptions lead to a third – that the need to preserve a close and harmonious transatlantic relationship must always trump any more specific European objective. But a vital and healthy transatlantic relationship requires tough negotiations to establish compromises that work for both sides – even if, as the often-combative trade and competition policy dealings across the Atlantic show, that may mean the occasional row.
Such conciliatory attitudes lead European elites to feel – their fourth illusion – that confronting the US from a joint European position would be counter-productive, if not indecent. So the EU member states opt to do their defence and security business under US direction in Nato – and prioritise their bilateral links with Washington over almost everything else. The British may pride themselves on the most celebrated “special relationship”, but most other European nations also quietly believe they have a special “in” with Washington which is the best route for promoting their national interests.
Americans find all this attention-seeking tiresome, but will naturally not pass up the opportunities to divide and rule.
Some Europeans think the answer lies in a proper EU/US strategic dialogue, and they have plenty of proposals for new forums and further summitry to force such a dialogue. But that requires the EU, collectively, to have something to say, which in turn means Europeans must steel themselves to discuss, within the EU, the big strategic issues on which Europe will need to be able to engage the US in the post-American world.
Afghanistan should be an object lesson. European leaders have been happy to ignore this intractable issue in their regular EU meetings, delegating the problem to Nato and American leadership. They now find themselves with over 30,000 troops committed to a troubled campaign, and consigned to the ante-room while they wait to learn the new American strategy, which they must then defend to their publics as their own.
Russia and the Middle East are two more items on an unappetising list of problems that Europeans must address, not in the spirit of second-guessing where the US wants to go, but to assert common European positions. Failing that, even the most charismatic and forceful new EU leaders will find even photo-opportunities in Washington, never mind serious attention, in increasingly short supply.
Jeremy Shapiro is a director of research at the Brookings Institution. Nick Witney is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
As Europeans gossip and conspire over the new post-Lisbon appointments to represent the European Union’s external face, they know only too well how global power is slipping away from them. European elites agonise over the spectre of irrelevance.
No doubt it was this anxiety that impelled EU leaders to press for the EU/US summit meeting in Washington earlier this month. With the guard about to change in Brussels, this was never going to be a productive encounter. The visitors got what they deserved – 90 minutes of the president’s time, and a lunch with Vice- President Joe Biden.
At least the experience may help Europeans take on board two important truths about Barack Obama, the man whose election so delighted them a year ago. First, his foreign policy strategy is to reposition America for the post-American world. Understanding that the US’s brief moment of global dominance has come and gone, he aims to ensure America gets its way by forging tactical alliances. He will work with China on the global economy, with Russia on nuclear disarmament, and with anyone else who can help serve the US’s interest.
Second, his self-declared pragmatism means a rigorous approach to how he allocates his time and energy. He will attend to those who can be useful, not the merely sympathetic. Glad-handing Europeans with nothing to offer will be a low priority.
For Europeans these are difficult truths to absorb. But they will not again carry weight in Washington until they grasp that a post-American world requires a post-American Europe. Such a Europe must discard a set of damaging illusions that, 20 years on from the end of the cold war, still shape its approaches to the US.
The first such illusion is of continuing dependence on US protection. With the Russian military a shadow of its Soviet predecessor, this is no longer the case. But it underlies Europe’s habitual deference to the US.
The second illusion is to mistake shared values for a transatlantic identity of interests. This encourages the widespread European belief that if Americans act in uncongenial ways this is a product of their naiveté – requiring Europeans tactfully to set them back on course.
These two misperceptions lead to a third – that the need to preserve a close and harmonious transatlantic relationship must always trump any more specific European objective. But a vital and healthy transatlantic relationship requires tough negotiations to establish compromises that work for both sides – even if, as the often-combative trade and competition policy dealings across the Atlantic show, that may mean the occasional row.
Such conciliatory attitudes lead European elites to feel – their fourth illusion – that confronting the US from a joint European position would be counter-productive, if not indecent. So the EU member states opt to do their defence and security business under US direction in Nato – and prioritise their bilateral links with Washington over almost everything else. The British may pride themselves on the most celebrated “special relationship”, but most other European nations also quietly believe they have a special “in” with Washington which is the best route for promoting their national interests.
Americans find all this attention-seeking tiresome, but will naturally not pass up the opportunities to divide and rule.
Some Europeans think the answer lies in a proper EU/US strategic dialogue, and they have plenty of proposals for new forums and further summitry to force such a dialogue. But that requires the EU, collectively, to have something to say, which in turn means Europeans must steel themselves to discuss, within the EU, the big strategic issues on which Europe will need to be able to engage the US in the post-American world.
Afghanistan should be an object lesson. European leaders have been happy to ignore this intractable issue in their regular EU meetings, delegating the problem to Nato and American leadership. They now find themselves with over 30,000 troops committed to a troubled campaign, and consigned to the ante-room while they wait to learn the new American strategy, which they must then defend to their publics as their own.
Russia and the Middle East are two more items on an unappetising list of problems that Europeans must address, not in the spirit of second-guessing where the US wants to go, but to assert common European positions. Failing that, even the most charismatic and forceful new EU leaders will find even photo-opportunities in Washington, never mind serious attention, in increasingly short supply.
Jeremy Shapiro is a director of research at the Brookings Institution. Nick Witney is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
Thursday, November 12, 2009
A new era as Turks and Kurds learn to co-operate
By David Phillips
Iraqis have stepped back from the brink by agreeing on a law that will allow elections to go forward in January. While this averts postponement of the ballot, which would have required the US to recalibrate its withdrawal from Iraq, the contentious process is a harbinger of difficulties to come. Once elections are held, Iraqis still have to establish a coalition government and overcome deep divisions on issues such as hydrocarbons, revenue-sharing and the status of Kirkuk, a city claimed by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. Given these flashpoints, Iraqi Kurds are placing as much importance on relations with Ankara as with Baghdad. Turkey is also hedging her bets in case Iraq’s elections trigger sustained violence that polarises Iraqis and destabilises the region.
It was only in February last year that Turkey massed 100,000 troops for a major cross-border operation to root out the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) from its hide-out in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. In a dramatic reversal, Ahmet Davudoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, made a historic visit to Iraqi Kurdistan just two weeks ago to sign landmark deals opening a Turkish consulate in Erbil and border-crossings for travel and trade. Both sides have made the strategic decision that their interests are better served through co-operation than confrontation.
The rapprochement is born from pragmatism and geographic necessity. Kurds know that their future lies to the west, not as a landlocked rump state in the Middle East. Their access to Europe goes through Turkey. Conversely, Iraqi Kurdistan is Turkey’s gate to Iraq and lucrative relations with the Gulf states. Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan are natural economic partners. Their annual trade has jumped to $5bn (€3.3bn, £3bn) since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. It will rise to $10bn this year and $20bn in 2010. There are 1,200 foreign companies in Iraqi Kurdistan, half of which are Turkish; 90 per cent of goods sold in Iraqi Kurdistan are made in Turkey.
In addition, Iraqi Kurdistan has 45bn barrels in estimated oil reserves and huge natural gas fields that Turkey needs to fuel its economy and to fill the Nabucco pipeline with supplies for Europe. A Turkish energy company, Genel Enerjy, has signed production-sharing agreements for the Tak Tak and Tawke oilfields in Iraqi Kurdistan that will produce 1m barrels per day – more than 20 times Turkey’s current domestic production.
There is an old adage that, “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. Yet they increasingly see Turkey as a prudent power and protector. They recall it was a haven to almost a million Iraqi Kurds who fled to the mountains after the Gulf war in 1991. However, they know Turkey will not act out of the goodness of her heart. It will guarantee security in Iraqi Kurdistan because it enables her to influence the balance of power in Iraq.
Turkey’s security establishment is obsessed with Iraq’s territorial integrity. It fears the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would inspire Kurds in Turkey to seek greater self-rule. Recent statements by Masoud Barzani, Iraqi Kurdistan’s president, have helped calm Turkish anxieties; Mr Barzani affirms that Iraqi Kurds accept their fate as part of a democratic, federal republic of Iraq in which political power and control of natural resources are decentralised.
In the 1990s, Ankara denied the very existence of Turkish Kurds, calling them “mountain Turks”. It declared a state of emergency and launched a scorched earth policy that devastated the country’s south-east where Kurds reside. Recently, however, it has taken a more conciliatory approach.
While maintaining security, the government of prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expanded cultural rights and invested heavily in social services and infrastructure in Kurdish areas. Building on Turkey’s repentance law, it is also beginning to explore some kind of PKK amnesty. It has turned to the Kurdish Regional Government to accelerate the PKK’s demobilisation by more vigorously disrupting cash flow, weapons supplies and the organisation’s logistics.
The interests of Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan currently converge, but co-operation could founder unless both sides accommodate the core interests of the other. Without progress on Turkey’s PKK problem, neither side will realise the full scope of benefits from today’s positive trends.
Iraqis have stepped back from the brink by agreeing on a law that will allow elections to go forward in January. While this averts postponement of the ballot, which would have required the US to recalibrate its withdrawal from Iraq, the contentious process is a harbinger of difficulties to come. Once elections are held, Iraqis still have to establish a coalition government and overcome deep divisions on issues such as hydrocarbons, revenue-sharing and the status of Kirkuk, a city claimed by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. Given these flashpoints, Iraqi Kurds are placing as much importance on relations with Ankara as with Baghdad. Turkey is also hedging her bets in case Iraq’s elections trigger sustained violence that polarises Iraqis and destabilises the region.
It was only in February last year that Turkey massed 100,000 troops for a major cross-border operation to root out the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) from its hide-out in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. In a dramatic reversal, Ahmet Davudoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, made a historic visit to Iraqi Kurdistan just two weeks ago to sign landmark deals opening a Turkish consulate in Erbil and border-crossings for travel and trade. Both sides have made the strategic decision that their interests are better served through co-operation than confrontation.
The rapprochement is born from pragmatism and geographic necessity. Kurds know that their future lies to the west, not as a landlocked rump state in the Middle East. Their access to Europe goes through Turkey. Conversely, Iraqi Kurdistan is Turkey’s gate to Iraq and lucrative relations with the Gulf states. Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan are natural economic partners. Their annual trade has jumped to $5bn (€3.3bn, £3bn) since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. It will rise to $10bn this year and $20bn in 2010. There are 1,200 foreign companies in Iraqi Kurdistan, half of which are Turkish; 90 per cent of goods sold in Iraqi Kurdistan are made in Turkey.
In addition, Iraqi Kurdistan has 45bn barrels in estimated oil reserves and huge natural gas fields that Turkey needs to fuel its economy and to fill the Nabucco pipeline with supplies for Europe. A Turkish energy company, Genel Enerjy, has signed production-sharing agreements for the Tak Tak and Tawke oilfields in Iraqi Kurdistan that will produce 1m barrels per day – more than 20 times Turkey’s current domestic production.
There is an old adage that, “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. Yet they increasingly see Turkey as a prudent power and protector. They recall it was a haven to almost a million Iraqi Kurds who fled to the mountains after the Gulf war in 1991. However, they know Turkey will not act out of the goodness of her heart. It will guarantee security in Iraqi Kurdistan because it enables her to influence the balance of power in Iraq.
Turkey’s security establishment is obsessed with Iraq’s territorial integrity. It fears the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would inspire Kurds in Turkey to seek greater self-rule. Recent statements by Masoud Barzani, Iraqi Kurdistan’s president, have helped calm Turkish anxieties; Mr Barzani affirms that Iraqi Kurds accept their fate as part of a democratic, federal republic of Iraq in which political power and control of natural resources are decentralised.
In the 1990s, Ankara denied the very existence of Turkish Kurds, calling them “mountain Turks”. It declared a state of emergency and launched a scorched earth policy that devastated the country’s south-east where Kurds reside. Recently, however, it has taken a more conciliatory approach.
While maintaining security, the government of prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expanded cultural rights and invested heavily in social services and infrastructure in Kurdish areas. Building on Turkey’s repentance law, it is also beginning to explore some kind of PKK amnesty. It has turned to the Kurdish Regional Government to accelerate the PKK’s demobilisation by more vigorously disrupting cash flow, weapons supplies and the organisation’s logistics.
The interests of Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan currently converge, but co-operation could founder unless both sides accommodate the core interests of the other. Without progress on Turkey’s PKK problem, neither side will realise the full scope of benefits from today’s positive trends.
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